The impact of ethic formation on individual income

In this paper, the relationships between individual income and ethics formation are studied. Our theoretical model explains what happens to individual incomes when a culture encourages people to devote life-time efforts to establish a virtuous character. Two propositions emerged from the present study. Firstly, if there exists a channel from effforts to income via ethics, individual income begins to increase and reaches a peak as more and more time is devoted to ethics formation. Additional time after the peak becomes detrimental to the individual income. Secondly, time for ethics formation becomes economically useless when the channel from efforts to income via ethics dissolves. Our simulations and econometric findings support the theoretical explanations.Growth; Institutions; Ethics; Turkey

Social preferences or sacred values? Theroy and evidence of deontological motivations

Recent advances in economic theory, largely motivated by experimental findings, have led to the adoption of models of human behavior where a decision-maker not only takes into consideration her own payoff but also others’ payoffs and any potential consequences of these payoffs. Investigations of deontological motivations, where a decision-maker makes her choice not only based on the consequences of a decision but also the decision per se have been rare. We propose an experimental method that can detect an individual’s deontological motivations by varying the probability of the decision-maker’s decision having consequences. It uses two states of the world, one where the decision has consequences and one where it has none. We show that a purely consequentialist decision-maker whose preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance will choose the decision that leads to the best consequences regardless of the probability of the consequential state. A purely deontological decision-maker is also invariant to the probability. However, a mixed consequentialist-deontological decision-maker’s choice changes with the probability. The direction of change gives insight into the location of the optimand for one’s duty. We provide a formal interpretation of major moral philosophies and a revealed preference method to detect deontological motivations and discuss the relevance of the theory and method for economics and law

Smooth Monotonic Networks

Monotonicity constraints are powerful regularizers in statistical modelling. They can support fairness in computer supported decision making and increase plausibility in data-driven scientific models. The seminal min-max (MM) neural network architecture ensures monotonicity, but often gets stuck in undesired local optima during training because of vanishing gradients. We propose a simple modification of the MM network using strictly-increasing smooth non-linearities that alleviates this problem. The resulting smooth min-max (SMM) network module inherits the asymptotic approximation properties from the MM architecture. It can be used within larger deep learning systems trained end-to-end. The SMM module is considerably simpler and less computationally demanding than state-of-the-art neural networks for monotonic modelling. Still, in our experiments, it compared favorably to alternative neural and non-neural approaches in terms of generalization performance

Social preferences or sacred values? Theroy and evidence of deontological motivations

Recent advances in economic theory, largely motivated by experimental findings, have led to the adoption of models of human behavior where a decision-maker not only takes into consideration her own payoff but also others’ payoffs and any potential consequences of these payoffs. Investigations of deontological motivations, where a decision-maker makes her choice not only based on the consequences of a decision but also the decision per se have been rare. We propose an experimental method that can detect an individual’s deontological motivations by varying the probability of the decision-maker’s decision having consequences. It uses two states of the world, one where the decision has consequences and one where it has none. We show that a purely consequentialist decision-maker whose preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance will choose the decision that leads to the best consequences regardless of the probability of the consequential state. A purely deontological decision-maker is also invariant to the probability. However, a mixed consequentialist-deontological decision-maker’s choice changes with the probability. The direction of change gives insight into the location of the optimand for one’s duty. We provide a formal interpretation of major moral philosophies and a revealed preference method to detect deontological motivations and discuss the relevance of the theory and method for economics and law

The corporate managers and stockholders relationship: the moral hazard issue, case of Moroccan listed companies

This paper deals with the moral hazard problem associated with the behavior of corporate managers. The stockholders (shareholders) cannot control ex ante the managers, because the latter’s action is unobservable to the former, and the stockholders cannot oblige the managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit both parties. The stockholders may not modify the impact of action taken by managers if and only if they decide to condition the action payment to the final observable income. In the specific context of emerging markets listed companies in where the level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle does not play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. In this Paper we will specifically deal with this type of problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Our approach consists to show the moral hazard issue existing between two parties: the stockholders (i.e., uninformed “Principal”) and the manager namely the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., informed “Agent”).Asymmetrical Information; Moral Hazard; Non-fulfilment of Contract; Governance of Listed Companies; Collusion; Cooperative Game; Stockholders; Corporate Managers; Casablanca Stock Exchange.

Deontology and Safe Artificial Intelligence

The field of AI safety aims to prevent increasingly capable artificially intelligent systems from causing humans harm. Research on moral alignment is widely thought to offer a promising safety strategy: if we can equip AI systems with appropriate ethical rules, according to this line of thought, they'll be unlikely to disempower, destroy or otherwise seriously harm us. Deontological morality looks like a particularly attractive candidate for an alignment target, given its popularity, relative technical tractability and commitment to harm-avoidance principles. I argue that the connection between moral alignment and safe behavior is more tenuous than many have hoped. In general, AI systems can possess either of these properties in the absence of the other, and we should favor safety when the two conflict. In particular, advanced AI systems governed by standard versions of deontology need not be especially safe

The impact of ethic formation on individual income

In this paper, the relationships between individual income and ethics formation are studied. Our theoretical model explains what happens to individual incomes when a culture encourages people to devote life-time efforts to establish a virtuous character. Two propositions emerged from the present study. Firstly, if there exists a channel from effforts to income via ethics, individual income begins to increase and reaches a peak as more and more time is devoted to ethics formation. Additional time after the peak becomes detrimental to the individual income. Secondly, time for ethics formation becomes economically useless when the channel from efforts to income via ethics dissolves. Our simulations and econometric findings support the theoretical explanations

The impact of ethic formation on individual income

In this paper, the relationships between individual income and ethics formation are studied. Our theoretical model explains what happens to individual incomes when a culture encourages people to devote life-time efforts to establish a virtuous character. Two propositions emerged from the present study. Firstly, if there exists a channel from effforts to income via ethics, individual income begins to increase and reaches a peak as more and more time is devoted to ethics formation. Additional time after the peak becomes detrimental to the individual income. Secondly, time for ethics formation becomes economically useless when the channel from efforts to income via ethics dissolves. Our simulations and econometric findings support the theoretical explanations