Self-organisation of mobile robots in large structure assembly using multi-agent systems

Competition between manufacturers in large structure assembly (LSA) is driven by the need to improve the adaptability and versatility of their manufacturing systems. The lack of these qualities in the currently used systems is caused by the dedicated nature of their fixtures and jigs. This has led to their underutilisation and costly changeover procedures. In addition to that, modern automation systems tend to be dedicated to very specific tasks. This means that such systems are highly specialised and can reach obsolescence once there is a substantial change in production requirements. In this doctoral thesis, a dynamic system consisting of mobile robots is proposed to overcome those limitations. As a first knowledge contribution in this doctoral thesis, it is investigated under which conditions using mobile robots instead of the traditional, fixed automation systems in LSA can be advantageous. In this context, dynamic systems are expected to be more versatile and adaptive than fixed systems. Unlike traditional, dedicated automation systems, they are not constrained to gantry rails or fixed to the floor. This results in an expanded working envelope and consequently the ability to reach more workstations. Furthermore, if a product is large enough, the manufacturer can choose how many mobile robots to deploy around it. Accordingly, it was shown that the ability to balance work rates on products and consequently meet their due times is improved. For the second knowledge contribution, two fundamentally different decision-making models for controlling mobile agents in the complex scheduling problem are investigated. This is done to investigate ways of taking full advantage from the potential benefits of applying mobile robots. It is found that existing models from related academic literature are not suited for the given problem. Therefore, two new models had to be proposed for this purpose. It was plausible to use an agent-based approach for self-organisation. This is because similarly to agents, mobile robots can perform independently of one-another; and have limited perception and communication abilities. Finally, through a comparison study, scenarios are identified where either model is better to use. In agreement with much of the established literature in the field, the models are shown to exhibit the common advantages and disadvantages of their respective architecture types. Considering that the enabling technologies are nearing sufficient maturity for deploying mobile robots in LSA, it is concluded that this approach can have several advantages. Firstly, the granularity and freedom of movement enables much more control over product completion times. Secondly, the increased working envelope enables higher utilisation of manufacturing resources. In the context of LSA, this is a considerable challenge because products take a very long time to get loaded and unloaded from workstations. However, if the product flow is steady, there are rare disruptions and rare production changes, fixed automation systems have an advantage due to requiring much less time (if any) for moving and localising. Therefore, mobile systems become more preferred to fixed systems in environments where there is an increasing frequency of disruptions and changes in production requirements. The validation of agent-based self-organisation models for mobile robots in LSA confirms the expectations based on existing literature. Also, it reveals that with relatively low amounts of spare capacity (5%) in the manufacturing systems, there is little need for sophisticated models. The value of optimised models becomes apparent when spare capacity approaches 0% (or even negative values) and there is less room for inefficiencies in scheduling

What to bid and when to stop

Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and is studied by various disciplines, ranging from economics and game theory, to electronic commerce, social psychology, and artificial intelligence. Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but also time-consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last decades there has been a large interest in the automation of negotiation, for example in the setting of e-commerce. This interest is fueled by the promise of automated agents eventually being able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators.Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways, and there is now a large body of negotiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, some agents are able to predict the opponent's preferences very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated bidding strategy. The problem however, is that there is little incremental improvement in agent design, as the agents are tested in varying negotiation settings, using a diverse set of performance measures. This makes it very difficult to meaningfully compare the agents, let alone their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way to pinpoint the most effective components in a negotiating agent.There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the different components of a negotiating agent's strategy: first, it allows the study of the behavior and performance of the components in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to compare the preference learning component of all agents, and to identify the best among them. Second, we can proceed to mix and match different components to create new negotiation strategies., e.g.: replacing the preference learning technique of an agent and then examining whether this makes a difference. Such a procedure enables us to combine the individual components to systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strategies.To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components, we identify structure in most agent designs by introducing the BOA architecture, in which we can develop and integrate the different components of a negotiating agent. We identify three main components of a general negotiation strategy; namely a bidding strategy (B), possibly an opponent model (O), and an acceptance strategy (A). The bidding strategy considers what concessions it deems appropriate given its own preferences, and takes the opponent into account by using an opponent model. The acceptance strategy decides whether offers proposed by the opponent should be accepted.The BOA architecture is integrated into a generic negotiation environment called Genius, which is a software environment for designing and evaluating negotiation strategies. To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation research community, we amend the Genius repository with various existing agents and scenarios from literature. Additionally, we organize a yearly international negotiation competition (ANAC) to harvest even more strategies and scenarios. ANAC also acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and encourages the design of negotiation strategies and scenarios.We re-implement agents from literature and ANAC and decouple them to fit into the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior. For each of the three components, we manage to find and analyze the best ones for specific cases, as described below. We show that the BOA framework leads to significant improvements in agent design by wining ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating teams from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA framework and is informed by a preliminary analysis of the different components.In every negotiation, one of the negotiating parties must accept an offer to reach an agreement. Therefore, it is important that a negotiator employs a proficient mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When contemplating whether to accept an offer, the agent is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the offer may be suboptimal, as better offers may still be presented before time runs out. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached, resulting in a break off with no gain for either party. We classify and compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We propose new acceptance strategies and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions. We also provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the efficacy of acceptance conditions.Later, we adopt a more principled approach by applying optimal stopping theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon all existing acceptance strategies.Another principal component of a negotiating agent's strategy is its ability to take the opponent's preferences into account. The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two different ways. One is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the model's quality. We evaluate and compare the performance of a selection of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We provide an overview of the factors influencing the quality of a model and we analyze how the performance of opponent models depends on the negotiation setting. We identify a class of simple and surprisingly effective opponent modeling techniques that did not receive much previous attention in literature.The other way to measure the quality of an opponent model is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures. We review all methods to measure the accuracy of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy translate into performance differences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good performance. This leads to new insights concerning how to construct an opponent model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.Finally, we take two different approaches to gain more insight into effective bidding strategies. We present a new classification method for negotiation strategies, based on their pattern of concession making against different kinds of opponents. We apply this technique to classify some well-known negotiating strategies, and we formulate guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful, which gives insight into the bidding strategy space of negotiating agents. Furthermore, we apply optimal stopping theory again, this time to find the concessions that maximize utility for the bidder against particular opponents. We show there is an interesting connection between optimal bidding and optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they are mirrored versions of each other.Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together again. We take all BOA components accumulated so far, including the best ones, and combine them all together to explore the space of negotiation strategies.We compute the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and we study the interaction between components. We find that combining the best agent components indeed makes the strongest agents. This shows that the component-based view of the BOA architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing negotiating agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By varying the BOA components we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the significance of each. The bidding strategy is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance conditions and finally followed by the opponent model.Our results validate the analytical approach of the BOA framework to first optimize the individual components, and then to recombine them into a negotiating agent