Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, i.e. willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.auction ; corruption ; collusion

Heuristic bidding strategies for multiple heterogeneous auctions

This paper investigates utility maximising bidding heuristics for agents that participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions, in which the auction format and the starting and closing times can be different. Our strategy allows an agent to procure one or more items and to participate in any number of auctions. For this case, forming an optimal bidding strategy by global utility maximisation is computationally intractable, and so we develop two-stage heuristics that first provide reasonable bidding thresholds with simple strategies before deciding which auctions to participate in. The proposed approach leads to an average gain of at least 24% in agent utility over commonly used benchmarks

Centralized versus market-based approaches to mobile task allocation problem: State-of-the-art

Centralized approach has been adopted for finding solutions to resource allocation problems (RAPs) in many real-life applications. On the other hand, market-based approach has been proposed as an alternative to solve the problem due to recent advancement in ICT technologies. In spite of the existence of some efforts to review the pros and cons of each approach in RAPs, the studies cannot be directly applied to specific problem domains like mobile task allocation problem which is characterised with high level of uncertainty on the availability of resources (workers). This paper aims to review existing studies on task allocation problems(TAPs) focusing on those two approaches and their comparison and identify major issues that need to be resolved for comparing the two approaches in mobile task allocation problems. Mobile Task Allocation Problem (MTAP) is defined and its problematic structures are explained in relation with task allocation to mobile workers. Solutions produced by each approach to some applications and variations of MTAP are also discussed and compared. Finally, some future research directions are identified in order to compare both approaches in function of uncertainty emerging from the mobile nature of the MTAP

Dynamic threshold policy for delaying and breaking commitments in transportation auctions

In this paper we consider a transportation procurement auction consisting of shippers and carriers. Shippers offer time sensitive pickup and delivery jobs and carriers bid on these jobs. We focus on revenue maximizing strategies for shippers in sequential auctions. For this purpose we propose two strategies, namely delaying and breaking commitments. The idea of delaying commitments is that a shipper will not agree with the best bid whenever it is above a certain reserve price. The idea of breaking commitments is that the shipper allows the carriers to break commitments against certain penalties. The benefits of both strategies are evaluated with simulation. In addition we provide insight in the distribution of the lowest bid, which is estimated by the shippers

Smoothing sparse and unevenly sampled curves using semiparametric mixed models: An application to online auctions

Functional data analysis can be challenging when the functional objects are sampled only very sparsely and unevenly. Most approaches rely on smoothing to recover the underlying functional object from the data which can be difficult if the data is irregularly distributed. In this paper we present a new approach that can overcome this challenge. The approach is based on the ideas of mixed models. Specifically, we propose a semiparametric mixed model with boosting to recover the functional object. While the model can handle sparse and unevenly distributed data, it also results in conceptually more meaningful functional objects. In particular, we motivate our method within the framework of eBay's online auctions. Online auctions produce monotonic increasing price curves that are often correlated across two auctions. The semiparametric mixed model accounts for this correlation in a parsimonious way. It also estimates the underlying increasing trend from the data without imposing model-constraints. Our application shows that the resulting functional objects are conceptually more appealing. Moreover, when used to forecast the outcome of an online auction, our approach also results in more accurate price predictions compared to standard approaches. We illustrate our model on a set of 183 closed auctions for Palm M515 personal digital assistants

Interaction between intelligent agent strategies for real-time transportation planning

In this paper we study the real-time scheduling of time-sensitive full truckload pickup-and-delivery jobs. The problem involves the allocation of jobs to a fixed set of vehicles which might belong to dfferent collaborating transportation agencies. A recently proposed solution methodology for this problem is the use of a multi-agent system where shipper agents other jobs through sequential auctions and vehicle agents bid on these jobs. In this paper we consider such a multi-agent system where both the vehicle agents and the shipper agents are using profit maximizing look-ahead strategies. Our main contribution is that we study the interrelation of these strategies and their impact on the system-wide logistical costs. From our simulation results, we conclude that the system-wide logistical costs (i) are always reduced by using the look-ahead policies instead of a myopic policy (10-20%) and (ii) the joint effect of two look-ahead policies is larger than the effect of an individual policy. To provide an indication of the savings that might be realized with a central solution methodology, we benchmark our results against an integer programming approach

Moving from Data-Constrained to Data-Enabled Research: Experiences and Challenges in Collecting, Validating and Analyzing Large-Scale e-Commerce Data

Widespread e-commerce activity on the Internet has led to new opportunities to collect vast amounts of micro-level market and nonmarket data. In this paper we share our experiences in collecting, validating, storing and analyzing large Internet-based data sets in the area of online auctions, music file sharing and online retailer pricing. We demonstrate how such data can advance knowledge by facilitating sharper and more extensive tests of existing theories and by offering observational underpinnings for the development of new theories. Just as experimental economics pushed the frontiers of economic thought by enabling the testing of numerous theories of economic behavior in the environment of a controlled laboratory, we believe that observing, often over extended periods of time, real-world agents participating in market and nonmarket activity on the Internet can lead us to develop and test a variety of new theories. Internet data gathering is not controlled experimentation. We cannot randomly assign participants to treatments or determine event orderings. Internet data gathering does offer potentially large data sets with repeated observation of individual choices and action. In addition, the automated data collection holds promise for greatly reduced cost per observation. Our methods rely on technological advances in automated data collection agents. Significant challenges remain in developing appropriate sampling techniques integrating data from heterogeneous sources in a variety of formats, constructing generalizable processes and understanding legal constraints. Despite these challenges, the early evidence from those who have harvested and analyzed large amounts of e-commerce data points toward a significant leap in our ability to understand the functioning of electronic commerce.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342306000000231 in the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents?

Both mainstream economics and its critics have focused on models of individual rational agents even though most important decisions are made by small groups. Little systematic work has been done to study the behavior of small groups as decision-making agents in markets and other strategic games. This may limit the relevance of both economics and its critics to the objective of developing an understanding of how most important decisions are made. In order to gain some insight into this issue, this paper compares group and individual economic behavior. The objective of the research is to learn whether there are systematic differences between decisions made by groups and individual agents in market environments characterized by risky outcomes. A quantitative measure of deviation from minimallyrational decisions is used to compare group and individual behavior in common value auctions.