23 research outputs found
Fermatâs last theorem proved in Hilbert arithmetic. I. From the proof by induction to the viewpoint of Hilbert arithmetic
In a previous paper, an elementary and thoroughly arithmetical proof of Fermatâs last theorem by induction has been demonstrated if the case for ân = 3â is granted as proved only arithmetically (which is a fact a long time ago), furthermore in a way accessible to Fermat himself though without being absolutely and precisely correct. The present paper elucidates the contemporary mathematical background, from which an inductive proof of FLT can be inferred since its proof for the case for ân = 3â has been known for a long time. It needs âHilbert mathematicsâ, which is inherently complete unlike the usual âGödel mathematicsâ, and based on âHilbert arithmeticâ to generalize Peano arithmetic in a way to unify it with the qubit Hilbert space of quantum information. An âepochĂ© to infinityâ (similar to Husserlâs âepochĂ© to realityâ) is necessary to map Hilbert arithmetic into Peano arithmetic in order to be relevant to Fermatâs age. Furthermore, the two linked semigroups originating from addition and multiplication and from the Peano axioms in the final analysis can be postulated algebraically as independent of each other in a âHamiltonâ modification of arithmetic supposedly equivalent to Peano arithmetic. The inductive proof of FLT can be deduced absolutely precisely in that Hamilton arithmetic and the pransfered as a corollary in the standard Peano arithmetic furthermore in a way accessible in Fermatâs epoch and thus, to himself in principle. A future, second part of the paper is outlined, getting directed to an eventual proof of the case ân=3â based on the qubit Hilbert space and the Kochen-Specker theorem inferable from it
Welcome to Hell on Earth - Artificial Intelligence, Babies, Bitcoin, Cartels, China, Democracy, Diversity, Dysgenics, Equality, Hackers, Human Rights, Islam, Liberalism, Prosperity, The Web
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of one or two billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone elseâthere is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my essay âSuicide by Democracyâ. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly.
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, the Democratic Party and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searleâs The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinkerâs Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmidesâ Standard Social Science Model.
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable worldâ technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers.
Another section describes the religious delusion â that there is some super power that will save us.
The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences.
The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion, i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces these delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendantâs heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems
Law, Politics and Paradox : Orientations in Legal Formalism
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the significance of the logical phenomenon of paradox for law and its relation to politics. I examine a selection of formal legal and political theories that in different ways understand law as a totality of norms, communications or behaviors, how paradox emerges in these theories, and what implications their understanding of paradox has for the relationship between law and politics. I argue that these legal and political theories can be meaningfully and in a novel way grouped according to their orientation to legal totality and paradox.
To my knowledge, there is no research systematically mapping orientations to paradox in legal theory. It is the objective of this dissertation to fill this lack. Paradox presents challenges for formal thought, i.e. thought that analyzes the logic of totalities. Law, considered as a totality or form, gathers a plurality of entities under a common denominator and into a legal order. It is in reflecting on such formalization that we encounter paradoxes. This work aims to contribute to a growing literature on the implications of formalism for contemporary social and political thought by providing a legal theoretical perspective hitherto missing in these discussions.
I use as a heuristic device a grouping of formal thought presented by the philosopher Paul M. Livingston. According to this grouping, there are three main orientations in contemporary formal thought to totality: the constructivist-criteriological, the paradoxico-critical and the generic orientation. These orientations arise on grounds of the âmetalogical choiceâ: they prefer to view totality (such as law as a system or order) either as complete but inconsistent (the paradoxico-criticism), or as consistent but incomplete (the constructivist-criteriological and the generic orientation). I will apply, and modify when necessary, this categorization in order to analyze the theories of Hans Kelsen, Niklas Luhmann, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou and Hans Lindahl, and to provide a systematic mapping of how the nature of law as a totality is understood in contemporary formal legal-political thought.
Accounts of modern law encounter a paradox, I argue, if they observe law as an autonomous, self-referential totality that claims for itself the right to draw a distinction between itself and non-law. The paradox of autonomous law is that it cannot consistently show that it is itself legal as a totality. The basic problem that this implies is that the legal system or collective is unable to legitimate its existence and identity in response to challenges in any other way than by drawing on its own resources â which precisely is what the challenge targets in the first place. If we think of law as offering a framework within which questions of justice and injustice can be answered, the paradox emerges when we question the justice of this framework itself.
The dissertation defends the paradoxico-critical orientation. It argues that the legal system is a paradoxical totality, which implies that there is no neutral metalanguage, such as natural law, that could solve the problem of lawâs self-reference for good. This challenges legal theory to show how the problem of nihilistic relativism, the mere perpetuation of the self-referential legal system, can be mitigated and lawâs normative authority in society rethought.
In Chapter 1, I define the notion of paradox, explicate its meaning and role in formal thought and motivate its application to legal theory. In Chapter 2, I show that in his theory of the basic norm, Kelsen can be understood as oscillating between the constructivist-criteriological position and the paradoxico-criticism, between an attempt at guaranteeing legal orderâs consistency in a metalanguage, i.e. legal science, and an acknowledgement of law as an inconsistent totality. In Chapter 3, I interpret Luhmann as a paradoxico-evolutionary thinker: he observes the legal system as constitutively inconsistent but emphasizes the ways in which the system seeks to make this inconsistency unproblematic for functional reasons. In Chapter 4, I show that in systems theory, just like in Kelsenâs pure theory, the politics of the paradox remains unarticulated. I also show that, for Agamben, a paradoxico-critical thinker, the paradoxical articulation of law and politics is exposed in the state of exception, which, in his analysis, has become the new normal, requiring âmessianicâ politics to deactivate the whole nihilistic sovereign-legal apparatus. For Badiou, the representative of the generic orientation, which I discuss in Chapter 5, what can be said within a language, and by implication a legal system, is pre-determined by that language. Politics, the desire to say the unsayable, is thrown fully outside the language and the legal system to a position from which lawâs incompleteness, its incapacity to offer space for justice and politics, can only be disclosed. Both Agamben and Badiou, thus, think about politics as âpost-juridical.â In Chapter 6, I show that the very inconsistency and paradox at the heart of the legal order is, for Lindahlâs paradoxico-criticism, the site of the politics of its limits. This dissertation, then, concludes that the paradoxical limits of the legal totality can be understood as the site of politics in law. Taking lawâs paradox into account allows for a non-nihilistic conception of politically contestable law and legal authority.VĂ€itöskirja selvittÀÀ paradoksin kĂ€sitteen merkitystĂ€ oikeudelle ja oikeuden ja politiikan vĂ€liselle suhteelle. Analysoin oikeusfilosofian alaan kuuluvassa tutkimuksessani, miten valikoimani oikeus- ja politiikan teoreetikot ymmĂ€rtĂ€vĂ€t oikeuden normeista, kommunikaatioista tai toiminnasta koostuvana kokonaisuutena, miten paradoksi ilmenee heidĂ€n teorioissaan ja mitĂ€ seurauksia sillĂ€ on heidĂ€n kĂ€sitykselleen oikeuden ja politiikan suhteesta. VĂ€itĂ€n, ettĂ€ oikeus- ja politiikan teorian kenttÀÀ voi uudella tavalla hahmottaa selvittĂ€mĂ€llĂ€ suhtautumistapoja oikeuden paradoksiin.
Aiemmin oikeusteoriassa ei ole systemaattisesti selvitetty kÀsityksiÀ oikeuden paradoksista, ja vÀitöskirjan tavoitteena on tÀyttÀÀ tÀmÀ aukko. Se osallistuu kasvavaan filosofiseen keskusteluun formaalin ajattelun merkityksestÀ yhteiskunta- ja poliittiselle teorialle ja tarjoaa oikeusteoreettisen nÀkökulman, joka keskustelusta vielÀ puuttuu.
Paradoksi hahmottuu oikeusteoreettisena ongelmana, kun oikeutta teoretisoidaan kokonaisuutena eli oikeusjĂ€rjestyksenĂ€. KĂ€ytĂ€n tutkimuksessani heuristisena apuna filosofi ja loogikko Paul M. Livingstonin kehittĂ€mÀÀ formaalin ajattelun jaottelua kolmeen, konstruktivistis-kriteriologiseen, paradoksis-kriittiseen ja geneeriseen suuntaukseen. NĂ€mĂ€ suuntaukset kĂ€sittĂ€vĂ€t kokonaisuuksien luonteen eri tavoin ja siten tekevĂ€t erilaisen âmetaloogisen valinnanâ: ne kĂ€sittĂ€vĂ€t kokonaisuudet, kuten oikeuden systeeminĂ€ tai normijĂ€rjestyksenĂ€, joko tĂ€ydellisinĂ€ mutta paradoksaalisina tai konsistentteinĂ€ mutta epĂ€tĂ€ydellisinĂ€. Sovellan tutkimuksessani tĂ€tĂ€ jaottelua ja analysoin sen avulla Hans Kelsenin, Niklas Luhmannin, Giorgio Agambenin, Alain Badioun ja Hans Lindahlin oikeus-poliittista ajattelua. Tavoitteena on systemaattisesti selvittÀÀ, miten nykyaikaisessa formaalissa oikeus-poliittisessa ajattelussa ymmĂ€rretÀÀn oikeuden luonne kokonaisuutena.
VÀitöskirja puolustaa paradoksis-kriittistÀ suuntausta. VÀitÀn, ettÀ moderni oikeus voidaan ymmÀrtÀÀ paradoksaalisena, jos se kÀsitetÀÀn autonomisena, itseensÀ viittaavana kokonaisuutena, joka pidÀttÀÀ itselleen oikeuden vetÀÀ raja oikeuden ja ei-oikeuden vÀlille. Autonomisen oikeuden paradoksi on se, ettei oikeusjÀrjestys pysty itse ristiriidattomasti oikeuttamaan itseÀÀn. OikeusjÀrjestys mahdollistaa riidanratkaisun sekÀ oikean ja vÀÀrÀn, laillisen ja laittoman erottamisen toisistaan, mutta oikeuden yritykset ratkaista tarjoamansa riidanratkaisun oma oikeutus ja laillisuus johtavat paradoksiin. Seurauksena on, ettÀ oikeusjÀrjestelmÀ ja -yhteisö kykenee vastamaan kohtaamaansa kritiikkiin vain omasta nÀkökulmastaan, mikÀ juuri on kritiikin kohteena.
VĂ€itöskirjassa esitetÀÀn, ettĂ€ oikeusjĂ€rjestelmĂ€n ymmĂ€rtĂ€minen paradoksaalisena kokonaisuutena merkitsee sekĂ€ âmetakielenâ, kuten itsenĂ€isen luonnonoikeuden, hylkÀÀmistĂ€ ratkaisuna oikeuden itseensĂ€ viittaavuuden ongelmaan ettĂ€ luopumista tĂ€ydellisen ja konsistentin oikeusjĂ€rjestyksen ideasta. TĂ€stĂ€ seuraa, ettĂ€ oikeusteoria joutuu kohtaamaan oikeuden poliittisuuden, nihilistisen relativismin ongelman sekĂ€ etsimÀÀn uusia tapoja kĂ€sittÀÀ oikeuden normatiivisuus ja auktoriteetti yhteiskunnassa
Educating Semiosis: Exploring ecological meaning through pedagogy
This thesis consists of six essays â framed by introduction and conclusion chapters â that develop possibilities for philosophy of education and pedagogy from the lens of bio-semiotics and edu-semiotics (biological and educational semiotics). These transdisciplinary inquiries have found commonality in the concept of learning-as-semiosis, or meaning-making across nature/culture bifurcations. Here, quite distinct branches of research intersect with the American scientist-philosopher Charles Sanders Peirceâs (1839 - 1914) pragmatic semiotics. I argue in these essays that the research pathway suggested by the convergence of edu- and bio-semiotics, reveals possibilities for developing a (non-reductive) theory of learning (and pedagogy generally) that puts meaning-making processes in a central light. A fully semiotic theory of learning implores us to take an ecological and biological view of educational processes. These processes explore the complementarity of organism-environment relations and the relationship between learning and biological adaptation. They also unravel new implications for education through the basic recognition that meaning is implicitly ecological. Understanding semiotic philosophy as an educational foundation allows us to take a broader and less dichotomized view of educational dynamics, such as: learning and teaching, curriculum design, arts and music education, inter/trans-disciplinary education, literacy (including environmental and digital literacy), as well as exploring the relationships and continuities between indigenous/place-based and formal pedagogical processes and practices. From this meaning-based and ecological perspective, what is important in the educational encounter is not psychologic explanations of learning stages, predetermined competencies, or top-down implemented learning-outcomes, but rather meaning and significance and how this changes through time-space and with others (not only human others) in a dynamic and changing environment. As addressed more directly in the conclusion chapter, these essays unravel the implications of this emerging approach to the philosophy of education, pedagogy and learning theory, specifically by providing conceptual/philosophical possibilities for integrating arts education, science education, and indigenous place-based knowledge into holistic educational approaches and programs
Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 Michael Starks 3rd Edition
This collection of articles and reviews are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy and dictatorship appears inevitable.
