Circular 12

Ih Alaska— Oats-and-peas make better silage than hay / Silage and silos pay / Field-choppers cut labor costs / Smooth bromegrass is an excellent forage / Alsike clover and Hubam sweetclover / make good annuals / Better forage means bigger profitsIn cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Administratio

Insights gained from conversations with labor market decision makers

I describe insights into wage dynamics and downward wage rigidity obtained from more than two hundred interviews with businesspeople, labor leaders, and various labor market intermediaries and made in the early 1990s in the Northeast of the United States. I explain the morale explanation for downward rigidity of the pay of existing employees and discuss what morale is, why businesspeople care about it, and why pay cuts damage it. I discuss the origin and nature of pay structures internal to an establishment, the relation between pay at different establishments, and why firms tend to lay off workers rather than cut pay. The findings of the study to be discussed are reported in detail in Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall during a Recession. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1999). JEL Classification: E3, J3, J5wage determination, wage rigidity

Firm Performance and Wages: Evidence from Across the Corporate Hierarchy

Does it matter whether you work for a successful company? And if so, does it matter who you are? To answer these questions we construct a unique panel dataset covering the pay of all CEOs, senior managers and a fully representative sample of workers for a large group of publicly-listed companies covering just under 90% of the market capitalization of the UK stock market. We show that senior management appear to have pay that is strongly associated with various measures of firm performance (such as shareholder returns and quasi-rents), while workers' pay is only weakly associated with such measures. A 10% increase in firm value is associated with an increase of 3% in CEO pay but only 0.2% in average workers' pay. Falls in firm performance are also followed by CEO pay cuts and significantly more CEO firings. This is essentially a result of the responsiveness of flexible pay to performance and only senior executives have a large enough share of pay in bonuses to generate a sizeable overall effect on pay. External control matters for pay - firms with lower levels of institutional ownership have smaller pay-performance elasticities for CEOs and do not cut their pay when performance is poor.

Social comparison in the workplace: evidence from a field experiment

We conducted a randomized field experiment to examine how workers respond to wage cuts, and whether their response depends on the wages paid to coworkers. Workers were assigned to teams of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both team members’ wages caused a substantial decrease in performance. When only one team member’s wage was cut, the performance decrease for the workers who received the cut was more than twice as large as the individual performance decrease when both workers’ wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison processes among workers affect effort provision because the only difference between the two wage cut conditions is the other team member’s wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their team member’s pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers’ wages remained unchanged, indicating that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.Compensation, fairness, field experiment, social comparison

Show Me the Money! Dividend Payouts after the Bush Tax Cut

The centerpiece of President Bush's tax cut in 2003 was a sharp reduction in the individual dividend tax rate. The dividend tax cut was designed to spur investment and boost the stock market by increasing the after-tax return on corporate earnings, thus raising stock valuations. The tax cut also reduced the tax bias against dividends to spur larger payouts to shareholders. That reduces the amount of discretionary cash available to executives and will likely reduce the number of Enron-style corporate financial scandals. This study examines the impact of the dividend tax cut after one year. We gathered data on dividend payouts before and after the 2003 tax cut for all Standard & Poor's 500 companies. We found a highly positive response to the tax cut: Annual dividends paid by S&P 500 companies rose from $146 billion to$172 billion, an increase of $26 billion.In addition, special dividends of$7 billion have been paid, raising the total first-year dividend increase to $33 billion.Thus, dividends increased 18 percent without special dividends and 23 percent with special dividends.Twenty-two companies that did not previously pay dividends have initiated regular dividends.Equity values rose more than$2 trillion after the tax cut.The large and positive response to the dividend tax cut, which is scheduled to expire at the end of 2008, suggests that Congress should make it permanent

Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?

We provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. Using US data for 1950-90 we document, contrary to widespread assumptions, substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both across states and over time. Gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes, after controlling for state and time fixed effects. The economic effects seem large: governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in their states. There is strong evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward-for-performanc.' The evidence on the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive, but is suggestive of rent extraction' motives. Lastly, we find that democratic institutions seem to play an important role in shaping pay. For example, voter-initiatives and the presence of significant political opposition lead to large reductions in the income elasticity of pay, and to large increases (at least double) in the tax elasticities of pay, relative to the elasticities that are observed when these democratic institutions are weaker.

