Curiosity Killed the Cat and the Asymptotically Optimal Agent

Reinforcement learners are agents that learn to pick actions that lead to high reward. Ideally, the value of a reinforcement learner's policy approaches optimality--where the optimal informed policy is the one which maximizes reward. Unfortunately, we show that if an agent is guaranteed to be "asymptotically optimal" in any (stochastically computable) environment, then subject to an assumption about the true environment, this agent will be either destroyed or incapacitated with probability 1; both of these are forms of traps as understood in the Markov Decision Process literature. Environments with traps pose a well-known problem for agents, but we are unaware of other work which shows that traps are not only a risk, but a certainty, for agents of a certain caliber. Much work in reinforcement learning uses an ergodicity assumption to avoid this problem. Often, doing theoretical research under simplifying assumptions prepares us to provide practical solutions even in the absence of those assumptions, but the ergodicity assumption in reinforcement learning may have led us entirely astray in preparing safe and effective exploration strategies for agents in dangerous environments. Rather than assuming away the problem, we present an agent with the modest guarantee of approaching the performance of a mentor, doing safe exploration instead of reckless exploration.Comment: 8 pages, with 4 page appendix; 1 figur

Pessimism About Unknown Unknowns Inspires Conservatism

If we could define the set of all bad outcomes, we could hard-code an agent which avoids them; however, in sufficiently complex environments, this is infeasible. We do not know of any general-purpose approaches in the literature to avoiding novel failure modes. Motivated by this, we define an idealized Bayesian reinforcement learner which follows a policy that maximizes the worst-case expected reward over a set of world-models. We call this agent pessimistic, since it optimizes assuming the worst case. A scalar parameter tunes the agent's pessimism by changing the size of the set of world-models taken into account. Our first main contribution is: given an assumption about the agent's model class, a sufficiently pessimistic agent does not cause "unprecedented events" with probability $1-\delta$, whether or not designers know how to precisely specify those precedents they are concerned with. Since pessimism discourages exploration, at each timestep, the agent may defer to a mentor, who may be a human or some known-safe policy we would like to improve. Our other main contribution is that the agent's policy's value approaches at least that of the mentor, while the probability of deferring to the mentor goes to 0. In high-stakes environments, we might like advanced artificial agents to pursue goals cautiously, which is a non-trivial problem even if the agent were allowed arbitrary computing power; we present a formal solution.Comment: 12 pages, plus 16-page appendix; to be published in COLT 2020 proceeding