The development of a systematic inquiry framework and its application in developing new understanding regarding feedback and communication in a manufacturing environment

Bibliography: leaves 133-134.The context of this report is a manufacturing concern that supplies accessories to the clothing industry. With the opening up of the South African borders and the removal of inherent restrictions it has become an environment that is very competitive and dynamic

A world beside itself : Jakob von Uexküll, Charles S. Peirce, and the genesis of a biosemiotic hypothesis

This thesis explores the conceptual origins of a biosemiotic understanding of the human as a consequence of the vital role of signs in the evolution of life. According to this challenge to definitions of man as the sole bearer of knowledge, human society and culture are not only characterised by the use and production of signs, human life and thought are the products of ongoing processes of semiosis. Along with Thomas Sebeok’s argument concerning animal architecture, examples from Modernist and Contemporary art are presented to introduce a new perspective on the natural and cultural significance of acts of inhabitation. By tracing its historical development in the nineteenth and twentieth century via the concept of the environment, this perspective on both human and non-human life is shown to contest those methods of modern science that are rooted in anthropocentrism The precedents of this perspective are then elaborated through an explication of the work of two of the forefathers of biosemiotics: the biologist Jakob von Uexküll and the philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt demonstrated that in order to make sense of its surroundings each living organism must be situated within an integral world of signs. Peirce’s philosophical account of semiotics explained the evolution of signs in terms of processes of habit formation and the abductive power of thought. Together Uexküll and Peirce provide an impetus for reconsidering the metaphorical implications of aesthetics in terms of the semiotic inheritance of ecological systems. While having critically interrogated their differences especially with respect to their derivation from Kantian philosophy and German Idealism, in conclusion, the ideas of Peirce and Uexküll on the reciprocity of life and signs are shown to mutually contribute to a more advanced comprehension of human subjectivity

Peircean realism - towards a scientific metaphysics

The problem of the status of metaphysics - what it is and what it is for, what use it is - has been with us for millennia, at least since Plato took issue with the Sophists, and continues to the present day. Here I attempt an intervention in this perennial dispute, with the aim of providing some kind of rapprochement between the factions. This intervention is based on how Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) understood metaphysics and the position presented here is thus called 'Peircean realism'. The basic idea is that everyone has a metaphysics and has to have one, just to get by in everyday life, and this is no different for scientific inquirers in their professional work. The subject matter of metaphysics is thus presuppositions, whether it is what we rely on to go shopping or to discover the Higgs boson. We rely on these in our activities and expect them to have an effect on outcomes, so when our expectations are frustrated, doubt may be thrown on our presuppositions. We would thus like the ability to inquire into our presuppositions so as not to repeat mistakes, but our instinctive, evolved capacity for reasoning may not be up the job, since it is entwined with what we take for granted. Instead, Peirce develops a science of good reasoning that includes a theory of inquiry, which would allow us to scrutinise our presuppositions, to perform metaphysical inquiry. The starting point for this science of good reasoning is basic principles of combination and organisation, because these are involved in all activity, and these are Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. This is also where I start in the exposition of and argument for Peircean realism as a scientific - that is, truth-directed - metaphysics that provides the best possible general presuppositions to the natural and human sciences, the special sciences that deal with matters in their particularity; that Peircean realism is a viable metaphysics for those sciences. This exposition and argument comprises the first part of this thesis. In the second part, the case for Peircean realism is further bolstered by turning a critical eye on positions that are deficient from the Peircean point of view, in that they lack one or other category and thus starve the special sciences of the resources they need, or that they try to ignore metaphysics entirely. All this is meant to demonstrate that metaphysics is unavoidable, that we need all three of Peirce's categories for a viable metaphysics for the special sciences, and that Peircean realism is just such a metaphysics

Mattering: A Recreation of the Realism of Charles S. Peirce

Mattering' is the process and the product of Reality. It is One from nothing. Whether there is more than one universe as the string theorists argue, is beyond my ken. Fortunately I am not concerned here with epistemology but with understanding. Nor am I preoccupied with revealing Truth. Rather, my purpose is to explore the meaning and consequences of 'mattering': to be able to say that, beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that 'it' matters – that 'it' is 'mattering'. This can be made intelligible by way of reflection on the Pragmatic Maxim of the American polymath Charles S. Peirce [1839-1914] and validated with his systematic method of inquiry. Part 1 of my thesis explores and presents Peirce's work. Part 2 is an exposition of my three part hypothesis of 'mattering', that: 1. value functions as a condition of intelligibility - purpose, as the ground of 'mattering' is dependent on value; 2. power - where power is the capacity to cause - is the enabler of force functioning as actual 'mattering'; 3. 'mattering' is evolutionary realization of universal telos. For Peirce, inquiry is triggered by genuine doubt. His method begins with imagination: with the generation of a hypotheses that, if valid, will relieve the irritation of doubt. Creating my hypothesis of 'mattering' free of consideration of truth was liberating. This is what Peirce called abduction: active imagination which can be considered as reasonable, but only in so far as it can be reasoned from by deduction and induction. This is Mathematics, the first of the heuretic sciences (the branch of sciences which treats of discovery or invention) and its aim is to draw necessary conclusions; Philosophy is the next class of the heuretic sciences, followed by the Special Sciences. The first order of Peirce's second class, Philosophy, is his Phenomenology - his doctrine of categories - the purpose of which is to describe what is before the mind and to show that the description is correct. It is the beginning of discovering meaning, and involves observation of what Peirce called the phaneron (whatever is before the mind) - in my case, my hypothesis. Through differentiation, abstraction or prescision, and dissociation it identifies the three irreducible categories of reality identified by Peirce as First (possibility), Second (actuality) and Third (probability). The second order of his philosophical method is the Normative Sciences of Esthetics (aesthetics), the ideal, Ethics, going for the ideal, and Semeiotic or logic, what can reasonably be hoped for. By practicing what he preached, Peirce built the third order of Philosophy, his Metaphysics of Tychism (chance), Synechism (continuity), and Agape. [In physics, Agape arguably is gravity and the still to be discovered something that will deliver the Holy Grail: the theory of everything.] This is 'mattering'. I argue it is grounded in the values of integrity, respect and transparency, values which are expressed through the enactment (or powering) of 'mattering's' purpose or telos which grows and develops. This is, 'mattering': universal realisation of evolutionary telos. Our species, which evolved, as did the Universe, from the Universe - the process and product of 'mattering' - appears set on a trajectory of ecocide for which we are responsible. One model for understanding this travesty is Freud's scheme of Id (desire) Ego (mediator) Superego (should). If Ego, which makes choices, sides with and empowers the unmitigated, individual wanting that is Id, by ignoring Superego - cooperative imperatives for universal growth and development - Earth's evolutionary trajectory is jeopardised. We ignore the categorial values of integrity, respect, and transparency with which evolutionary universal telos is co-dependent, at our peril. The global dysfunction of Egos, especially those that have commandeered power by disempowering others, can be healed. Together, but only together, we can get back on track and reclaim Earth's and our future. This one Universe from which we evolved and with which we are evolving, can do it, and, even granted that it has been practicing longer, we too can do it: we can make it matter. It matters. It is 'mattering'

Peirce's Semeiotic and the Implications for Aesthetics in the Visual Arts: a study of the sketchbook and its positions in the hierarchies of making, collecting and exhibiting

The thesis argues that a particular aesthetic theory (Esthetics), is implied by Peirce's Semeiotic, and that they have both been clarified when tested from the perspective of a visual art practice involving sketchbooks. This research also constructs and lays out the first 'user friendly' guide to Semeiotically analyse any object, be it emotional, material or conceptual. Findings were generated by comparing Peirce's sporadic writings on esthetics with his more complete Semeiotic, assessing them in situations making artworks, proposing and exhibiting them in public spaces, and analysing meanings of sketchbooks from UK public collections. It was found that in theory: - Peirce's Esthetic power develops from oscillating between the powers to 'form' and 'express' (generalise and specify), while accepting the limits to both powers, revealed by such an oscillation alongside self and hetero criticism. -this entails appreciating what is most or least up to us, enabling the most effect where one is most free and limiting frustration where least free. -a Peircean Esthetic power can be learnt; however it requires that the learner properly wishes to be directed to that goal (EP2:48). Implications for the visual arts through practice: - artists could contribute to all of Peirce's non-native sciences, (Esthetics, Ethics and Logic), as their appreciation of 'feelings' is well trained, if they can also 'formalise'. -art has a part role in natural education (and possibly institutional education) by developing an Esthetic power that Peirce claims could 'humanise and free' the individual (free in a Peircean sense, which may seem like very little freedom to some) (EP2: 147-148). In the conclusion, a summary of these uncovered implications is set against some problems raised by the complexity of the Semeiotic, and the immeasurability of Esthetic progress. Set against that critique is a positive assessment of the effects of the research on the sketchbook practice

