Globalization and Trust: Theory and Evidence from Cooperatives

We study the effect of globalization on the stock of trust in organizations. We present a simple model of endogenous trust and show that contrary to centralized hierarchies (pure limited liability firms), decentralized organizational structures (cooperatives) foster the emergence of trust. We treat organizations as directly observable ‘summary statistics’ for underlying trust and ask what will be the fate of trust as the world becomes increasingly globalized. Because the cooperative is an intrinsically less efficient organizational form and globalization implies harsher competitive pressures, conventional wisdom suggests that the viability of cooperatives is in jeopardy. We show that this is not necessarily true. If the increase in competition is bundled with an increase in uncertainty and risk, the cooperative may become a more efficient organizational form. We conclude that globalization does not necessarily erode trust. The case of Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa is used to motivate assumptions and illustrate the results.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39978/3/wp592.pd

The simple geometry of transmission and stabilization in closed and open economies

This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on macroeconomic stabilization in closed and open economies. We present a stylized theoretical framework, and illustrate its main properties with the help of an intuitive graphical apparatus. Among the issues we discuss: optimal monetary policy and the welfare gains from macroeconomic stabilization; international transmission of real and monetary shocks and the role of exchange rate pass-through; the design of optimal exchange rate regimes and monetary coordination among interdependent economies.Classification-JEL: E31, E52, F42optimal monetary policy, nominal rigidities, exchange rate pass-through, international cooperation

International Schumpeterian Competition and Optimal R&D subsidies

This paper studies the welfare effects of international competition in the market for innovations, and analyzes how competition affects the costs and the benefits of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. I set up a two-country quality-ladder growth model where the leader, the home country, has R&D firms innovating in all sectors of the economy, and the follower, the foreign country, shows innovating firms only in a subset of industries. The measure of the set of sectors where R&D workers from both countries compete for innovation determines the scale of international Schumpeterian competition. Both governments engage in a strategic R&D subsidy game and respond optimally to changes in competition. For a given level of subsidies, increases in foreign competition raise the quality of goods available (growth effect) and lowers domestic profits (business-stealing effect); the overall effect of competition on domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting forces. When governments play a strategic subsidy game, increases in foreign competition trigger a defensive innovation policy mechanism that raises the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Cooperation in subsidies leads both countries to set higher subsidies. Finally, while cooperation is beneficial for the global economy, there exists a threshold level of competition below which the home country experiences welfare losses under cooperation.international competition, endogenous technical change, growth theory, strategic R&D subsidies, international policy cooperation

The Simple Geometry of Transmission and Stabilization in Closed and Open Economies

This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on macroeconomic stabilization in closed and open economies. We present a stylized theoretical framework, and illustrate its main properties with the help of an intuitive graphical apparatus. Among the issues we discuss: optimal monetary policy and the welfare gains from macroeconomic stabilization; international transmission of real and monetary shocks and the role of exchange rate pass-through; the design of optimal exchange rate regimes and monetary coordination among interdependent economies.

Some reflections on multilateral environmental agreements

In an international setting, sovereignty of countries imposes serious problems on compliance and participation for a multilateral environmental agreement. This paper discusses both problems simultaneously in a three-country-setting. It employs a repeated-game-model and develops some basic conditions which agreements must meet. These conditions are applied on a specific model which allows only a subcoalition of two countries to join an agreement. However, this subcoalition is able to introduce transfer policies which initiate extra reductions of the outsider country. The paper shows that transfer policies may be based on a cost-inferior technology which makes non-compliance less attractive.

The Economics of Child Trafficking (Part II)

The trafficking of children is a thriving business. In this paper, we highlight key economic characteristics of this business. We show that the fight against child trafficking is far from trivial and that supply-side policies have very limited effect unless preceded by attacks on the demand side. Successful policies involve international cooperation on both fronts. We work within a model of a source country to highlight the necessary ingredients of a successful international cooperation towards the elimination of child trafficking.Child trafficking, worst forms of child labor, international coordination

Modeling the fiscal impacts caused by climate change

Aim of the paper: The purpose is to gather the practices and to model the impacts of climate change on fiscal spending and revenues, responsibilities and opportunities, balance and debt related to climate change (CC). Methodology of the paper: The methodology will distinguish fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation, besides direct and indirect costs. It will also introduce cost benefit analyses to evaluate the propensity of policy makers for action or passivity. Several scenarios will be drafted to see the different outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the natural and artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. There will be a list of actions when the fiscal correction of market failures will be necessary. Findings: There will be a summary and synthesis of estimation models on CC impacts on public finances, and morals of existing/existed budgeting practices on mitigation. The model will be based on damages (and maybe benefits) from CC, adjusted with probabilities of scenarios and policy making propensity for action. Findings will cover the way of funding of fiscal costs. Practical use, value added: From the synthesis of model, the fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation can be estimated for any developed, emerging and developing countries. The paper will try to reply, also, for the challenge how to harmonize fiscal and developmental sustainability