Effectiveness in the Realisation of Speaker Authentication

© 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.An important consideration for the deployment of speaker recognition in authentication applications is the approach to the formation of training and testing utterances . Whilst defining this for a specific scenario is influenced by the associated requirements and conditions, the process can be further guided through the establishment of the relative usefulness of alternative frameworks for composing the training and testing material. In this regard, the present paper provides an analysis of the effects, on the speaker recognition accuracy, of various bases for the formation of the training and testing data. The experimental investigations are conducted based on the use of digit utterances taken from the XM2VTS database. The paper presents a detailed description of the individual approaches considered and discusses the experimental results obtained in different cases

MCE 2018: The 1st Multi-target Speaker Detection and Identification Challenge Evaluation

The Multi-target Challenge aims to assess how well current speech technology is able to determine whether or not a recorded utterance was spoken by one of a large number of blacklisted speakers. It is a form of multi-target speaker detection based on real-world telephone conversations. Data recordings are generated from call center customer-agent conversations. The task is to measure how accurately one can detect 1) whether a test recording is spoken by a blacklisted speaker, and 2) which specific blacklisted speaker was talking. This paper outlines the challenge and provides its baselines, results, and discussions.Comment: http://mce.csail.mit.edu . arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1807.0666

Efficient Invariant Features for Sensor Variability Compensation in Speaker Recognition

In this paper, we investigate the use of invariant features for speaker recognition. Owing to their characteristics, these features are introduced to cope with the difficult and challenging problem of sensor variability and the source of performance degradation inherent in speaker recognition systems. Our experiments show: (1) the effectiveness of these features in match cases; (2) the benefit of combining these features with the mel frequency cepstral coefficients to exploit their discrimination power under uncontrolled conditions (mismatch cases). Consequently, the proposed invariant features result in a performance improvement as demonstrated by a reduction in the equal error rate and the minimum decision cost function compared to the GMM-UBM speaker recognition systems based on MFCC features

Practical Hidden Voice Attacks against Speech and Speaker Recognition Systems

Voice Processing Systems (VPSes), now widely deployed, have been made significantly more accurate through the application of recent advances in machine learning. However, adversarial machine learning has similarly advanced and has been used to demonstrate that VPSes are vulnerable to the injection of hidden commands - audio obscured by noise that is correctly recognized by a VPS but not by human beings. Such attacks, though, are often highly dependent on white-box knowledge of a specific machine learning model and limited to specific microphones and speakers, making their use across different acoustic hardware platforms (and thus their practicality) limited. In this paper, we break these dependencies and make hidden command attacks more practical through model-agnostic (blackbox) attacks, which exploit knowledge of the signal processing algorithms commonly used by VPSes to generate the data fed into machine learning systems. Specifically, we exploit the fact that multiple source audio samples have similar feature vectors when transformed by acoustic feature extraction algorithms (e.g., FFTs). We develop four classes of perturbations that create unintelligible audio and test them against 12 machine learning models, including 7 proprietary models (e.g., Google Speech API, Bing Speech API, IBM Speech API, Azure Speaker API, etc), and demonstrate successful attacks against all targets. Moreover, we successfully use our maliciously generated audio samples in multiple hardware configurations, demonstrating effectiveness across both models and real systems. In so doing, we demonstrate that domain-specific knowledge of audio signal processing represents a practical means of generating successful hidden voice command attacks

Protecting Voice Controlled Systems Using Sound Source Identification Based on Acoustic Cues

Over the last few years, a rapidly increasing number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems that adopt voice as the primary user input have emerged. These systems have been shown to be vulnerable to various types of voice spoofing attacks. Existing defense techniques can usually only protect from a specific type of attack or require an additional authentication step that involves another device. Such defense strategies are either not strong enough or lower the usability of the system. Based on the fact that legitimate voice commands should only come from humans rather than a playback device, we propose a novel defense strategy that is able to detect the sound source of a voice command based on its acoustic features. The proposed defense strategy does not require any information other than the voice command itself and can protect a system from multiple types of spoofing attacks. Our proof-of-concept experiments verify the feasibility and effectiveness of this defense strategy.Comment: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN), Hangzhou, China, July-August 2018. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1803.0915