The Cowl - v.27 - n.19 - May 12, 1965

The Cowl - student newspaper of Providence College. Vol 27, Number 19 - May 12, 1965. 10 pages

On the computational complexity of ethics: moral tractability for minds and machines

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr’s three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the moral tractability thesis

Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values

The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation algorithm that determines who gets what--and who does not. In this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and estimate weights in a principled way from their responses. We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical values of the weights we computed matter little, other than the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant effect, with certain classes of patients being (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value judgments

A critical and experimental study in the development of moral ideas

This study makes no attempt at a comprehensive history of ethics. It rather approaches some representative theories from the standpoint of the thesis that morality is the socialized behaviour of the integrated personality. The interest is primarily in what tendencies these various theories consider to be innate in man; in their treatment of the socialization of the individual; and of the integration of the personality; in their suggested solutions to the ego -alter conflict; and in their consideration of religion as an integrative force within the personality.The experimental section makes no attempt to measure morality or moral traits, for it is difficult, if indeed it be possible, for a laboratorial test situation, which would be a necessary prerequisite to such measurement, to elicit natural moral reactions from subjects. Furthermore, the objective measurement of morality would necessitate the establishment of a norm as a standard which, when it has been secured, is, after all, a somewhat arbitrary gauge for measuring what many think to be incommensurable. Henri Clavier (1) speaks to the point in these words: " There is no algebra or arithmetic of the soul, neither a physics, a chemistry, nor a physiology ".This study, rather, tries to discover what development of moral ideas takes place in the mind of the child in early adolescence, in that period of growth when self -consciousness and moral responsibility are thought to become manifest.The method used is the group questionnaire. Since words are but the symbols of ideas, it is assumed that ethical ideas and moral vocabulary develop together. It may be objected that words carry varying shades of meaning for various children; but this difficulty inheres in language itself. It may be further held that the questionnaire measures intelligence by means of a moral vocabulary; but even if this be the case, such measurement of intelligence does not exclude a simultaneous measurement of moral ideas.The questions of the test are based upon the theory that central to the development of moral behaviour is the development, within society, of the self -regarding sentiment.Some writers hold that morality is merely custom, a social phenomenon. Others hold that ethics treats of what ought to be, that it is constituted of those principles which determine the true worth of ultimate ends of conduct. The present essay presents the thesis that the criteria of morality are two: first, socialization of behaviour; second, integration of the personality around a worthy master sentiment.Although "meta- psychological" theories are not.legitimately a part of psychology, this essay, in one instance, dares to trespass slightly upon metaphysical territory, because in this case that field is not wholly foreign to the present thesis. This transgression is noted where made."Ideas" are considered to be simply the conditions of one's thinking upon any subject - the " enduring cognitive dispositions and systems of dispositions ""Concepts ", in addition, are thought of as partaking of the nature of the universal rather than of the particular. "Ideals" are those constructs of the imagination and reflection which embody highest values; they serve as archetypes for the determination of the copy. ideals are mental constructs " in which needs find their fulfilment"

An Explanatory Model of Motivation for Cyber-Attacks Drawn from Criminological Theories

A new influence model for Cyber Security is presented that deals with security attacks and implementation of security measures from an attacker's perspective. The underlying hypothesis of this model is that Criminological theories of Rational Choice, Desire for Control, and Low Self-Control are relevant to cybercrime and thereby aid in the understanding its basic Motivation. The model includes the roles of Consequences, Moral Beliefs such as Shame and Embarrassment together with Formal Sanctions in deterring cybercrime, as well as role of Defense Posture to limit the Opportunity to attack and increase the likelihood that an attacker will be detected and exposed. One of the motivations of the study was the observation that few attempts have been made to understand cybercrime, in the context of typical crime because: (a) an attacker may consider his actions as victimless due to remoteness of the victim; (b) ease to commit cybercrimes due to opportunities afforded by the Internet and its accessibility, and readily available tools and knowledge for an attack; and (c) vagueness of cybercrime laws that makes prosecution difficult. In developing the model, information from studies in classical crime was related to Cybercrime allowing for analysis of past cyber-attacks, and subsequently preventing future IS attacks, or mitigating their effects. The influence model's applicability is demonstrated by applying it to case studies of actual information attacks which were prosecuted through the United States Courts, and whose judges' opinions are used for statements of facts. Additional, demonstration of the use and face validity of the model is through the mapping of the model to major annual surveys' and reports' results of computer crime. The model is useful in qualitatively explaining "best practices" in protecting information assets and in suggesting emphasis on security practices based on similar results in general criminology