Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods: The Impact of Competing Secondary Markets

A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer's designing contracts that give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer's point of view (see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the manufacturer's marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization problem. Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the marginal cost. Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This contract is identical to "selling the firm to the retailer" at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels. Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit equal to an integrated renter's profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers. We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods context and identifying a new coordination problemunlike the traditional coordination models, a durable goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the traditional "selling the firm to the retailer," approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.

Durable Goods Cpmpetition in Secondary Electronic Markets

We develop a game-theoretic framework to investigate the competitive implications of consumer-to-consumer electronic marketplaces, which promote concurrent selling of new and used goods. In many e-marketplaces, where suppliers cannot directly use second-hand goods for practicing inter-temporal price discrimination, the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods become significant. We examine conditions under which it is optimal for suppliers to operate in such markets, explaining why used-goods markets may not be predatory for them. While a monopolist supplier is worse off in the presence of a secondary market, competition can in fact make it better off. The presence of used-goods markets provides an active outlet for some consumers to sell their second-hand goods. Such sales lead to an increase in their disposable income. This increased income can then be used to buy an additional new good. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our model predicts the reduction in the price of new goods when there are used-goods markets. We highlight the strategic role that used goods commission plays in determining optimal profits. Overall, for a wide range of parameters, there is an increase in social welfare from establishing such secondary markets

Effect of Electronic Secondary Markets on the Supply Chain

We present a model to investigate the competitive implications of electronic secondary markets that promote concurrent selling of new and used goods on a supply chain. In secondary markets where suppliers cannot directly utilize used goods for practicing intertemporal price discrimination and where transaction costs of resales is negligible, the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods become significant. We examine conditions under which it is optimal for suppliers to operate in such markets, explaining why these markets may not always be detrimental for them. Intuitively, secondary markets provide an active outlet for some highvaluation consumers to sell their used goods. The potential for such resales lead to an 05 ghose.pmd 91 8/26/2005, 1:10 PM 92 GHOSE, TELANG, AND KRISHNAN increase in consumersâ valuation for a new good, leading them to buy an additional new good. Given sufficient heterogeneity in consumerâ s affinity across multiple suppliersâ products, the â market expansion effectâ accruing from consumersâ cross-product purchase affinity can mitigate the losses incurred by suppliers from the direct â cannibalization effect.â We also highlight the strategic role that used goods commission set by the retailer plays in determining profits for suppliers. We conclude the paper by empirically testing some implications of our model using a unique data set from the online book industry, which has a flourishing secondary market.NYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc

Are ATM/POS Data Relevant When Nowcasting Private Consumption?

Policymakers need timely and reliable information on the current state of the economy as macroeconomic forecasts and policy decisions are strongly affected by the quality and completeness of this assessment. Therefore, forecasters are always in search of new indicators that are related with the macroeconomic variable of interest and available earlier. This paper proposes the use of the ATM/POS data as an indicator to estimate private consumption. An application for Portugal is presented as a case study, where the out of sample performance of this indicator is evaluated against some benchmark naïve models and other alternative bridge models. The results clearly support the use of this information to nowcast non durables private consumption.

Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets

Markets for durable goods constitute an important part of the economy. In this paper I first briefly review the microeconomic theory literature on durable-goods markets, focusing mostly on the last ten years. I then discuss a number of my own recent analyses concerning optimal antitrust policy in durable-goods markets that mostly build on ideas in the larger literature. Specific topics covered include: (i) optimal antitrust policy for durable-goods mergers; (ii) practices that eliminate secondhand markets; (iii) tying in markets characterized by upgrades and switching costs; and (iv) antitrust policy for aftermarket monopolization in durable-goods markets.

Are secondary markets beneficial for a virtual world operator?

Selling virtual goods for real money has become the dominant business model for virtual worlds in the past decade. As the amount of money involved in virtual goods sales increases, market performance questions gain relevance. In this thesis, we examine the effects of secondary markets on the profitability of a virtual world service provider operating under a virtual goods sales model. More specifically, we ask whether the service provider should tolerate secondary markets or seek to kill them off. The structure of this thesis is as follows: we first review how virtual worlds operate as businesses and provide an analysis of the market conditions faced by a virtual world operator to provide sufficient context for the reader. We then examine the inner workings of virtual economies and review structures commonly encountered within them. Next, we conduct a literature review on real world secondary market models and analyses. Finally, we evaluate the implications of real world secondary market results on secondary markets for virtual goods. In the final section, we present conclusions and possible avenues for further study. We find that recent durable goods research suggests that a profit-maximizing monopolist will not shut down secondary markets, but will choose to reduce durability of goods instead and that these results can apply to virtual worlds as well. However, we also show that the question of allowing or not allowing secondary markets cannot be answered based on profitability alone and that service providers have to also account for externalities brought on by secondary markets

Dynamic Adverse Selection and the Size of the Informed Side of the Market

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if a simple piece of information is made publicly available: the size of the informed side of the market. Moreover, we show that if exchanges can take place frequently enough, then agents roughly enjoy the entire potential surplus from exchanges. We illustrate these findings with a dynamic model of trade where buyers and sellers repeatedly interact over time. More precisely we prove that, if the size of the informed side of the market is a public information at each trading stage, then there exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all goods are sold in finite time and where the price and quality of traded goods are increasing over time. Moreover, we show that as the time between exchanges becomes arbitrarily small, full trade still obtains in finite time – i.e., all goods are actually traded in equilibrium – while total surplus from exchanges converges to the entire potential. These results suggest two policy interventions in markets suffering from dynamic adverse selection: first, the public disclosure of the size of the informed side of the market in each trading stage and, second, the increase of the frequency of trading stages.dynamic adverse selection; full trade; size of the informed side; frequency of exchanges; asymmetric information

Dynamic Adverse Selection and the Size of the Informed Side of the Market

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if a simple piece of information is made publicly available: the size of the informed side of the market. Moreover, we show that if exchanges can take place frequently enough, then agents roughly enjoy the entire potential surplus from exchanges. We illustrate these findings with a dynamic model of trade where buyers and sellers repeatedly interact over time. More precisely we prove that, if the size of the informed side of the market is a public information at each trading stage, then there exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all goods are sold in finite time and where the price and quality of traded goods are increasing over time. Moreover, we show that as the time between exchanges becomes arbitrarily small, full trade still obtains in finite time – i.e., all goods are actually traded in equilibrium while total surplus from exchanges converges to the entire potential. These results suggest two policy interventions in markets suffering from dynamic adverse selection: first, the public disclosure of the size of the informed side of the market in each trading stage and, second, the increase of the frequency of trading stagesdynamic adverse selection; full trade; size of the informed side; frequency of exchanges; asymmetric information