EASTERN ADRIATIC CITIES AND THEIR ROLE IN VENETIAN (LONG-DISTANCE) COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE 13TH AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE 14TH CENTURY – AN OVERVIEW

The main strategy was to maintain the sea route from the northernmost point of the Adriatic to the Levant, and to introduce the necessary legal, commercial, and administrative practices modelled upon its own. During the 13th and 14th centuries Venice worked on gaining military and economic control over the Eastern Adriatic and “prepared the ground” for its later long dominance in that area. In this period, from Venetian perspective, the cities were primarily strategic and exchange points – and were increasingly perceived as the natural hub of connections between the Mediterranean and Central Europe or the West and the Levant. The infrastructures that supported the Venetian long-distance trade in the 13th and 14th centuries were related to security, equipment, and the possibility of transit, as well as supplying enough manpower on the way.The main strategy was to maintain the sea route from the northernmost point of the Adriatic to the Levant, and to introduce the necessary legal, commercial, and administrative practices modelled upon its own. During the 13th and 14th centuries Venice worked on gaining military and economic control over the Eastern Adriatic and “prepared the ground” for its later long dominance in that area. In this period, from Venetian perspective, the cities were primarily strategic and exchange points – and were increasingly perceived as the natural hub of connections between the Mediterranean and Central Europe or the West and the Levant. The infrastructures that supported the Venetian long-distance trade in the 13th and 14th centuries were related to security, equipment, and the possibility of transit, as well as supplying enough manpower on the way

The legal position of the Dubrovnik Republic against Turkey in the 15th and early 16th century and its efforts to introduce the so-called "Dubrovnik duty" in 1521

The author's aim was to analyse the legal situation of the Dubrovnik Republic and Dubrovnik merchants operating in the lands subject to the Sultans in the 15th and early 16th centuries. The conclusion was that in the early period the position was secured individually by obtaining salvus conductus. The imposition of vassal status on the Republic by the Turks (finally in 1458) was linked to the necessity of paying tribute, but at the same time there was a uniform regulation of the status of Dubrovnik merchants. During the reigns of Mehmed II and Selim, attitudes towards the Raguzans were hostile (increasing tribute, increasing customs duties) and merchants suffered oppression. The benevolent attitude of the young Suleiman resulted in the institution of the so-called Dubrovnik customs in 1521, whose favourable arrangements became one of the foundations of Raguzan prosperity under the protection of the sultans in the following century

Venetian Rule over Dubrovnik in the Early Thirteenth Century and the “Leased Countship” of Giovanni Dandolo (c. 1209-1235)

Based on a variety of sources, this article aims to investigate the character of Venetian rule over Dubrovnik in the first decades of the thirteenth century, drawing a parallel with the administrative models in other Venetian possessions. The abundance of documents related to the countship of Giovanni Dandolo (1209?-1235) allows the reconstruction of the count’s family and social background, his earnings from the Ragusan function, as well as an insight into his business pursuits. In addition, some old approaches are reassessed and new interpretations of the Ragusan political situation of that time⸺impacted by international developments in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and the Ragusan hinterland⸺are offered. Analysed and interpreted are the first two pacts between Dubrovnik and Venice (1232, 1236), along with the reasons for their conclusion

