The new resilience of emerging and developing countries: systemic interlocking, currency swaps and geoeconomics

The vulnerability/resilience nexus that defined the interaction between advanced and developing economies in the post-WWII era is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Yet, most of the debate in the current literature is focusing on the structural constraints faced by the Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) and the lack of changes in the formal structures of global economic governance. This paper challenges this literature and its conclusions by focusing on the new conditions of systemic interlocking between advanced and emerging economies, and by analysing how large EDCs have built and are strengthening their economic resilience. We find that a significant redistribution of ‘policy space’ between advanced and emerging economies have taken place in the global economy. We also find that a number of seemingly technical currency swap agreements among EDCs have set in motion changes in the very structure of global trade and finance. These developments do not signify the end of EDCs’ vulnerability towards advanced economies. They signify however that the economic and geoeconomic implications of this vulnerability have changed in ways that constrain the options available to advanced economies and pose new challenges for the post-WWII economic order

Capital account liberalization in China: the need for a balanced approach

This repository item contains a single issue of the Pardee Center Task Force Reports, a publication series that began publishing in 2009 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future.This is the third report stemming from the Pardee Center Task Force on Regulating Capital Flows for Long-Run Development, a project of the Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI) at Boston University. This report is the collective work of experts examining the benefits and risks of accelerated capital account liberalization in China. The contributing authors – all leading scholars and practitioners from around the world (listed below) – met at Boston University in February 2014 to discuss the experiences of other emerging market countries that liberalized the capital account to glean lessons for China as it considers this delicate task. This volume is an outcome from that meeting, presenting the authors’ perspectives on important aspects of capital account liberalization that China should pay special attention to, not only for its own sake, but also in consideration of the potential impacts that China’s actions may have on other emerging markets and the global economy overall

Crisis and contagion in East Asia : nine lessons

The authors investigate the origins of the East Asian crisis and its contagion, examine the channels of contagion, and discuss policy recommendationsThey make detailed recommendations in the context of nine general lessons learned from the East Asian crisis. 1) Preventing crises and contagion: avoid large current account deficits financed through short-term private capital inflows. Aggressively regulate and supervise financial systems to ensure that banks and nonbank financial institutions manage risks prudently. Put in place incentives for sound corporate finance to prevent high leverage ratios and overreliance on foreign borrowing. 2) Managing crises and contagion: In the context of sound policies, mobilize timely external liquidity of sufficient magnitude to restore market confidence. At times of crisis,"bail in"private foreign creditors. When official resources are too limited for the magnitude of the crisis or contagion, and when private creditors are not amenable to coordination, some involuntary private involvement may be needed too. Keep in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all monetary and fiscal stance for responding to crises and contagion. 3) Resolving the systemic consequences of crises and contagion. Move swiftly to establish domestic and international mechanisms for dealing with the assets and liabilities on nonviolable banks and corporations. Cushion the effects of crisis on low-income groups through social policies to ameliorate the inevitable social tensions associated with adjustment. 4) Developing an effective regional financial architecture. Improve mechanisms for preventing, managing, and resolving crises and contagion at the regional level in ways consistent with improvements in the global financial architecture.Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Banks&Banking Reform,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Economics,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation

Investment Strategies to Exploit Economic Growth in China

Since the beginning of the economic reforms two decades ago, the economy in China has enjoyed a real growth rate of 9.6 percent per year. We believe that China is only in the early stages of its rapid-growth period. China is likely to enjoy rapid growth for decades to come at rates well above those of any other large country in the world.

The sustainability of China's exchange rate policy and capital account liberalisation.

This paper deals with two related issues: the sustainability of China’s exchange rate regime and the opening up of its capital account. The exchange rate discussion deliberately passes over the issue of the “equilibrium” value of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation – typically at the heart of the current policy debate – and focuses instead on the domestic costs of the current regime and the potential risks to domestic financial stability in the long run. The paper argues that the renminbi exchange rate should be increasingly determined by market forces and that administrative controls should be progressively relinquished. The exchange rate is obviously linked to well-functioning and efficient capital markets, which require no barriers to capital flows. Thus, exchange rate reform has to be correctly sequenced with reform of the capital account to avoid disruptive capital flows. The paper discusses China’s twin surpluses of the current and capital accounts and attempts to identify the drivers of this “anomalous” external position. The pragmatic strategy pursued by the Chinese authorities in the aftermath of the Asian crisis encouraged FDI inflows and favoured the accumulation of a large stock of foreign exchange reserves. Combined with a relatively weak institutional setting, these factors have been important determinants of the pattern and composition of the country’s capital flows and international investment position. Finally, the paper speculates on the outlook for Chinese capital flows should barriers to capital movements be lifted. It argues that whether China continues to supply capital to the rest of the world or eventually becomes a net borrower in international capital markets – as was the case for most of its recent history – will depend on the evolution of its institutions. JEL Classification: F10, F21, F31, F32, P48.China, exchange rate policy, international investment position, capital account liberalisation, institutions.

China’s “Triangle of Woes” and Its Impact on Financial Stability

The purpose of this paper is to apply Dean’s (2001) model of the ‘Asian governance triangle’ to assess the symbiosis relationships among the Chinese government finance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the banking system in China. According to Dean, the relationship as a whole is fragile and unhealthy. This is because crises of such character are interdependent and contagious in that crisis in any one corner could readily lead to crises in the others. However, China has so far managed to avoid a financial crisis, which according to Dean (2001), is due to three reasons. Firstly, China remains willing to pour public funds into its SOEs and banks. Partly, as a result, hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese people keep adding to their bank deposits, which enable the banks to sustain their flow of non-repayable loans to the SOEs. Secondly, China remains shielded from the crisis by its holding of massive foreign exchange reserves. Finally, the financial system is well protected by its exchange and capital controls. However, over the years, a series of reforms of its SOEs and banking system has severed the symbiosis relationships through the introduction of banking and corporate governance in the system. Any disruption of the gradual approach towards the reforms by hastily adopting a f lexible exchange rate and free capital flows would do more harm than benefit China in the long run.China, corporate governance, banking governance, banking reforms, government finance, state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks

"How to Sustain the Chinese Economic Miracle? The Risk of Unraveling the Global Rebalancing"

This paper investigates China’s role in creating global imbalances, and the related call for a massive renminbi revaluation as a (supposed) panacea to forestall their reemergence as the world economy recovers from severe crisis. We reject the prominence widely attributed to China as a cause of global imbalances and the exclusive focus on the renminbi-dollar exchange rate as misguided. And we emphasize that China's response to the global crisis has been exemplary. Apart from acting as a growth leader in the global recovery by boosting domestic demand to offset the slump in exports, China has in the process successfully completed the first stage in rebalancing its economy, which is in stark contrast to other leading trading nations that have simply resumed previous policy patterns. The second stage in China’s rebalancing will consist of further strengthening private consumption. We argue that this will be best supported by continued reliance on renminbi stability and capital account management, so as to assure that macroeconomic policies can be framed in line with domestic development requirements.Global Imbalances; Rebalancing; Renminbi Revaluation; Stimulus Package; Export-led Growth