Decentralized Delay Optimal Control for Interference Networks with Limited Renewable Energy Storage

In this paper, we consider delay minimization for interference networks with renewable energy source, where the transmission power of a node comes from both the conventional utility power (AC power) and the renewable energy source. We assume the transmission power of each node is a function of the local channel state, local data queue state and local energy queue state only. In turn, we consider two delay optimization formulations, namely the decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP) and Non-cooperative partially observable stochastic game (POSG). In DEC-POMDP formulation, we derive a decentralized online learning algorithm to determine the control actions and Lagrangian multipliers (LMs) simultaneously, based on the policy gradient approach. Under some mild technical conditions, the proposed decentralized policy gradient algorithm converges almost surely to a local optimal solution. On the other hand, in the non-cooperative POSG formulation, the transmitter nodes are non-cooperative. We extend the decentralized policy gradient solution and establish the technical proof for almost-sure convergence of the learning algorithms. In both cases, the solutions are very robust to model variations. Finally, the delay performance of the proposed solutions are compared with conventional baseline schemes for interference networks and it is illustrated that substantial delay performance gain and energy savings can be achieved

Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral