Debt enforcement and the return on money

The rate-of-return-dominance puzzle asks why low-return assets, like fiat money, are used in actual economies given that risk-free higher-return assets are available. As long as this question remains unresolved, most conclusions from monetary models which arbitrarily restrict the marketability properties of alternative assets to make money valuable are difficult to assess. In this paper, I provide a framework in which fiat money has value in equilibrium, even though a higher-return asset is available and there are neither restrictions nor transaction costs in using it. I suggest that the use of money is associated with frictions underlying debt contracts. In an environment where full enforcement is not feasible, the actual rate of return on assets is determined by incentives eliciting voluntary debt repayment. I show that the inflation rate or, more generally, the depreciation rate of an asset in which debts are denominated may function as a commitment device. As a result, money is used in equilibrium and the optimal inflation rate is positive.Money, Inflation, Debt Enforcement, Banking.

Money as a legally enforceable debt

Money is usually regarded as a subject in the domain of economists, but it is really a fundamentally legal notion. In fact, it is a creation of the law. Money is a special object of property, and at the same time a form of debt, enforceable by law which ultimately confers on it the quality of money. The concept of dematerialised property assists in describing the concept of money accurately. The article discusses the different types of money, and the creation of money through central banks and through commercial banks by giving credit. It explores the possible legal foundation of this money creation process. The discussion also looks at the legal regulation of money creation in Germany and presents findings from an interview with a practising commercial lawyer in Germany which confirm the author’s thesis that money is a legally enforceable debt

Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukrainian Data

In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia

Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data

In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39671/3/wp287.pd

Sovereign Debt and the “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis

The academic literature on sovereign debt largely assumes that law has little role to play. Indeed, the primary question addressed by the literature is why sovereigns repay at all given the irrelevance of legal enforcement. But if law, and specifically contract law, does not matter, how to explain the fact that sovereign loans involve detailed contracts, expensive lawyers, and frequent litigation? This Essay makes the case that contract design matters even in a world where sovereign borrowers are hard (but not impossible) to sue. We identify a number of gaps in the research that warrant further investigation

Tax reforms - taxes without tax laws

This paper suggests a new tax system without tax laws, tax collection departments and tax enforcement agencies.This new tax system will be without present system’s all Direct and Indirect taxes accompanied by tax laws, tax exemptions, multiple tax collection departments for States and Centre, compulsory accounting, auditing and tax returns to relieve 7 billion people of the world from the cobweb of ambiguous and complex tax structures, plethora of tax laws, mandatory and cumbersome accounting, auditing, tax returns and consequent quagmire of all tax related cases. Taxation, tax collection, tax enforcement, tax compliance, allocation of revenues to various ministries or departments, distribution of subsidies, implementation of welfare schemes and money supply into the economy are unified and integrated in the banking system. There will be no tax collection expenditure for the Governments and no tax compliance costs for the people either. Citizens need not maintain separate account books and submit tax returns annually for paying either Direct taxes on personal incomes or Indirect taxes while running business or industry. Yet, this new tax system envisages 20 to 30 % more revenues from single tax called "TOP Tax” - than presently accruing revenues from multiple taxes collected by different tax collection departments/agencie

Pari Passu and A Distressed Sovereign\u27s Rational Choices

Part I describes the disruptive role the pari passu clause plays in sovereign debt compositions, stating the case favoring the narrow reading. Part II reconsiders the economic incentives in play at the time lenders close loans to sovereigns, stating a case for the broad reading. Part III works the competing readings through the legal framework of bond contract interpretation. The exercise shows that the matter comes down to a choice between an ex ante reading, conducted as of the time the contract is executed and delivered, and an ex post reading, conducted as of the later time of distress. The Article concludes that the ex post reading legitimately may be attached to the clause, not because it is correct at all times and in all contexts, but because this is in fact a time of distress

Measuring the Institutional Change of the Monetary Regime in a Political Economy Perspective (Groups of interest and monetary variables during the Currency Board introduction in Bulgaria)

The paper explores the possibilities to measure the institutional change in the monetary field. A political economy theoretical framework is built up, where the change of the monetary regime is analyzed as the outcome of the debtors - creditors interactions. In this perspective, the value of some traditional monetary variables during the period before and after the introduction of the Currency Board in Bulgaria, in 1997, reveals the main actors' evolving relative positions.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40118/3/wp732.pd