Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints

On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its domestic public debt, declared a moratorium on the private banks' foreign liabilities, which was equivalent to an outright default, and abandoned its exchange rate regime. The depth of the Russian meltdown shocked the international markets, and precipitated a period of serious financial instability. It is important to understand the roots of such a crisis to learn about possible lessons on both issues of bank supervision and international stability. While the visible cause of the crisis was an unsustainable fiscal deficit couples with massive capital flight, the critical question concerns the origin of such circumstances. This paper argues that the structure of individual incentives in the Russian legal context, compounded by the exceptional support granted by international institutions to Russia, explains the cycle of nonpayment, capital flight and fiscal unbalances leading to the dramatic 1998 crisis. We offer an interpretative model of noncompliance, cash-stripping and rational collective nonpayment, which led to the fiscal and banking crisis and ultimately to a complete meltdown. In our view, the banking sector was already insolvent prior to the crisis, and contributed directly and indirectly to it. The last section of the paper puts forward a radical medium-term policy proposal for a stable banking and payment system for Russia. Russia needs to create a basic foundation for savings and intermediation by asset restrictions and market segmentation, crude but effective rules used in all underdeveloped systems to restrain asset stripping and opportunism. Concretely, we propose a cautious extension of deposit insurance away from the monopolistic Sberbank and towards a narrow banking layer. The proposal also proposes to restore charter value in the commercial banking sector.

Contract Development In A Matching Market: The Case of Kidney Exchange

We analyze a new transplant innovation — Advanced Donation, referred to by some as a kidney “gift certificate,” “layaway plan,” or “voucher — as a case study offering insights on both market and contract development. Advanced Donation provides an unusual window into the evolution of the exchange of a single good — a kidney for transplantation — from gift, to simple barter, to exchange with a temporal separation of obligations that relies solely on trust and reputational constraints for enforcement, to a complex matching market in which the parties rely, at least in part, on formal contract to define and clarify their obligations to each other. The transplant community, however, has historically viewed formal contracts in the transplant setting with discomfort, and that traditional discomfort remains evident in current Advanced Donation practice. We conclude that the use of formal contracts in Advanced Donation is likely inadvertent, and the contracts, in a number of ways, are inadequate to tackle the complex, nonsimultaneous exchange of kidneys in which patients donate a kidney before their intended recipients have been matched with a potential donor

Russian Financial Transition: The Development of Institutions and Markets for Growth

A well-developed financial intermediation industry increases domestic savings, efficiently allocates investment resources to the most productive uses in the economy and increases the rate of economic growth. In the Soviet economy the banking system served as a means of collecting household savings and a means of distributing centrally determined capital grants to enterprises. Banks then audited enterprise financial activities to ensure compliance to the financial plan. After a decade the transition from the Soviet banking system to a market oriented banking system is incomplete and fraught with uncertainty. While the number of financial institutions has increased dramatically, the state sector still dominates financial sector activity, the legal and regulatory framework is incomplete, information necessary for risk management is of poor quality and policy makers and regulators have been slow to act to improve intermediation services. While significant progress has been made, the commonly recognized characteristics of a sound financial system are not yet met.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39839/3/wp455.pd

Microeconomic Aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000

The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS) over the period 1950-2000. The key structural change in this region is the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent attempt at transition to a market economy. We begin the paper with an examination of the key legacies from the socialist period. We then examine the key microeconomic actors in transition economies: households, enterprises, and government officials. Although there are many common processes at work, differences in economic performance tend to coincide with the geographical divide. Legacies play an important part. We also argue that differences in openness also plays an important role in generating different outcomes. These factors, combined with defects in the political and legal system, have given rise to a vicious circle of resistance to reform in the NIS.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39732/3/wp348.pd

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

In this paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.barter, demonetisation, debt overhang, renegotiations

Barter relationships

We offer a simple economic model of repeated barter to explore current economic exchange in Russia: individuals trade with each other in a dynamic environment where the threat of dissolving the relationship constrains the incentives to cheat. We show how the value of future interactions affects the willingness of individuals to trade with each other; only when rates of interaction are large can trust compensate for an absence of money. Moreover, when trading relationships are asymmetric – either in the trading partners’ values for each other’s goods or in their relative bargaining power – the resulting barter allocations are distorted, as goods must be used for liquidity reasons. When third-party middlemen exist who can facilitate barter, they command a premium for their services, and have preferences for improved liquidity which may or may not correspond with the other traders in the barter economy. Fourth, we demonstrate that the restriction of trading to tight trading networks may be a socially efficient response to insufficient barter interactions. Finally, we consider how liquidity constraints affect pricing, and illustrate how the existence of a barter market can mute incentives to change prices in response to credit crunches.Barter, non-monetary exchange

MEETING PRIVATE GRADES AND STANDARDS IN TRANSITION AGRICULTURE: EXPERIENCES FROM THE ARMENIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY

Livestock Production/Industries,