A log mining approach for process monitoring in SCADA

SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems are used for controlling and monitoring industrial processes. We propose a methodology to systematically identify potential process-related threats in SCADA. Process-related threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs actions, which look legitimate, but which are intended to disrupt the SCADA process. To detect such threats, we propose a semi-automated approach of log processing. We conduct experiments on a real-life water treatment facility. A preliminary case study suggests that our approach is effective in detecting anomalous events that might alter the regular process workflow

Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques

SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability

An Approach to Using Non Safety-Assured Programmable Components in Modest Integrity Systems

Programmable components (like personal computers or smart devices) can offer considerable benefits in terms of usability and functionality in a safety-related system. However there is a problem in justifying the use of programmable components if the components have not been safety justified to an appropriate integrity (e.g. to SIL 1 of IEC 61508). This paper outlines an approach (called LowSIL) developed in the UK CINIF nuclear industry research programme to justify the use of non safety-assured programmable components in modest integrity systems. This is a seven step approach that can be applied to new systems from an early design stage, or retrospectively to existing systems. The stages comprise: system characterisation, component suitability assessment, failure analysis, failure mitigation, identification of additional defences, identification of safety evidence requirements, and collation and evaluation of evidence. In the case of personal computers, there is supporting guidance on usage constraints, claim limits on reliability, and advice on “locking down” the component to maximise reliability. The approach is demonstrated for an example system. The approach has been applied successfully to a range of safety-related systems used in the nuclear industry

Understanding Malicious Attacks Against Infrastructures - Overview on the Assessment and Management of Threats and Attacks to Industrial Control Systems

This report describes approaches to the assessment and management of malicious threats and attacks relating to critical infrastructures in general, and electric power infrastructures in particular. Securing infrastructures implies taking into account both the natural and man-made (intentional) events. While protecting against the natural disruptive events is a feasible (yet not trivial) task, benefiting by well-established practices, dealing with intentional attacks comes up across many difficulties, especially due to the unpredictability of such events. The report outlines the state-of-the-art in dealing with threats and malicious attacks, considering both physical and cyber actions. Several approaches taken at national and international levels towards securing the critical infrastructures are also provided.JRC.G.6-Sensors, radar technologies and cybersecurit

