Two Cheers for Czech Democracy

The paper discusses the state of Czech democracy and current research agendas on democracy in the Czech Republic, focusing in particular on the role of political parties. It considers Czech democracy both in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the light of the evolving relationship between CEE and Western Europe. It suggests that current CEE states such as the Czech Republic gradually approximating to models of West European-style party politics may need rethinking. It then examines democracy in the Czech Republic in relation to debates on democratic “backsliding”, arguing that in the Czech cases the principal “backsliding” risks lie less in the rise of authoritarian populists than a potential crisis of democratic representation driven by perceptions of corruption. The paper concludes with some suggestions about future avenues for research on Czech and CEE democracy

DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION IN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES, 1995-2018. CES Open Forum Series 2018-2019

Until recently, many political scientists had believed that the stability of democracy is assured once certain threshold conditions – prosperity, democratic legitimacy, the development of a robust civil society – were attained. Democracy would then be consolidated, and remain stable. In this article we show that levels of support for democratic governance are not stable over time, even among high-income democracies, and have declined in recent years. In contrast to theories of democratic consolidation, we suggest that just as democracy can come to be “the only game in town” through processes of democratic deepening and the broad-based acceptance of democratic institutions, so too a process of democratic deconsolidation can take place as citizens sour on democratic institutions, become more open to authoritarian alternatives, and vote for anti-system parties. Public opinion measures of democratic deconsolidation are strongly associated with subsequent declines in the actual extent of democratic governance and predict not only recent democratic backsliding in transitional democracies, such as Venezuela or Russia, but also anticipated the downgrades in Freedom House scores occurring across a range of western democracies since 2016

The European Commission’s Complicity in Macedonia’s State Capture. CEPS Commentary, 24 July 2017

Macedonia is a textbook example of how the European Commission – instead of acting as a driving force behind the democratic transformation of society – can become a direct accomplice to democratic backsliding, argues Vasko Popetrevski in this new CEPS Commentary

Has EU Enlargement Been, and Will It Continue to Be, a Success? An Evaluation of EU Enlargement's Effects on Policies Pursued by Candidate Countries

In this paper, I discuss whether enlargement has been a successful external policy of the European Union (EU). In particular, I evaluate the policy’s success based on its effects on the policies candidate countries have pursued. I argue that the prospect of entering the European Union has promoted beneficial democratic, economic and social reforms in candidate countries, and therefore can be judged to have been a success. I focus on two sets of enlargement rounds where the potential for the EU’s influence on candidate countries’ policies was greatest: the 1980s rounds, during which Spain, Portugal and Greece – three countries with then-recent histories of dictatorship – were admitted; and the 2004/2007 rounds, during which twelve new Member States acceded, mostly from the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. I conclude that enlargement has, indeed, been a success: The prospect of entering the European Union (EU) has prompted candidate countries to pursue political, economic and social reforms that have contributed to the consolidation of democracy, to improvements in their human rights records, as well as to the betterment of their market economies. Finally, I discuss whether the enlargement process is likely to continue to be successful in improving the candidate countries’ policies, both in the Western Balkans (the likely next focus of EU enlargement), but also in potential further expansions

Has EU Enlargement Been, and Will It Continue to Be, a Success? An Evaluation of EU Enlargement's Effects on Policies Pursued by Candidate Countries

In this paper, I discuss whether enlargement has been a successful external policy of the European Union (EU). In particular, I evaluate the policy’s success based on its effects on the policies candidate countries have pursued. I argue that the prospect of entering the European Union has promoted beneficial democratic, economic and social reforms in candidate countries, and therefore can be judged to have been a success. I focus on two sets of enlargement rounds where the potential for the EU’s influence on candidate countries’ policies was greatest: the 1980s rounds, during which Spain, Portugal and Greece – three countries with then-recent histories of dictatorship – were admitted; and the 2004/2007 rounds, during which twelve new Member States acceded, mostly from the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. I conclude that enlargement has, indeed, been a success: The prospect of entering the European Union (EU) has prompted candidate countries to pursue political, economic and social reforms that have contributed to the consolidation of democracy, to improvements in their human rights records, as well as to the betterment of their market economies. Finally, I discuss whether the enlargement process is likely to continue to be successful in improving the candidate countries’ policies, both in the Western Balkans (the likely next focus of EU enlargement), but also in potential further expansions.enlargement, European Union, democratization, economic reform, human rights, democratic consolidation, social reform, Regional Integration, International Organization, Multilevel Governance, Supranational Institutions

CENTRAL EUROPE’S DESCENT INTO AUTOCRACY: ON AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM. CES Open Forum Series 2018-2019, September 4, 2018

The article offers an analysis of the particular type of populism that has evolved in ECE, most notably in Hungary and Poland. The new populism in ECE differs from other populisms because it combines the elements of populism, ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism. Adhering to a similar script, which consists of sustained attacks on rule of law institutions, civil rights and freedoms, the media and electoral rules, both populist governments in a relatively short period of time dismantled almost all the key cornerstones of democracy in Hungary and Poland. The current surge of populism in ECE demonstrates that constitutional democracy is in great danger when its core principles no longer enjoy wide democratic support. Paradoxically, constitutional democracy can play its “counter-majoritarian” role only when a majority of the people believe that it is the only game in town. Ultimately, democratic political parties and social movements with credible political ideas and programs offer the best hope for the survival of constitutional democracy. The role of law and constitutional checks and balances is less of an essential bulwark against democratic backsliding than is traditionally presumed in the legal literature

The divided continent: Understanding Europe’s social landscape in 2020 and beyond. European Policy Centre 11 February 2020

The political upheaval and dysfunction of recent years have focused political minds on better understanding the volatility underpinning European electorates. Interest in public opinion research has soared, yet it can be difficult to draw the findings of such surveys and focus groups into something meaningful and cohesive, from which genuine insights can be drawn. It is pertinent that policymakers at both the national and EU institutional levels grasp a clear and incisive idea of what is taking place culturally, socially and politically in EU member states, and that these tea leaves can be interpreted and harnessed to produce responsive, targeted policies. This research analysis report sets out the findings of a major survey conducted across 13 EU member states (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands), which were selected to provide a representative snapshot of the bloc as a whole. This survey was expansive in its scope and unique in its focus on social and cultural issues, as well as politics, leadership and economic security. The data is interpreted through three distinct themes, each of which is likely to play a critical role in Europe’s ‘mood music’ over its coming parliamentary term: nostalgia, intergenerational conflict and democratic legitimacy. These themes have become the subject of much amateur punditry, although institutional understanding of their complex nature is often shallow. Therefore, this paper seeks to shine a more evidenced-based contextual light around their formation and nuances of application

Protecting democracy inside the European Union? The party politics of sanctioning democratic backsliding

As the salience of ‘democratic backsliding’ in member states of the European Union (EU) increases, preferences inside EU institutions about whether to sanction governments that breach liberal democratic principles diverge. Anecdotal evidence suggests that party politics play a key role in determining attitudes towards sanctions: parties strategically protect target governments that belong to their European party family. This paper conducts a first systematic analysis of this claim. I examine a most-likely case for partisan politics – the position of political groups in the European Parliament. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Analysis of positions towards backsliding in Hungary (since 2010) and Romania (in 2012) finds that party politics do, indeed, matter, but that they cannot be reduced to ideological distance (in Left/Right terms). Preferences about sanctions are the result of conjectural causation, in which parties’ commitment to liberal democracy as well as their attitudes towards European integration also play a role. An implication of this finding is that while partisan politics can be an obstacle to the use of sanctions, specific partisan configurations are more conducive, e.g. if sanctions target governments of the Left