9,776 research outputs found
Topological Distance Games
We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes
of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's
inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents
on the topology graph. This model of topological distance games (TDGs) offers
an appealing combination of important aspects of several prominent settings in
coalition formation, including (additively separable) hedonic games, social
distance games, and Schelling games. We study the existence and complexity of
stable outcomes in TDGs -- for instance, while a jump stable assignment may not
exist in general, we show that the existence is guaranteed in several special
cases. We also investigate the dynamics induced by performing beneficial jumps.Comment: Appears in the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), 202
On the price of stability of some simple graph-based hedonic games
We consider graph-based hedonic games such as simple symmetric fractional hedonic games and social distance games, where a group of utility maximizing players have hedonic preferences over the players’ set, and wish to be partitioned into clusters so that they are grouped together with players they prefer. The players are nodes in a connected graph and their preferences are defined so that shorter graph distance implies higher preference. We are interested in Nash equilibria of such games, where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to another cluster, and we focus on the notion of the price of stability. We present new and improved bounds on the price of stability for several graph classes, as well as for a slightly modified utility function
Hedonic Coalition Formation for Distributed Task Allocation among Wireless Agents
Autonomous wireless agents such as unmanned aerial vehicles or mobile base
stations present a great potential for deployment in next-generation wireless
networks. While current literature has been mainly focused on the use of agents
within robotics or software applications, we propose a novel usage model for
self-organizing agents suited to wireless networks. In the proposed model, a
number of agents are required to collect data from several arbitrarily located
tasks. Each task represents a queue of packets that require collection and
subsequent wireless transmission by the agents to a central receiver. The
problem is modeled as a hedonic coalition formation game between the agents and
the tasks that interact in order to form disjoint coalitions. Each formed
coalition is modeled as a polling system consisting of a number of agents which
move between the different tasks present in the coalition, collect and transmit
the packets. Within each coalition, some agents can also take the role of a
relay for improving the packet success rate of the transmission. The proposed
algorithm allows the tasks and the agents to take distributed decisions to join
or leave a coalition, based on the achieved benefit in terms of effective
throughput, and the cost in terms of delay. As a result of these decisions, the
agents and tasks structure themselves into independent disjoint coalitions
which constitute a Nash-stable network partition. Moreover, the proposed
algorithm allows the agents and tasks to adapt the topology to environmental
changes such as the arrival/removal of tasks or the mobility of the tasks.
Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm improves the performance, in
terms of average player (agent or task) payoff, of at least 30.26% (for a
network of 5 agents with up to 25 tasks) relatively to a scheme that allocates
nearby tasks equally among agents.Comment: to appear, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computin
Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games
Hedonic games provide a natural model of coalition formation among
self-interested agents. The associated problem of finding stable outcomes in
such games has been extensively studied. In this paper, we identify simple
conditions on expressivity of hedonic games that are sufficient for the problem
of checking whether a given game admits a stable outcome to be computationally
hard. Somewhat surprisingly, these conditions are very mild and intuitive. Our
results apply to a wide range of stability concepts (core stability, individual
stability, Nash stability, etc.) and to many known formalisms for hedonic games
(additively separable games, games with W-preferences, fractional hedonic
games, etc.), and unify and extend known results for these formalisms. They
also have broader applicability: for several classes of hedonic games whose
computational complexity has not been explored in prior work, we show that our
framework immediately implies a number of hardness results for them.Comment: 7+9 pages, long version of a paper in IJCAI 201
Coalition Resilient Outcomes in Max k-Cut Games
We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the \emph{max -cut game}, where
we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a set of colors. Nodes represent players and edges capture their mutual
interests. The strategy set of each player consists of the colors. When
players select a color they induce a -coloring or simply a coloring. Given a
coloring, the \emph{utility} (or \emph{payoff}) of a player is the sum of
the weights of the edges incident to , such that the color chosen
by is different from the one chosen by . Such games form some of the
basic payoff structures in game theory, model lots of real-world scenarios with
selfish agents and extend or are related to several fundamental classes of
games.
Very little is known about the existence of strong equilibria in max -cut
games. In this paper we make some steps forward in the comprehension of it. We
first show that improving deviations performed by minimal coalitions can cycle,
and thus answering negatively the open problem proposed in
\cite{DBLP:conf/tamc/GourvesM10}. Next, we turn our attention to unweighted
graphs. We first show that any optimal coloring is a 5-SE in this case. Then,
we introduce -local strong equilibria, namely colorings that are resilient
to deviations by coalitions such that the maximum distance between every pair
of nodes in the coalition is at most . We prove that -local strong
equilibria always exist. Finally, we show the existence of strong Nash
equilibria in several interesting specific scenarios.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of
the 45th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of
Computer Science (SOFSEM'19
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