6 research outputs found
Network games with dynamic players: Stabilization and output convergence to Nash equilibrium
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using
their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this
work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states,
which allows the agents to have more general and heterogeneous dynamics and
maintain some privacy of their local states. The concerned network game is
formulated with agents modeled by uncertain linear systems subject to external
disturbances. The cost function of each agent is a linear quadratic function
depending on the outputs of its own and its neighbors in the underlying graph.
The main challenge stemming from this game formulation is that merely driving
the agent outputs to the Nash equilibrium does not guarantee the stability of
the agent dynamics. Using local output and the outputs from the neighbors of
each agent, we aim at designing game strategies that achieve output Nash
equilibrium seeking and stabilization of the closed-loop dynamics.
Particularly, when each agents knows how the actions of its neighbors affect
its cost function, a game strategy is developed for network games with digraph
topology. When each agent is also allowed to exchange part of its compensator
state, a distributed strategy can be designed for networks with connected
undirected graphs or connected digraphs
Distributed Game Strategy Design With Application To Multi-Agent Formation Control
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent formation control problem from a game theory point of view. It is well known that a major difficulty in a communication network based formation control problem is that each agent is only able to exchange information with other agents according to the communication topology. This information constraint prevents many game strategy design approaches that require individual agents to have global information from being implemented in many cases. We formulate the formation control problem in such a way that individual agents try to minimize their locally measured formation errors and to solve it as a differential game problem. We consider two cases of non-cooperative and cooperative games and propose a novel distributed design approach that utilizes the relationship between the initial and terminal state variables. This approach is applied to an illustrative formation control example among three agents and the formation errors under various scenarios are compared and analyzed