The EEAS and the eastern partnership: let the blame game stop

In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so

Intra-institutional coordination and inter-institutional negotiations: The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)

Analyses of the rising capacity for coordination within the Secretariats-General of the European Commission and Council have concentrated on their effects within these respective institutions. This article, in contrast, argues that the presence/absence of coordination capacities developed within an institution may have an important bearing also on the relations between institutions (e.g., in inter-institutional negotiations). The empirical analysis traces the negotiation process leading up to the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and finds substantial support for the theoretical argument. --Coordination,European Union,EEAS,inter-institutional negotiations

Europe ́s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management The EU’s Integrated Approach between Political Rhetoric and Institutional Practice. November 2019

The European Union (EU) aspires to play a part in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace- building through civil and/or military operations, through stabilisation efforts, and by building resilience at home and abroad. To bring this ambition to fruition, EU institutions have gradually expanded their ‘comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis’ (CA) to become a full-fledged ‘integrated approach to conflict and crisis’ (IA).1 In their most basic form, CAs seek coordination and coherence in responding to external conflicts and crises by adopting a system-wide ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA). In their more elaborate form, IAs have incorpo- rated non-traditional security concepts, variously known as conflict transformation, (non-liberal) peacebuilding and human-security approaches. In their most expansive form, IAs may even be understood to apply to external action writ large

Now We Are One...A Rough Start for the EEAS

The first year of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has already elicited much comment, both internally and externally. This contribution briefly reviews the nature of this commentary and then suggests some possible short-term ‘wins’ for the Service, as well as some challenges that will require a longer-term perspective. The main shorter-term issue considers the need to create stronger linkages and priorities between existing strategies and to start the difficult process of melding a common mindset within the Service. The longer-term challenges revolve around recruitment, balance and resources. The latter is particularly important in order to enable the delegations to assume their full roles. The barrage of criticism that greeted the EEAS’s first birthday is also a commentary on how critical the role of the Service is to achieving the core goals of the Lisbon Treaty in external relations; namely, to aim towards more coherence, effectiveness and visibility

Madam Ambassador: A Statistical Comparison of Female Ambassadors across the U.S.,German, and EU Foreign Services. College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 03/2019

Since the end of the Cold War, transatlantic partners have championed enlightenment principles and progressive values around the world, including gender equality. The extent to which the actors tasked with spreading these fundamental values also embody them within their own organizations – in this case within the diplomatic profession – is the focus of this research. This paper examines how women’s representation at the ambassadorial level has changed from 1990 to 2018 across the foreign services of the U.S., Germany, and the European Union (EU). A dataset constructed especially for this study compares: (1) the numbers of female ambassadors over time, (2) the ‘types’ of posts they are sent to, and (3) recruitment pipelines and training, including special characteristics like political appointments in the U.S. and different origins of EU ambassadors. The results show that the U.S. foreign service peaks at 40% women’s representation in 2017, the EU at 22% in 2014, and Germany only at 14.5% in 2018. Females disproportionately serve in small African nations, multilateral organizations, and former Soviet states. Female U.S. ambassadors are more likely to come from the career track, while political appointees are overwhelmingly male, at a ratio of 4:1. In Europe, two-thirds of female ambassadors previously worked at the European Commission and one-third in their national foreign service, while founding Member States – especially France, Germany, and Italy – are dominant. Interviews with seasoned diplomats help illuminate and contextualize the underlying causes that potentially drive these trends, including policy, historical, or cultural factors. Looking towards the future, this work provides a small, yet important building block in rooting the concept of gender equality firmly within the success strategy of each diplomatic corps. A future generation of foreign policy leaders depends on it

Towards a new European Global Security Strategy: challenges and Opportunities

This report briefly examines the interplay between the European security strategic vision and capabilities, its institutional architecture and policy implementation practices, with a particular focus on the EU consular affairs, EU democracy promotion and EU engagement in frozen conflicts under the Neighbourhood Policy (Appendices 1-3). This report contends that in order for the EU to develop an effective and sustainable global security strategy, it first, has to reconcile the vision of its strategic priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional settings. Second, a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security, which does not only focus on the internal dimensions of the EU Security strategy (capabilities), but also equally draws on its external aspects - a genuinely inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensions of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed. Finally, while legitimation of the new security vision is essential within the EU, a greater emphasis should be placed on its external environment, which must not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy instruments as suggested by the EEAs, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs of third parties. Case-studies in appendices elaborate further on some specific aspects of the EU security within the eastern neighbourhood context

Why the EU is failing in its neighbourhood: the case of Armenia

As the Arab Spring has made clear, the EU’s strategic aim of being surrounded by a ring of secure, democratic, and prosperous friends has not yet materialized. While most previous analyses have found fault with inconsistent application of conditionality, this article locates the root of the problem with an the EU’s institutional set-up. Starting from interviews and documentary analysis, it uses Armenia as a case study to demonstrate how competition within and between the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission has led to internal, horizontal, and vertical inconsistencies that have seriously hampered the EU’s capacity to promote reforms. If recent institutional reforms have been designed to address precisely these problems, sociological rational choice and historical institutionalism suggest that it remains to be seen to what extent these recent reforms and initiatives will be able to bring about a change substantial enough to make the EU more successful in its neighbourhood

The EU as a security actor in Africa

Instability and conflict in Africa create a range of security problems for Europe. Rapidly increasing migration via the Mediterranean Sea, extremism and terrorism, as well as cross-border crime, all have implications for security in Europe, but are spill-over effects of instability outside Europe. The European Union has a considerable interest in a stable Africa, and also seems willing to assume a special responsibility for the continent. This Clingendael report focuses on the European Union’s role as a security actor in Africa. It considers the use of all the policy instruments at the EU’s disposal. The authors concentrate mainly on the question how the integrated approach is evolving, and what consequences this has for the Common Security and Defence Policy

Humanitarian aid as an integral part of the European Union's external action: the challenge of reconciling coherence and independence

The article focuses on the European Union's (EU) humanitarian aid policy. It addresses the challenge for the EU to deliver independent humanitarian aid while simultaneously seeking to establish more coherence between its external policies. The article examines how the EU tries to reconcile these potentially conflicting policy goals, both de jure and in practice. Empirically, it explores the interaction between EU humanitarian aid and development cooperation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and trade policy. While the independence of the humanitarian aid delivery is, for the most part, not being undermined, it remains difficult to establish positive synergies with other external policies because of institutional hurdles and legal constraints, as well as political obstacles and operational incompatibilities