Quantifying : Fuzzy categories and non-regularity in English

Expressing quantity in English is an area replete with complexity, irregularity, fuzzy categories and nuances of usage that pose a hurdle for many English language learners. This paper describes some of these complexities that underlie seemingly straightforward binary categories such as the mass/count and singular/plural distinctions. The paper will also describe other aspects of quantification such as the usage of much and many in questions versus propositional statements and the expression of vague amounts. The aim is to reveal the complex conceptual, grammatical and pragmatic factors that bear on any expression of quantity in English

Towards a Platonic theory of wholes and parts

The aim of this thesis is to introduce and elaborate a new conception of the relation between wholes and parts. Wholes, I propose, can be conceived of as 'Unities', in contrast to their currently familiar conception as 'sums'. Following a clue given in the distinction which Plato draws in the Theaetetus (203c-205e) between two conceptions of a complex entity, I argue that a similar distinction can be coherently developed in modern terms.Part I is preoccupied with general conceptual and historical background. Some theoretical constraints on any theory of wholes and parts are challenged and found to be merely apparent.In Part II the conception of wholes as sums is presented, and it is extensively argued that modern discussions of wholes generally presuppose this conception. This presupposition is shared not only by authors who subscribe to the 'classical' mereological theories of Lesniewski, and Goodman, but also by theorists of holistic sympathies (making use, for example, of the notion of an organic whole, or of a Gestalt) who rely on 'neoclassical' theories. It is urged that this conception suffers from serious, fundamental difficulties and drawbacks.In Part III the conception of wholes as Unities is introduced. A theory of Unities is laid down in systematic, formal detail, and the points of divergence from presuppositions of traditional theories are discussed. It is shown how in conceiving of concrete entities (of certain types) as Unities one is free from many difficulties which beset their conception as sums. Finally, it is shown how the theory of Unities provides a powerful tool for resolving some central metaphysical puzzles concerning concrete entities, especially puzzles associated with preservation of identity in the face of loss or gain of parts

Externalism, internalism and logical truth

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed

Excavating a linguistic category : on the properties of Ism al-Fi‘l and the limits of Kalām al-‘Arab

Examining the occurrence of ism fi‘l murtajal (an obscure lexical class whose words syntactically are verbs, while morphologically resemble irregular nouns) in three early, founding works of Arabic grammar and lexicology, affords analysis of the words’ structures and origins, and informs our understanding of the Classical Arabic linguistic register at whose edges they existed. These works’ terminology for the items differs from modern terms. Said terminology seems furthermore not yet standardized. Many items do not fit into conventional root-pattern morphological analysis, though creative or unprecedented derivational methods render them pliable to Arabic’s triradical morphosyntactic system. Some items do correspond to known roots, and a few are recognizable as basically conventional, if irregular, imperatives. A few times items exhibit archaic or irregular phonetics or morphophonology. This lexeme class’ presence in the performative Classical Arabic (‘arabiyyah) suggests its founding corpus (kalām al-‘arab) was not merely linguistic (i.e., “Arabic language”) but also cultural (i.e., perceptions of ‘urūbah—Arabness—itself).Middle Eastern Studie

The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions

The past, both proximate and remote, is often consulted in attempts to predict the future. Of course extrapolation from past to future is at best an uncertain art. Extrapolation, however, is not the only problem. Lessons from the recent past are distorted by lack of perspective. Lessons from the distant past are distorted by distance. The first step is to choose which of the competing pasts to consult. Selfishly, I choose to consult the recent past, as it continues through the present and on into the near-term future, from the perspective of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I gain at least two advantages from this perspective. The first advantage is that the Civil Rules Committee experience is familiar. Many of the observations that follow build from my own summaries of the public testimony and comments on proposals to amend Rule 23 that were published in 1996. One function of these observations, indeed, is to provide an accessible accounting to the many who took the time and effort to participate so helpfully in the rulemaking process. The proposals were intended to be relatively modest, opening opportunities to pare back the use of class actions in some settings and to expand the flexibility of class actions in other

Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology

The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions

The past, both proximate and remote, is often consulted in attempts to predict the future. Of course extrapolation from past to future is at best an uncertain art. Extrapolation, however, is not the only problem. Lessons from the recent past are distorted by lack of perspective. Lessons from the distant past are distorted by distance. The first step is to choose which of the competing pasts to consult. Selfishly, I choose to consult the recent past, as it continues through the present and on into the near-term future, from the perspective of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I gain at least two advantages from this perspective. The first advantage is that the Civil Rules Committee experience is familiar. Many of the observations that follow build from my own summaries of the public testimony and comments on proposals to amend Rule 23 that were published in 1996. One function of these observations, indeed, is to provide an accessible accounting to the many who took the time and effort to participate so helpfully in the rulemaking process. The proposals were intended to be relatively modest, opening opportunities to pare back the use of class actions in some settings and to expand the flexibility of class actions in other

Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology

The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of natural language expressions serve as poor guides for ontological investigation, insofar as their meanings will fail to determine the referents of their constituents. This undermines the Realist’s use of natural languages to settle disputes in metaphysics