Leak localization in water distribution networks using pressure and data-driven classifier approach

Leaks in water distribution networks (WDNs) are one of the main reasons for water loss during fluid transportation. Considering the worldwide problem of water scarcity, added to the challenges that a growing population brings, minimizing water losses through leak detection and localization, timely and efficiently using advanced techniques is an urgent humanitarian need. There are numerous methods being used to localize water leaks in WDNs through constructing hydraulic models or analyzing flow/pressure deviations between the observed data and the estimated values. However, from the application perspective, it is very practical to implement an approach which does not rely too much on measurements and complex models with reasonable computation demand. Under this context, this paper presents a novel method for leak localization which uses a data-driven approach based on limit pressure measurements in WDNs with two stages included: (1) Two different machine learning classifiers based on linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and neural networks (NNET) are developed to determine the probabilities of each node having a leak inside a WDN; (2) Bayesian temporal reasoning is applied afterwards to rescale the probabilities of each possible leak location at each time step after a leak is detected, with the aim of improving the localization accuracy. As an initial illustration, the hypothetical benchmark Hanoi district metered area (DMA) is used as the case study to test the performance of the proposed approach. Using the fitting accuracy and average topological distance (ATD) as performance indicators, the preliminary results reaches more than 80% accuracy in the best cases.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Subspace Methods for Data Attack on State Estimation: A Data Driven Approach

Data attacks on state estimation modify part of system measurements such that the tempered measurements cause incorrect system state estimates. Attack techniques proposed in the literature often require detailed knowledge of system parameters. Such information is difficult to acquire in practice. The subspace methods presented in this paper, on the other hand, learn the system operating subspace from measurements and launch attacks accordingly. Conditions for the existence of an unobservable subspace attack are obtained under the full and partial measurement models. Using the estimated system subspace, two attack strategies are presented. The first strategy aims to affect the system state directly by hiding the attack vector in the system subspace. The second strategy misleads the bad data detection mechanism so that data not under attack are removed. Performance of these attacks are evaluated using the IEEE 14-bus network and the IEEE 118-bus network.Comment: 12 page