The Adriatic, Gulf of Venice? Trade, ports and relations in the late Middle Ages

Aux xive et xve siècles, Venise, placée favorablement en Méditerranée, à proximité des grands fleuves et de cols alpins qui conduisent en Lombardie ou en Allemagne et en Flandre, tente d’imposer un monopole de navigation et de commerce à la mer Adriatique considérée comme son Golfe. Elle bénéficie de son avance technique et de son organisation (l’Arsenal), de ses bateaux (nefs coques, galères), de ses connaissances financières, de sa richesse et de l’expérience acquise par ses marchands sur les places du Levant comme à l’Ouest. Cité sans campagne (ville sans contado), elle fait venir de l’extérieur, par la mer ou par les fleuves, tout ce qui est nécessaire à sa population (matériaux de construction, bois de chauffage, et tout le vivre, céréales, vin, huile et bétail) et à son industrie navale ou textile (draperie et soierie), elle craint de manquer et met à contribution une vaste partie de l’Europe, Pourtant, elle se heurte à de graves difficultés en Adriatique même, à la piraterie, aux puissances riveraines, aux ports concurrents, Raguse et Ancône, à l’intrusion du capital et de marchands toscans dans les ports de Dalmatie, elle cherche à appliquer son monopole aux territoires qu’elle domine politiquement et qui constituent son empire, mais, par peur de la contrebande qui ruinerait ses recettes douanières et fiscales, elle réduit l’activité maritime et commerciale de ses territoires-sujets. Les marchands vénitiens font certes commerce où ils veulent mais dès qu’ils entrent en Adriatique, ils doivent se rendre à Venise avec leurs marchandises et non dans un autre port. Venise semble forte de sa puissance assise sur des points d’appui solides et sur la faiblesse de ses adversaires: si Gênes n’est plus une menace, de nouveaux dangers menacent en Adriatique même, les Turcs ottomans contre qui Venise commence à mener d’épuisantes guerres.In the 14th and 15th centuries, Venice, favorably positioned in the Mediterranean, near the great rivers and Alpine passes that led to Lombardy, Germany and Flanders, tried to impose a monopoly on navigation and trade in the Adriatic Sea, which was considered its Gulf. It benefited from its technical advance and its organization (the Arsenal), its ships (hulls, galleys), its financial knowledge, its wealth and the experience acquired by its merchants in the places of the Levant as well as in the West. City without countryside (city without contado), it makes come from outside, by the sea or by the rivers, all that is necessary for its population (building materials, firewood, and all the food, cereals, wine, oil and cattle) and for its naval or textile industry (drapery and silk), it fears to miss and puts at contribution a vast part of Europe, However, it runs up against serious difficulties in the Adriatic itself, However, it faced serious difficulties in the Adriatic itself, with piracy, with the riparian powers, with the competing ports of Ragusa and Ancona, with the intrusion of capital and Tuscan merchants in the ports of Dalmatia, it tried to apply its monopoly to the territories that it dominated politically and that constituted its empire, but, for fear of smuggling that would ruin its customs and tax revenues, it reduced the maritime and commercial activity of its subject territories. Venetian merchants could trade wherever they wanted, but as soon as they entered the Adriatic, they had to go to Venice with their goods and not to another port. Venice seems strong of its power based on solid points of support and on the weakness of its adversaries: if Genoa is not any more a threat, new dangers threaten in the Adriatic itself, the Ottoman Turks against whom Venice begins to lead exhausting wars

Venetian Rule over Dubrovnik in the Early Thirteenth Century and the “Leased Countship” of Giovanni Dandolo (c. 1209-1235)

Based on a variety of sources, this article aims to investigate the character of Venetian rule over Dubrovnik in the first decades of the thirteenth century, drawing a parallel with the administrative models in other Venetian possessions. The abundance of documents related to the countship of Giovanni Dandolo (1209?-1235) allows the reconstruction of the count’s family and social background, his earnings from the Ragusan function, as well as an insight into his business pursuits. In addition, some old approaches are reassessed and new interpretations of the Ragusan political situation of that time⸺impacted by international developments in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and the Ragusan hinterland⸺are offered. Analysed and interpreted are the first two pacts between Dubrovnik and Venice (1232, 1236), along with the reasons for their conclusion

Venetian Rule over Dubrovnik in the Early Thirteenth Century and the ‘Leased Countship’ of Giovanni Dandolo (c. 1209-1235)

