Differential Privacy of Aggregated DC Optimal Power Flow Data

We consider the problem of privately releasing aggregated network statistics obtained from solving a DC optimal power flow (OPF) problem. It is shown that the mechanism that determines the noise distribution parameters are linked to the topology of the power system and the monotonicity of the network. We derive a measure of "almost" monotonicity and show how it can be used in conjunction with a linear program in order to release aggregated OPF data using the differential privacy framework.Comment: Accepted by 2019 American Control Conference (ACC

Measuring Membership Privacy on Aggregate Location Time-Series

While location data is extremely valuable for various applications, disclosing it prompts serious threats to individuals' privacy. To limit such concerns, organizations often provide analysts with aggregate time-series that indicate, e.g., how many people are in a location at a time interval, rather than raw individual traces. In this paper, we perform a measurement study to understand Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) on aggregate location time-series, where an adversary tries to infer whether a specific user contributed to the aggregates. We find that the volume of contributed data, as well as the regularity and particularity of users' mobility patterns, play a crucial role in the attack's success. We experiment with a wide range of defenses based on generalization, hiding, and perturbation, and evaluate their ability to thwart the attack vis-a-vis the utility loss they introduce for various mobility analytics tasks. Our results show that some defenses fail across the board, while others work for specific tasks on aggregate location time-series. For instance, suppressing small counts can be used for ranking hotspots, data generalization for forecasting traffic, hotspot discovery, and map inference, while sampling is effective for location labeling and anomaly detection when the dataset is sparse. Differentially private techniques provide reasonable accuracy only in very specific settings, e.g., discovering hotspots and forecasting their traffic, and more so when using weaker privacy notions like crowd-blending privacy. Overall, our measurements show that there does not exist a unique generic defense that can preserve the utility of the analytics for arbitrary applications, and provide useful insights regarding the disclosure of sanitized aggregate location time-series

MVG Mechanism: Differential Privacy under Matrix-Valued Query

Differential privacy mechanism design has traditionally been tailored for a scalar-valued query function. Although many mechanisms such as the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms can be extended to a matrix-valued query function by adding i.i.d. noise to each element of the matrix, this method is often suboptimal as it forfeits an opportunity to exploit the structural characteristics typically associated with matrix analysis. To address this challenge, we propose a novel differential privacy mechanism called the Matrix-Variate Gaussian (MVG) mechanism, which adds a matrix-valued noise drawn from a matrix-variate Gaussian distribution, and we rigorously prove that the MVG mechanism preserves $(\epsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of directional noise made possible by the design of the MVG mechanism. Directional noise allows the impact of the noise on the utility of the matrix-valued query function to be moderated. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate the performance of our mechanism using three matrix-valued queries on three privacy-sensitive datasets. We find that the MVG mechanism notably outperforms four previous state-of-the-art approaches, and provides comparable utility to the non-private baseline.Comment: Appeared in CCS'1

Pyramid: Enhancing Selectivity in Big Data Protection with Count Featurization

Protecting vast quantities of data poses a daunting challenge for the growing number of organizations that collect, stockpile, and monetize it. The ability to distinguish data that is actually needed from data collected "just in case" would help these organizations to limit the latter's exposure to attack. A natural approach might be to monitor data use and retain only the working-set of in-use data in accessible storage; unused data can be evicted to a highly protected store. However, many of today's big data applications rely on machine learning (ML) workloads that are periodically retrained by accessing, and thus exposing to attack, the entire data store. Training set minimization methods, such as count featurization, are often used to limit the data needed to train ML workloads to improve performance or scalability. We present Pyramid, a limited-exposure data management system that builds upon count featurization to enhance data protection. As such, Pyramid uniquely introduces both the idea and proof-of-concept for leveraging training set minimization methods to instill rigor and selectivity into big data management. We integrated Pyramid into Spark Velox, a framework for ML-based targeting and personalization. We evaluate it on three applications and show that Pyramid approaches state-of-the-art models while training on less than 1% of the raw data