116,257 research outputs found

    UNDERSTANDING PREPOSITIONS THROUGH COGNITIVE GRAMMAR. A CASE OF IN

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    Poly - semantic nature of prepositions has been discussed in linguistic literature and confirmed by language data. In the majority of research within cognitive linguistics prepositions have been approached as predicates organising entities in space, with less attention paid to the search for a meaning schema sanctioning the numerous uses. Cognitive Grammar analytic tools allow for the analysis which results in discovering one meaning schema sanctioning the uses of the English preposition in. The present analysis is based on the assumption that the meaning schema of in profiles a relation of conceptual enclosure between two symbolic structures, one of which conceptually fits in the other. Accordingly, I argue that the speaker employs in to structure a real scene not because one element of the scene can physically enclose the other one, but due to conceptual ‘fitting in’ holding between the predication ‘preceding’ the preposition and the one that ‘follows’. In formal terms, the usage of in is conditioned and sanctioned by compatibility of active zones in the predications used to form the complex language expression involved. Peculiarities of physical organization may be ignored in such conceptualisation, though the speaker can choose to encode all peculiarities of physical organisation of real world objects employing different linguistic devices

    Developing the formal structures of artistic practice-as-research

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    In this article I discuss a topic that is emerging as a valuable paradigm for creative practitioners - practice-as-research. There is some controversy over this term that, I believe, goes to the heart of our understanding of the nature of knowledge. The controversy relates to the idea that practice and research are two inherently different types of activity and therefore that it impossible to engage in one ‘as’ the other. Tim Ingold’s (2011) work on the anthropology of knowledge and skill alongside a broader stream of work on cognition and perception (see for example Lakoff & Johnson 2003 and Gibson 1979) suggests that both artistic practice and academic research involve ‘puzzle-solving… carried on within the context of involvement in a real world of persons, objects and relations.’ (Ingold 2011, p.419). The argument revolves around the notion that there is no such thing as disembodied or abstract knowledge and that all knowledge is both embodied and personally related to the world one inhabits. As such, the written word provides a schematic system for representing the much richer communication processes of speech and bodily experience. The written word, however, can only be understood through reference to our lived experience. Lave (1990, p.310) has termed this ‘understanding in practice’ as a knowledge ‘based on rich expectations generated over time about its shape’ (Lave 1990, p.323). Scholarly research outputs and their modes of publication are still firmly entrenched in the printed word. I will explore strategies for communicating the non-verbal knowledge that forms the basis of much practice-as-research

    Rethought Forms: How Do They Work?

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    This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms, especially of his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution. It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that reconstruction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a “proposal” — his teaser to elicit a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions

    Discovery of Linguistic Relations Using Lexical Attraction

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    This work has been motivated by two long term goals: to understand how humans learn language and to build programs that can understand language. Using a representation that makes the relevant features explicit is a prerequisite for successful learning and understanding. Therefore, I chose to represent relations between individual words explicitly in my model. Lexical attraction is defined as the likelihood of such relations. I introduce a new class of probabilistic language models named lexical attraction models which can represent long distance relations between words and I formalize this new class of models using information theory. Within the framework of lexical attraction, I developed an unsupervised language acquisition program that learns to identify linguistic relations in a given sentence. The only explicitly represented linguistic knowledge in the program is lexical attraction. There is no initial grammar or lexicon built in and the only input is raw text. Learning and processing are interdigitated. The processor uses the regularities detected by the learner to impose structure on the input. This structure enables the learner to detect higher level regularities. Using this bootstrapping procedure, the program was trained on 100 million words of Associated Press material and was able to achieve 60% precision and 50% recall in finding relations between content-words. Using knowledge of lexical attraction, the program can identify the correct relations in syntactically ambiguous sentences such as ``I saw the Statue of Liberty flying over New York.''Comment: dissertation, 56 page
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