Na temelju raznovrsnih vrela ispituje se karakter mletačke vlasti u Dubrovniku u prvim desetljećima 13. stoljeća i uspoređuje s upravnim modelima na drugim mletačkim posjedima. Zahvaljujući obilju dokumenata vezanih uz kneževanje Giovannija Dandola (1209?-1235) utvrđuje se knežev socijalni background, rekonstruiraju njegovi prihodi od dubrovačke funkcije i razmatraju mogući poslovni interesi. Ujedno se preispituju stari i nude neki novi pogledi na dubrovačku političku situaciju toga doba pod utjecajem međunarodnih silnica na Jadranu, Sredozemlju i u kopnenom zaleđu. Analiziraju se i interpretiraju prva dva sporazuma s Venecijom (1232, 1236) i razlozi za njihovo zaključenje, uz osvrt na historiografsku tezu o dubrovačkim pobunama protiv mletačke vlasti.This article sheds light on the character of the Venetian rule in Dubrovnik in the first decades of the thirteenth century, drawing a parallel with the governmental models in other Venetian dominions after the Fourth Crusade. The predecessors of Count Giovanni Tiepolo (1237-1238) held their public office (comitatus) under some sort of lease. A wealth of documents regarding Count Giovanni Dandolo (1209?-1235) has helped trace the count’s social background (including his kin relations with Doge Pietro Ziani), along with the family business activities in the eastern Mediterranean at the end of the twelfth century. Prior to the opportunity to lease the office of Ragusan count, Dandolo was engaged in trade in Syria, and together with his brother Marco leased the collection of revenue in the Venetian colonies in Acre and Tyre, but eventually faced insolvency. The reconstruction of the income from his Ragusan countship suggests that his profit gains may have approximated 20% where in low risk and negligible investment costs were the main benefits. It appear likely that Dandolo developed his private business activities while on duty in Dubrovnik, in the same manner as he had done on the former leased functions. The article is also reconsidering old and offering new interpretations of the Ragusan political situation of the time under the influence of international powers in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and Dubrovnik’s hinterland. There is good reason to assume that the term guerre mentioned in the documents does not refer to the supposed attack of Stefan, Grand Župan of Serbia, but to the pirates of Omiš, whose activity represented a biggest challenge to the maritime traffic. In the 1230s Dubrovnik defined its relations with a number of rulers and despots from its immediate hinterland and wider Balkan inland (Serbian kings Radoslav and Vladislav; Andrija, Count of Hum; Bulgarian emperor John II Asen; Manuel Angelos, Despot of Thessaly; and Michael II Angelos, Despot of Epirus), yet its fate was largely determined by the power relations in the eastern Mediterranean, in which Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen and Emperor John III Vatatzes of Nicaea played an important role. A detailed textual and comparative analysis of the first two agreements (pacta) with Venice from 1232 and 1236 has shown that, contrary to the dominant historiographic paradigm, they were not drafted after crushed rebellions and that in many elements they proved less harmful to the Ragusan side than hitherto interpreted. The texts of these agreements are virtually the same, and were modelled on the agreement signed between Venice and Zadar in 1204 or early 1205. Count Dandolo’s departure from Dubrovnik in 1234 marked the beginning of an interregnum which extended to 1237, while the unsettled property issues of his descendants with the Ragusan commune dragged on for years. Upon Dandolo’s death, Venetian authorities did not lease the office of Ragusan count to a new holder, as they were preparing a new administrative arrangement (regimen), in which the office of Ragusan count was to be filled by state officials elected to a two-year term

Tra argento, grano e panni

Placed in a favourable position between land and sea, in the XV century Ragusa (Dubrovnik) was the protagonist of the commercial exchanges in the Mediterranean and represented an important reference point for all the merchants who turned to Constantinople. There were three goods in particular around which the small Republic built its fortune, attracting the attention of many merchants (especially Italians): the silver from the Balkan mines, the Apulian wheat and woolen cloths. In this volume the reconstruction of the international dimension of Ragusa passes through the review of multiple studies, coming especially from the Slavic area, conducted during the second half of the twentieth century, supplemented by a rich unpublished public, notary and corporate documentation kept in the Ragusa and Italian archives. In particular, the accounting records and correspondence of Piero Pantella, a Piacenza merchant who moved to Ragusa in 1415, were taken into consideration, from which the significant commercial activity that the merchant carried out in the Dalmatian city emerges, but also the important role that he covered in the development of the Ragusa textile manufacture

The conflict between the Angevins and the Byzantines in Morea in 1267-1289: A Late Byzantine endemic war

This article attempts to reconstruct a late Byzantine low-level war, namely the conflict in the Morea during 1267-1289, which took place between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the one side, and the Byzantines on the other side. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Special attention is given to the economic and demographic consequences of war for Morea, for the building of fortresses, and to the idea put forward in previous research that the war in Morea needlessly took resources away from the defense of Anatolia – thus contributing to the loss of the area to the Turks.This article attempts to reconstruct a late Byzantine low-level war, namely the conflict in the Morea during 1267-1289, which took place between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the one side, and the Byzantines on the other side. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Special attention is given to the economic and demographic consequences of war for Morea, for the building of fortresses, and to the idea put forward in previous research that the war in Morea needlessly took resources away from the defense of Anatolia – thus contributing to the loss of the area to the Turks