674 research outputs found

    Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication

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    Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201

    Coalitional games for abstract argumentation

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    International audienceIn this work we address the issue of the uncertainty faced by a user participating in multiagent debate. We propose a way to compute the relative relevance of arguments for such a user, by merging the classical argumentation framework proposed in [5] into a game theoretic coalitional setting, where the worth of a collection of arguments (opinions) can be seen as the combination of the information concerning the defeat relation and the preferences over arguments of a " user ". Via a property-driven approach, we show that the Shapley value [15] for coalitional games defined over an argumentation framework, can be applied to resume all the information about the worth of opinions into an attribution of relevance for the single arguments. We also prove that, for a large family of (coalitional) argumentation frameworks, the Shapley value can be easily computed

    Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games

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    We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation game the feasible set of networks contains a unique, finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets having the property that each subset forms a strategic basin of attraction. These basins of attraction contain all the networks that are likely to emerge and persist if individuals behave farsightedly in playing the network formation game. (3) A von Neumann Morgenstern stable set of the farsighted network formation game is constructed by selecting one network from each basin of attraction. We refer to any such von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set as a farsighted basis. (4) The core of the farsighted network formation game is constructed by selecting one network from each basin of attraction containing a single network. We call this notion of the core, the farsighted core. We conclude that the farsighted core is nonempty if and only if there exists at least one farsighted basin of attraction containing a single network. To relate our three equilibrium and stability notions (basins of attraction, farsighted basis, and farsighted core) to recent work by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we define a notion of pairwise stability similar to the Jackson-Wolinsky notion and we show that the farsighted core is contained in the set of pairwise stable networks. Finally, we introduce, via an example, competitive contracting networks and highlight how the analysis of these networks requires the new features of our network formation model.Basins of attraction, Network formation, Supernetworks, Farsighted core, Nash networks

    Networks and farsighted stability

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    We make two main contributions to the theory of economic and social network formation. First, we introduce the notion of a network formation network or a supernetwork. Supernetworks provide a framework in which we can formally define and analyze farsightedness in network formation. Second, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium corresponding to farsightedness. In particular, we introduce the notion of a farsightedly basic network as well as the notion of a farsighted basis, and we show that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis. A farsightedly basic network contained in the farsighted basis of a given supernetwork represents a possible final resting point (or absorbing state) of a network formation process in which agents behave farsightedly, Given the supernetwork representation of the rules governing network formation and the preferences of the individuals, a farsighted basis contains networks which are likely to emerge and persist of individuals behave farsightedly

    A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation

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    A Graph-Traversing Algorithm for Computing Some Stable Sets in Effectiveness Coalitional Games

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    We propose an algorithm for computing "main stable sets" recently introduced by Ciardiello, Di Liddo (2009) on effectiveness form coalitional games modeled through a directed pseudograph. The algorithm is based upon a graph traversing method exploring extended paths minimal in coalitions and we study some its interesting computational aspects for making these stability concepts as useful tools for decision theory.Algorithmic game theory; coalitional games; dominance relations; stable sets; graph theory.

    Tableau-based decision procedure for the multi-agent epistemic logic with all coalitional operators for common and distributed knowledge

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    We develop a conceptually clear, intuitive, and feasible decision procedure for testing satisfiability in the full multi-agent epistemic logic CMAEL(CD) with operators for common and distributed knowledge for all coalitions of agents mentioned in the language. To that end, we introduce Hintikka structures for CMAEL(CD) and prove that satisfiability in such structures is equivalent to satisfiability in standard models. Using that result, we design an incremental tableau-building procedure that eventually constructs a satisfying Hintikka structure for every satisfiable input set of formulae of CMAEL(CD) and closes for every unsatisfiable input set of formulae.Comment: Substantially extended and corrected version of arXiv:0902.2125. To appear in: Logic Journal of the IGPL, special issue on Formal Aspects of Multi-Agent System
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