A world beside itself : Jakob von Uexküll, Charles S. Peirce, and the genesis of a biosemiotic hypothesis

This thesis explores the conceptual origins of a biosemiotic understanding of the human as a consequence of the vital role of signs in the evolution of life. According to this challenge to definitions of man as the sole bearer of knowledge, human society and culture are not only characterised by the use and production of signs, human life and thought are the products of ongoing processes of semiosis. Along with Thomas Sebeok’s argument concerning animal architecture, examples from Modernist and Contemporary art are presented to introduce a new perspective on the natural and cultural significance of acts of inhabitation. By tracing its historical development in the nineteenth and twentieth century via the concept of the environment, this perspective on both human and non-human life is shown to contest those methods of modern science that are rooted in anthropocentrism The precedents of this perspective are then elaborated through an explication of the work of two of the forefathers of biosemiotics: the biologist Jakob von Uexküll and the philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt demonstrated that in order to make sense of its surroundings each living organism must be situated within an integral world of signs. Peirce’s philosophical account of semiotics explained the evolution of signs in terms of processes of habit formation and the abductive power of thought. Together Uexküll and Peirce provide an impetus for reconsidering the metaphorical implications of aesthetics in terms of the semiotic inheritance of ecological systems. While having critically interrogated their differences especially with respect to their derivation from Kantian philosophy and German Idealism, in conclusion, the ideas of Peirce and Uexküll on the reciprocity of life and signs are shown to mutually contribute to a more advanced comprehension of human subjectivity

The Chemistry of Relations: The periodic table examined through the lens of C.S. Peirce’s philosophy.

This thesis explores Charles Peirce’s reception of Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic arrangement of the chemical elements, the further impact of chemistry on Peirce’s philosophy, such as his phenomenology and diagrammatic reasoning, and the relations between Peirce's theory of iconicity and Mendeleev's periodic table. It is prompted by the almost complete absence in the literature of any discussion of Peirce’s unpublished chemistry manuscripts and the lack of attention given to the connections between Peirce’s early study of chemistry and his later philosophy. This project seeks to make a contribution to this otherwise neglected area of Peirce scholarship

Peirce, Vygotsky and Concept Formation

The purpose of this thesis to explore the theoretical similarities between Peirce and Vygotsky with respect to the process of concept formation. It is acknowledged that these two thinkers are seldom associated with each other in relation to the learning process. Peirce is seen as one of the founders of modern semiotics, but he is rarely linked with the activity of concept formation itself. Vygotsky, whilst associated with the latter, is not interpreted as a semiotician – even though he sometimes uses the terminology of signs. It will be argued in the course of this thesis, however, that their views are closer to each other than is commonly recognised and that this convergence derives from the influence of Hegel. In the case of Peirce, Hegel is often viewed in negative terms – as a philosophical legacy that Peirce is reacting against. It will be argued that this interpretation overlooks the deeper impact of Hegelian thought in terms of how Peirce constructs his semiotics. Indeed, an Hegelian interpretation of concept formation helps reframe Peirce’s account of the ‘mediating’ sign, the notion of the ‘determined’ sign, and the role of the ‘object’ in his triadic structure. Moreover, the reference point of Hegel creates an opportunity to re-evaluate Peirce’s icon, index and symbol. Hegel’s influence on Vygotsky is more frequently acknowledged, but seldom pursued in detail by commentators who often draw Vygotsky into a more social account of meaning construction. Full recognition of Hegel’s influence on Vygotsky, however, has the effect of reframing his notion of ‘mediation’, and making his account of concept formation less focused on the social dimension than is commonly recognised. The overall effect of these arguments is to reposition Vygotsky’s ‘natural history of the sign’ in a framework that parallels Peirce’s own account of sign formation. There remain, of course, important differences in the approaches of Peirce and Vygotsky, and these will be highlighted in the course of the discussion. But the broader perspective outlined below suggests that there should be greater recognition of their philosophical similarities