Choose the Right Rights, Use the Data Right

On Thursday 2nd November, the University of Glasgow Research Information Management Services Team, Jisc, and CREATe held an all-day workshop on licencing research datasets. The purpose of the workshop was to draw out issues around licencing of research datasets with a focus on identifying whether clarifications in terminology and guidance would be useful

Assessing National Human Rights Performance: A Theoretical Framework

Comparative quantitative assessment of human rights is hampered by the length of the list of internationally recognized rights. Not only is the list so long that it is hard to imagine gathering adequate data without an army of researchers (the International Human Rights Covenants contain more than thirty substantive articles, encompassing at least twice as many separate rights), but the results of such a comprehensive effort would almost certainly be overwhelming and bewildering in their complexity. In this article we try to narrow the list of rights concerning which it is necessary to gather data by establishing a theoretical framework for assessing a state’s human rights performance. We identify a relatively small set of ten essential rights that separately are intrinsically essential and together provide good proxies for almost all other rights. An assessment of national performance on these ten rights, we argue, will approximate a comprehensive assessment of a country’s overall human rights record

Can’t Buy Me Rights! The Contractual Structure of Asymmetrical Inter-firm Collaborations

The efficient allocation of control rights in inter-firm collaborations is a widely emphasized issue. In this paper, I empirically identify control rights and the allocation of these rights using a unique survey data set on collaborations between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Fifteen control rights are identified to make up the structure of deals with five rights being the items of contention in deal making (ownership of patents, production, further development of the technology, the right to manage the collaboration, and the right to market universally). I find that the assignment of control rights is related to the bargaining position of firms and incentive issues. Hence, goliaths –pharmaceutical incumbents–subrogate critical rights to the new ventures when the final outcome of the project is depending on the venture’s effort

Data protection and the legitimate interest of data controllers: much ado about nothing or the winter of rights?

EU data protection law is in a process of reform to meet the challenges of the modern economy and rapid technological developments. This study analyses the legitimate interest of data controllers as a legal basis for processing personal data under both the current data protection legislation and its proposed reform. The relevant provision expands the scope of lawful processing, but is formulated ambiguously, creating legal uncertainty and loopholes in the law. The new proposed regime does not resolve the problem.Taking a“rights” perspective, the paper aims to show that the provision should be narrowly interpreted in light of the ECJ case law, and to give effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights; a rephrasing of the norm is desirable. The provision on the legitimate interest of data controllers weakens the legal protection of data subjects

Venture capital exit rights

Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D8