The Extreme Risk of Personal Data Breaches & The Erosion of Privacy

Personal data breaches from organisations, enabling mass identity fraud, constitute an \emph{extreme risk}. This risk worsens daily as an ever-growing amount of personal data are stored by organisations and on-line, and the attack surface surrounding this data becomes larger and harder to secure. Further, breached information is distributed and accumulates in the hands of cyber criminals, thus driving a cumulative erosion of privacy. Statistical modeling of breach data from 2000 through 2015 provides insights into this risk: A current maximum breach size of about 200 million is detected, and is expected to grow by fifty percent over the next five years. The breach sizes are found to be well modeled by an \emph{extremely heavy tailed} truncated Pareto distribution, with tail exponent parameter decreasing linearly from 0.57 in 2007 to 0.37 in 2015. With this current model, given a breach contains above fifty thousand items, there is a ten percent probability of exceeding ten million. A size effect is unearthed where both the frequency and severity of breaches scale with organisation size like $s^{0.6}$. Projections indicate that the total amount of breached information is expected to double from two to four billion items within the next five years, eclipsing the population of users of the Internet. This massive and uncontrolled dissemination of personal identities raises fundamental concerns about privacy.Comment: 16 pages, 3 sets of figures, and 4 table

Quantitative information flow, with a view

We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdroppers, both quantitatively ( how much information is leaked) and qualitatively ( what properties are leaked). To this purpose, we extend information hiding systems ( ihs ), a model where the secret-observable relation is represented as a noisy channel, with views : basically, partitions of the state-space. Given a view W and n independent observations of the system, one is interested in the probability that a Bayesian adversary wrongly predicts the class of W the underlying secret belongs to. We offer results that allow one to easily characterise the behaviour of this error probability as a function of the number of observations, in terms of the channel matrices defining the ihs and the view W . In particular, we provide expressions for the limit value as n → ∞, show by tight bounds that convergence is exponential, and also characterise the rate of convergence to predefined error thresholds. We then show a few instances of statistical attacks that can be assessed by a direct application of our model: attacks against modular exponentiation that exploit timing leaks, against anonymity in mix-nets and against privacy in sparse datasets