A new Approach on Survey of Cut Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks

A wireless sensor network can get separated into multiple connected components due to the failure of some of its nodes, which is called a "cut". In this article we consider the problem of detecting cuts by the remaining nodes of a wireless senso r network. We propose an algorithm that a llows (i) every node to detect when the connectivity to a specially designated node has been lost, and (ii) one or more nodes (that are connected to the special node after the cut) to detect the occurrence of the cut. The algorithm is distributed and asynchronous: every node needs to communicate with only those nodes that are within its communication range. The algorithm is base d on the iterative computation of a fictitious "electrical potential" of the nodes. The convergence rate of the underlying iter ativ e scheme is independent of the size and structure of the network. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of thousands of tiny nodes having the capability of sensing, computation, and wireless communications. Wireless sensor network can suffer partition problem in the network which is called a cut. So a single topology of the network breaks into two or more parts. Here we discuss several cut detecti on techniques to detect the cuts in WSN

Minimum Sparsity of Unobservable Power Network Attacks

Physical security of power networks under power injection attacks that alter generation and loads is studied. The system operator employs Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) for detecting such attacks, while attackers devise attacks that are unobservable by such PMU networks. It is shown that, given the PMU locations, the solution to finding the sparsest unobservable attacks has a simple form with probability one, namely, $\kappa(G^M) + 1$, where $\kappa(G^M)$ is defined as the vulnerable vertex connectivity of an augmented graph. The constructive proof allows one to find the entire set of the sparsest unobservable attacks in polynomial time. Furthermore, a notion of the potential impact of unobservable attacks is introduced. With optimized PMU deployment, the sparsest unobservable attacks and their potential impact as functions of the number of PMUs are evaluated numerically for the IEEE 30, 57, 118 and 300-bus systems and the Polish 2383, 2737 and 3012-bus systems. It is observed that, as more PMUs are added, the maximum potential impact among all the sparsest unobservable attacks drops quickly until it reaches the minimum sparsity.Comment: submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Contro

Analyzing wireless communication network vulnerability with homological invariants

This article explains how sheaves and homology theory can be applied to simplicial complex models of wireless communication networks to study their vulnerability to jamming. It develops two classes of invariants (one local and one global) for studying which nodes and links present more of a liability to the network's performance when under attack.Comment: Submitted to ICASSP 201