Cyber-physical security of an electric microgrid

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are physical systems that are controlled or monitored by computer-based systems. CPSs are a combination of computation, networking, and physical processes. As CPSs are a combination of various diverse components, they are vulnerable to several security threats. Moreover, there are many different security domains (not just high/low, nor necessarily hierarchical). This paper utilizes previously developed multiple security domain nondeducibility (MSDND) to uncover potential integrity vulnerabilities in an electric microgrid. Invariants are manually generated using the insights obtained through MSDND analysis and use linear regression to automate the generation of invariants. The vulnerabilities are then mitigated, to the extent possible, by adding executable invariants on system operation. Implementation on the Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) testbed at the Singapore University of Technology and Design is reported. Limitations of the design and successes/shortcomings of attack mitigation are reported --Abstract, page iii

Software Defined Networks based Smart Grid Communication: A Comprehensive Survey

The current power grid is no longer a feasible solution due to ever-increasing user demand of electricity, old infrastructure, and reliability issues and thus require transformation to a better grid a.k.a., smart grid (SG). The key features that distinguish SG from the conventional electrical power grid are its capability to perform two-way communication, demand side management, and real time pricing. Despite all these advantages that SG will bring, there are certain issues which are specific to SG communication system. For instance, network management of current SG systems is complex, time consuming, and done manually. Moreover, SG communication (SGC) system is built on different vendor specific devices and protocols. Therefore, the current SG systems are not protocol independent, thus leading to interoperability issue. Software defined network (SDN) has been proposed to monitor and manage the communication networks globally. This article serves as a comprehensive survey on SDN-based SGC. In this article, we first discuss taxonomy of advantages of SDNbased SGC.We then discuss SDN-based SGC architectures, along with case studies. Our article provides an in-depth discussion on routing schemes for SDN-based SGC. We also provide detailed survey of security and privacy schemes applied to SDN-based SGC. We furthermore present challenges, open issues, and future research directions related to SDN-based SGC.Comment: Accepte

WE ARE ALL GONNA DIE: HOW THE WEAK POINTS OF THE POWER GRID LEAVE THE UNITED STATES WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK

Federal regulations aim to ensure grid reliability and harden it against outages; however, widespread outages continue. This thesis examines the spectrum of regulations to evaluate them. It outlines their structure, the regulations’ intent, and weighs them against evolving cyber and physical threats and natural disaster risks. Currently, the regulatory structure is incapable of providing uniform security. Federal standards protect only the transmission portion of the grid, leaving the distribution section vulnerable to attack due to varying regulations from state to state, or county to county. The regulations cannot adapt quickly enough to meet dynamic threats, rendering them less effective. Cyber threats can be so agile that protectors are unaware of vulnerabilities, and patching requirements are too lengthy, which increases the risk exposure. No current weather mitigation or standard is capable of protecting the grid despite regular natural disasters that cause power shutdowns. The thesis concludes that bridging these gaps requires not increasing protection standards, but redundancy. Redundancy, mirrored after the UK's infrastructure policy, is more likely to reduce failure risk through layered components and systems. Microgrids are proven effective in disasters to successfully deliver such redundancy and should be implemented across all critical infrastructure sectors.Civilian, Department of Homeland SecurityApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited