Cycles in adversarial regularized learning

Regularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization, machine learning and many other fields of computer science. A natural question that arises in these settings is how regularized learning algorithms behave when faced against each other. We study a natural formulation of this problem by coupling regularized learning dynamics in zero-sum games. We show that the system's behavior is Poincar\'e recurrent, implying that almost every trajectory revisits any (arbitrarily small) neighborhood of its starting point infinitely often. This cycling behavior is robust to the agents' choice of regularization mechanism (each agent could be using a different regularizer), to positive-affine transformations of the agents' utilities, and it also persists in the case of networked competition, i.e., for zero-sum polymatrix games.Comment: 22 pages, 4 figure

Continuous-time Analysis for Variational Inequalities: An Overview and Desiderata

Algorithms that solve zero-sum games, multi-objective agent objectives, or, more generally, variational inequality (VI) problems are notoriously unstable on general problems. Owing to the increasing need for solving such problems in machine learning, this instability has been highlighted in recent years as a significant research challenge. In this paper, we provide an overview of recent progress in the use of continuous-time perspectives in the analysis and design of methods targeting the broad VI problem class. Our presentation draws parallels between single-objective problems and multi-objective problems, highlighting the challenges of the latter. We also formulate various desiderata for algorithms that apply to general VIs and we argue that achieving these desiderata may profit from an understanding of the associated continuous-time dynamics