The Economic Crisis, Public Sector Pay, and the Income Distribution

An important aspect of the impact of the economic crisis is how pay in the public sector responds – in the face not only of the evolution of pay in the private sector, but also extreme pressure on public spending (of which pay is a very large proportion) as fiscal deficits soar. What are the effects on the income distribution of cutting public sector pay rates or alternative strategies to reduce the public sector pay bill, and how does these vary depending on the evolution of pay in the private sector? This paper investigates these issues using data and a tax-benefit simulation for Ireland, a country which faces a particularly severe fiscal crisis and where innovative measures have already been implemented to claw back pay from public sector workers in the guise of a "pensions levy", followed most recently by a significant cut in nominal pay rates. The SWITCH tax-benefit model first allows the distributional effects of these measures, which achieved a substantial reduction in the net public sector pay bill, to be teased out. The overall impact on the income distribution, set against alternative scenarios for pay in the private sector, is assessed. This provides empirical evidence relevant to policy choices in relation to a key aspect of household income over which governments have direct influence, while at the same time illustrating methodologically how a tax-benefit model can serve as the base for such investigation.public sector pay, income distribution, fiscal crisis

Wages, Supervision and Sharing:An Analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey

Instrumental efficiency wage models predict an inverse relationship between wages and supervision with this relationship becoming more pronounced amongst firms that participate in some form of employee sharing. To be sure, our theoretical exposition predicts that an increase in total remuneration will elicit a larger cut in optimal monitoring in ‘sharing’ rather than ‘non sharing’ firms. In this paper, we explore these predictions empirically using the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. Our results confirm an inverse relationship between supervision and pay but the trade-off is only heightened by the presence of performance related pay and employee share ownership schemes. We also find that employee share ownership and performance related pay are relatively more successful in alleviating the need to monitor, with the rate of profit sharing impacting insignificantly on the level supervision.Monitoring; supervision; profit sharing; employee share ownership; efficiency wages

The impact of communication medium and outcome severity on the effectiveness of social accounts

The present study was designed as a partial test of the model of social accounts by Folger and Cropanzano (1998). Organizational justice researchers have shown that social accounts are effective in reducing negative reactions and displacing blame from the decision-maker following a harmful decision. Using a 2 x 3 completely randomized design, the study examined the effects of outcome severity and media choice on four types of fairness perceptions, medium appropriateness, anger, and turnover intentions. A temporary pay cut scenario was used to manipulate two levels of outcome severity, and the company president provided an explanation of the pay cut using three different media. It was hypothesized that fairness perceptions, anger, and turnover intentions would be most favorable in the low outcome severity conditions and when the social account was delivered through a medium high in media richness. It was also believed that outcome severity and media choice would interact such that the effect of media on the dependent variables would be more pronounced under high outcome severity conditions. One hundred and thirty-two undergraduate students participated in the scenario-based study. Each participant received a brief scenario that stated the president of the company for whom they worked had decided to implement a 10-week pay cut for all employees. A scenario gave detailed information on how the pay cut would affect their weekly net pay

Endogenous Wage Rigidity

We use a random survey of Swedish human resource managers to study the reasons for wage rigidity. Our findings are as follows. First, during the exceptional recession of the 1990s only 1.1 percent of workers received a wage cut. Second, much wage rigidity can be traced to behavioral mechanisms involving negative reciprocity, relative wage comparisons and money illusion. Third, the reasons for wage rigidity differ significantly between large and small establishments, and between the high- and low-end of the labor market. Fourth, there are significant empirical complementarities between efficiency wage mechanisms and worker bargaining strength, and between “exogenous” institutions and endogenous sources of wage rigidity. Fifth, external pay comparisons are a more important source of rigidity in highly unionized establishments. Sixth, there are significant gender differences in pay bargaining and work moral.wage rigidity; survey evidence; matched data; reciprocity; behavioral macroeconomics; labor law