Since philosophy proper is essentially the same as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior), and philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the âhuman sciencesâ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the âhard sciencesâ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930âs.
Although I separate the book into sections on philosophy and psychology, religion, biology, the âhard sciencesâ and politics/sociology/economics, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problems as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, but itâs clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of peopleâs time, they are wasting the earth and their descendantâs future.
I hope that these essays will help to separate the philosophical issues of language use from the scientific factual issues, and in some small way hinder the collapse of civilization, or at least make it clear why it is doomed.
Those wishing to read my other writings may see Talking Monkeys 2nd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Stucture of Human Behavior (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (review revised 2019)
Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings).
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Remarks on Wittgenstein, Gödel, Chaitin, Incompleteness, Impossiblity and the Psychological Basis of Science and Mathematics
It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago.
Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical âsystem,â rather than as a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. âGödel shows us an unclarity in the concept of âmathematicsâ, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a systemâ and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Gödel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein commented many times that âtruthâ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and âfalseâ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. Wittgenstein often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godelâs Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ârestâ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Rodych notes ââŠWittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) âŠâ Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like âproofâ, âpropositionâ, âtrueâ, âincompleteâ, ânumberâ, and âmathematicsâ to a result in the tangle of games created with ânumbersâ and âplusâ and âminusâ signs etc., and with
âIncompletenessâ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. âOn Wittgensteinâs account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because âin mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]âŠâ
I make some brief remarks which note the similarities of these âmathematicalâ issues to economics, physics, game theory, and decision theory.
Those wishing further comments on philosophy and science from a Wittgensteinian two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my other writings -- Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock and Yanofsky (2019), and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Religion, Politics, Economics, Literature and History (2019)
Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions as shown by reviews of books by leading authors in philosophy and psychology, which as I note can be seen as the same discipline in many situations. In the next section I comment on very basic confusions where one might least expect them â in science and mathematics. Next, I turn to confusions where most people do expect themâin religion (i.e., in cooperative groups formed to facilitate reproduction). Finally, I provide some viewpoints on areas where all the issues come togetherâeconomics and politics.
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads
millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As Wittgenstein noted,it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious, deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searleâs The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinkerâs Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmidesâ Standard Social Science Model.
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Hence my essay âSuicide by Democracyâ. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly in the last paragraph
Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the âhuman sciencesâ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the âhard sciencesâ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever-present and Wittgenstein, arguably the greatest intuitive psychologist of all time, has laid it before us long ago, beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930âs.
Language is programmed in our genes and is involved in nearly all our social behavior. Philosophy in the strict sense (i.e., academic philosophy), is as Wittgenstein showed us, the study of the way language is used (language games) and I regard it as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (i.e., pretty much everything involving language which is often called System 2 or slow thinking). However, as I hope I have shown in my writings over the last decade, nonlinguistic behavior or System 1 or fast thinking is also described with language and this leads to endless confusion which I have tried to clarify here and which is summarized in the tables that I present.
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent students of behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgensteinâs fundamental discovery âthat all truly âphilosophicalâ problems are the sameâconfusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the sameâlooking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything, but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the modern perspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as âthinking fast, thinking slowâ), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show that this is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior with critical reviews of the writings of a wide variety of behavioral scientists (i.e., everyone).
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable worldâ technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers