Analyzing Attacks on Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC)

Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is one of the driving applications of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) and promises to bring more efficient and faster transportation through cooperative behavior between vehicles. In CACC, vehicles exchange information, which is relied on to partially automate driving; however, this reliance on cooperation requires resilience against attacks and other forms of misbehavior. In this paper, we propose a rigorous attacker model and an evaluation framework for this resilience by quantifying the attack impact, providing the necessary tools to compare controller resilience and attack effectiveness simultaneously. Although there are significant differences between the resilience of the three analyzed controllers, we show that each can be attacked effectively and easily through either jamming or data injection. Our results suggest a combination of misbehavior detection and resilient control algorithms with graceful degradation are necessary ingredients for secure and safe platoons.Comment: 8 pages (author version), 5 Figures, Accepted at 2017 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC

Delay Performance and Cybersecurity of Smart Grid Infrastructure

To address major challenges to conventional electric grids (e.g., generation diversification and optimal deployment of expensive assets), full visibility and pervasive control over utilities\u27 assets and services are being realized through the integratio

Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems

summary:This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched Stackelberg game framework is proposed to analyze the interdependent decision-making processes. A receding-horizon switched Stackelberg strategy for the controller is derived subsequently, which, together with the corresponding best response of the attacker, constitutes the switched Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system under the switched Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed if the switching signal exhibits a certain average dwell time. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in this paper