Regulating private military companies: What role for the EU?

Following allegations that private security guards were involved in the torture of Iraqi prisoners and in the wake an attempted coup by private mercenaries in Equatorial Guinea, the proliferation of so-called ‘private military companies’ (PMCs) is receiving considerable attention. Of particular concern is the lack of effective national and international controls of the industry. This article argues that much of the current debate about PMCs underestimates the extent of regulation that directly or indirectly applies to the industry. Especially in Europe, private military services are increasingly controlled by national and international legislation. The European Union (EU) plays a crucial role in this development because of two factors. First, the EU's free internal market in goods and services is putting pressure on the EU to harmonize national regulations on private security and policing and thus regulate the ‘soft’ end of the private military industry. Second, the growing role of the EU in foreign and defence issues is leading the EU to act as a driving force in assuring the implementation of non-proliferation policies among its member states. Following an examination of national and EU policies on the provision and export of specific private military services, this article concludes that, as the overlap and tensions between national and international policies grows, the EU is coming under increasing pressures to create common controls which subsume both

The Financial Flows of the Transnational Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Results

Until 2008, the growth of the world economy was quite strong and improved the economic well-being all over the globe, but this development was also accompanied by some risks. One of them is transnational crime, which has shown a remarkable increase in the last 20 years3. This raises the following two questions: (1) How is transnational crime financed, and what do we know about this financing? (2) What economic implications does transnational crime have? In this contribution question (2) will be very briefly answered, however the main focus lies on providing a more detailed answer on the financing of transnational crime (question 1). Additionally a detailed analysis of the finances of transnational crime is crucial to reduce their financial options, so that the basis of their operations is at least limited. Such an analysis is another goal of this chapter. My paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a literature review on the kinds of transnational crime financing. Section 3 shows the infiltration of transnational crime into the economic system. In section 4 some conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn.

Firing blanks? The Arms Trade Treaty

This paper assesses key provisions of the ATT by first back-grounding its origins and contested formulation before assessing its transfer, prohibition and national control provisions, Introduction The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by vote at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in April 2013 and opened for signatures two months later. It was approved by 154 states (later revised to 156), three against (Iran, Syria and North Korea), its 23 abstentions including some of the world’s key arms exporters and manufacturers (China, Russia, India) and leading arms buyers (Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). The treaty formally enters into force on December 24 2014 having received its requisite fiftieth ratification (including Australia and New Zealand) three months earlier. The United States reversed the previous Bush Administration’s opposition and signed the ATT in September 2013. In brief, the ATT introduces specific, legally binding measures to regulate international trade, transit and brokering of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW). Before authorising transfers, states parties must subject them to criteria established under a mandatory national control system. The treaty prohibits transfers where a UN authorised arms embargo is in place, where there is violation of international agreements relating to the transfer or illicit trafficking of conventional arms, or where risks of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes are known to exist. Where such prohibitions do not apply, an assessment is required as to whether a transfer risks undermining peace and security, potential violation of human rights, mounting of terrorist attacks, or conduct of organised crime. States parties are required to report annually to the UN on international exports and imports of conventional arms, and on the national laws and administrative procedures adopted for ATT implementation

Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Strengthening Domestic Regulations

yesSmall arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice in conflicts around the world and figure prominently in crime. Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and international level. The recognition that m o s t illicit SALW began as legal weapons is, however, fundamental to efforts to reduce the proliferation and misuse of SALW and the diversion of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Indeed, it is estimated that there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians worldwide as there are in the possession of states, and that in many parts of the world diversion from civilian stocks is the principal source of the illicit supply. Consequently, strengthening domestic regulation, which reduces the diversion of legal weapons to illegal markets, is a critical part of any strategy to address illicit trafficking. It is also consistent with resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and other Commissions as well as regional initiatives. This briefing reviews the ways in which SALW are diverted from legal to illegal markets and the measures which can be used to reduce this diversion. In addressing illicit trafficking in all its aspects, it is imperative that the UN Conference not does neglect this significant problem

The Difference Borders Make: (Il)legality, Migration and Trafficking in Italy among Eastern European Women in Prostitution

About the book: Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration is a groundbreaking exploration of the parallel and entwined meanings of home and migration. Contributors draw on feminist and postcolonial theory to explore topics including Irish, Palestinian, and indigenous attachments to ‘soils of significance’; the making of and trafficking across European borders; the female body as a symbol of home or nation; and the shifting grounds of ‘queer’ migrations and ‘creole’ identities. This innovative analysis will open up avenues of research and inspire new debate

The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Transnational Crime Organizations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results

The financial means of international terror and transnational organized crime organizations are analyzed. First, some short remarks about the organization of international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is provided about the financing of terrorist and transnational organized crime organizations, their sources and the various methods they use. Third, an attempt is made to estimate the financial means of terror organizations with the help of a latent estimation approach (MIMIC procedure). The figures show that Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have sufficient financial means. Fourth, some remarks are made about the negative effects of terror on the economy in highly developed countries and some strategies are presented to combat (the financing) of terrorism.Financial flows of terrorist organizations, financial flows of transnational organized crime, Hawala banking, money laundering, transnational organized crime, terrorist organizations, kinds of terrorist financing