Mitigating Emergent Safety and Security Incidents of CPS by a Protective Shell

In today's modern world, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have gained widespread prevalence, offering tremendous benefits while also increasing society's dependence on them. Given the direct interaction of CPS with the physical environment, their malfunction or compromise can pose significant risks to human life, property, and the environment. However, as the complexity of CPS rises due to heightened expectations and expanded functional requirements, ensuring their trustworthy operation solely during the development process becomes increasingly challenging. This thesis introduces and delves into the novel concept of the 'Protective Shell' – a real-time safeguard actively monitoring CPS during their operational phases. The protective shell serves as a last line of defence, designed to detect abnormal behaviour, conduct thorough analyses, and initiate countermeasures promptly, thereby mitigating unforeseen risks in real-time. The primary objective of this research is to enhance the overall safety and security of CPS by refining, partly implementing, and evaluating the innovative protective shell concept. To provide context for collaborative systems working towards higher objectives — common within CPS as system-of-systems (SoS) — the thesis introduces the 'Emergence Matrix'. This matrix categorises outcomes of such collaboration into four quadrants based on their anticipated nature and desirability. Particularly concerning are outcomes that are both unexpected and undesirable, which frequently serve as the root cause of safety accidents and security incidents in CPS scenarios. The protective shell plays a critical role in mitigating these unfavourable outcomes, as conventional vulnerability elimination procedures during the CPS design phase prove insufficient due to their inability to proactively anticipate and address these unforeseen situations. Employing the design science research methodology, the thesis is structured around its iterative cycles and the research questions imposed, offering a systematic exploration of the topic. A detailed analysis of various safety accidents and security incidents involving CPS was conducted to retrieve vulnerabilities that led to dangerous outcomes. By developing specific protective shells for each affected CPS and assessing their effectiveness during these hazardous scenarios, a generic core for the protective shell concept could be retrieved, indicating general characteristics and its overall applicability. Furthermore, the research presents a generic protective shell architecture, integrating advanced anomaly detection techniques rooted in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) and human machine teaming. While the implementation of protective shells demonstrate substantial positive impacts in ensuring CPS safety and security, the thesis also articulates potential risks associated with their deployment that require careful consideration. In conclusion, this thesis makes a significant contribution towards the safer and more secure integration of complex CPS into daily routines, critical infrastructures and other sectors by leveraging the capabilities of the generic protective shell framework.:1 Introduction 1.1 Background and Context 1.2 Research Problem 1.3 Purpose and Objectives 1.3.1 Thesis Vision 1.3.2 Thesis Mission 1.4 Thesis Outline and Structure 2 Design Science Research Methodology 2.1 Relevance-, Rigor- and Design Cycle 2.2 Research Questions 3 Cyber-Physical Systems 3.1 Explanation 3.2 Safety- and Security-Critical Aspects 3.3 Risk 3.3.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 3.3.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment 3.3.3 Risk Reduction Mechanisms 3.3.4 Acceptable Residual Risk 3.4 Engineering Principles 3.4.1 Safety Principles 3.4.2 Security Principles 3.5 Cyber-Physical System of Systems (CPSoS) 3.5.1 Emergence 4 Protective Shell 4.1 Explanation 4.2 System Architecture 4.3 Run-Time Monitoring 4.4 Definition 4.5 Expectations / Goals 5 Specific Protective Shells 5.1 Boeing 737 Max MCAS 5.1.1 Introduction 5.1.2 Vulnerabilities within CPS 5.1.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.1.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.2 Therac-25 5.2.1 Introduction 5.2.2 Vulnerabilities within CPS 5.2.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.2.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.3 Stuxnet 5.3.1 Introduction 5.3.2 Exploited Vulnerabilities 5.3.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.3.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.4 Toyota 'Unintended Acceleration' ETCS 5.4.1 Introduction 5.4.2 Vulnerabilities within CPS 5.4.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.4.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.5 Jeep Cherokee Hack 5.5.1 Introduction 5.5.2 Vulnerabilities within CPS 5.5.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.5.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.6 Ukrainian Power Grid Cyber-Attack 5.6.1 Introduction 5.6.2 Vulnerabilities in the critical Infrastructure 5.6.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.6.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.7 Airbus A400M FADEC 5.7.1 Introduction 5.7.2 Vulnerabilities within CPS 5.7.3 Specific Protective Shell Mitigation Mechanisms 5.7.4 Protective Shell Evaluation 5.8 Similarities between Specific Protective Shells 5.8.1 Mitigation Mechanisms Categories 5.8.2 Explanation 5.8.3 Conclusion 6 AI 6.1 Explainable AI (XAI) for Anomaly Detection 6.1.1 Anomaly Detection 6.1.2 Explainable Artificial Intelligence 6.2 Intrinsic Explainable ML Models 6.2.1 Linear Regression 6.2.2 Decision Trees 6.2.3 K-Nearest Neighbours 6.3 Example Use Case - Predictive Maintenance 7 Generic Protective Shell 7.1 Architecture 7.1.1 MAPE-K 7.1.2 Human Machine Teaming 7.1.3 Protective Shell Plugin Catalogue 7.1.4 Architecture and Design Principles 7.1.5 Conclusion Architecture 7.2 Implementation Details 7.3 Evaluation 7.3.1 Additional Vulnerabilities introduced by the Protective Shell 7.3.2 Summary 8 Conclusion 8.1 Summary 8.2 Research Questions Evaluation 8.3 Contribution 8.4 Future Work 8.5 Recommendatio

A Novel Approach to Determining Real-Time Risk Probabilities in Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems

Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems are substantially different from their more common and ubiquitous information technology system counterparts. Industrial control systems, such as distributed control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are used for controlling the power grid, were not originally designed with security in mind. Geographically dispersed distribution, an unfortunate reliance on legacy systems and stringent availability requirements raise significant cybersecurity concerns regarding electric reliability while constricting the feasibility of many security controls. Recent North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards heavily emphasize cybersecurity concerns and specifically require entities to categorize and identify their Bulk Electric System cyber systems; and, have periodic vulnerability assessments performed on those systems. These concerns have produced an increase in the need for more Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems specific cybersecurity research. Industry stakeholders have embraced the development of a large-scale test environment through the Department of Energy’s National Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Test-bed program; however, few individuals have access to this program. This research developed a physical industrial control system test-bed on a smaller-scale that provided an environment for modeling a simulated critical infrastructure sector performing a set of automated processes for the purpose of exploring solutions and studying concepts related to compromising control systems by way of process-tampering through code exploitation, as well as, the ability to passively and subsequently identify any risks resulting from such an event. Relative to the specific step being performed within a production cycle, at a moment in time when sensory data samples were captured and analyzed, it was possible to determine the probability of a real-time risk to a mock Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System by comparing the sample values to those derived from a previously established baseline. This research achieved such a goal by implementing a passive, spatial and task-based segregated sensor network, running in parallel to the active control system process for monitoring and detecting risk, and effectively identified a real-time risk probability within a Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System Test-bed. The practicality of this research ranges from determining on-demand real-time risk probabilities during an automated process, to employing baseline monitoring techniques for discovering systems, or components thereof, exploited along the supply chain