An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire.deterrence; law and economics; incentives; crowding out; experiment

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire.deterrence; law and economics; incentives; crowding out; experiment

Employment, Dynamic Deterrence and Crime

Using monthly panel data we solve and estimate, using maximum likelihood techniques, an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity adversely affects future employment outcomes. This acts as 'dynamic deterrence' to crime: the threat of future adverse effects on employment payoffs when caught committing crimes reduces the incentive to commit them. We show that this dynamic deterrence effect is strong in the data. Hence, policies which weaken dynamic deterrence will be less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since the latter weakens dynamic deterrence as anticipated future redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes. Static models of criminal behavior neglect this and hence sole reliance on them can result in misleading policy analysis.

Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

The standard economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent (type-I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type-II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss-aversion, or differential sensitivity to procedural fairness, type-I errors can have a larger effect on deterrence than type-II errors. We test these predictions with an experiment where participants make a decision on whether to steal from other individuals, being subject to different probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of judicial errors have a large and significant impact on deterrence, but these effects are not symmetric. An increase in the probability of type-I errors has a larger negative impact on deterrence than an equivalent increase in the probability of type-II errors. This asymmetry is largely explained by risk aversion and, to a lesser extent, type-I error aversion.Judicial errors, criminal procedure, procedural fairness, experimental economics, law and economics, crime, deterrence

Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System

crime, beliefs, deterrence, perceptions

An Economic Analysis of Crime

This study estimates the economic factors that explain crime rates for robbery, burglary, and larceny in the United States from 2002 to 2009. A panel data set was used, covering 2002, and 2004 to 2009. Our explanatory variables were sorted into three categories: economic, deterrence, and demographic. Economic variables included unemployment and poverty rates. Deterrence variables included concealed carry weapons laws, preventative spending, and incarceration rates. Demographic variables included the urbanization rate, the dropout rate, the young male population (15-24), as well as the racial composition of the population. Our results varied across the three crime types, becoming less significant as the violence of the observed crime increased. Our results indicate that econometric models have difficulty predicting and explaining crime rates. This may be due to the fact that rational economic calculation is not a primary determinant of crime

The Incapacitation Effect of Incarceration: Evidence From Several Italian Collective Pardons

Incarceration of criminals reduces crime through two main channels, deterrence and incapac- itation. Because of a simultaneity between crime and incarceration–arrested criminals increase the prison population–it is difficult to measure these effects. This paper estimates the incapaci- tation effect on crime using a unique quasi-natural experiment, namely the recurrent collective pardoning between 1962 and 1995 of up to 35 percent of the Italian prison population. Since these pardons are enacted on a national level, unlike in Levitt (1996), we can control for the endogeneity of these laws that might be driven by criminals’ expectations: it is optimal to com- mit crimes shortly before a collective pardon gets enacted. This effect represents a deterrence effect, which, if not properly controlled for, would bias our IV estimates towards zero. The incapacitation effect is large and precisely estimated. The elasticity of crime with respect to prison population ranges, depending on the type of crime, between 0 and 49 percent. These numbers are increasing during our sample period, which suggests that habitual criminals are now more likely to be subject to pardons than in the past. A benefit-cost analysis suggests that pardons, seen as a short term solution to prison overcrowding, are inefficient.Crime, Pardon, Amnesty, Deterrence, Incapacitation

Camera Surveillance as a Measure of Counterterrorism?

Camera surveillance has recently gained prominence in policy proposals on combating terrorism. We evaluate this instrument of counterterrorism as resting on the premise of a deterrence effect. Based on comparative arguments and previous evidence on crime, we expect camera surveillance to have a relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on other forms of crime. In particular, we emphasize opportunities for substitution (i.e., displacement effects), the interaction with media attention aspired to by terrorists, the limits of real-time interventions, the crowding-out of social surveillance, the risk of misguided profiling, and politico-economic concerns regarding the misuse of the technology.Camera surveillance, closed-circuit television (CCTV), public security, deterrence, terrorism

Divide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Optimally designed "courageous" leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties, and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. "Moderate" leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanctions may deter organized crime (a) by protecting an agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 038 \pagebreakAntitrust; Cartels; Collusion; Competition policy; Crime deterrence; Law enforcement; Leniency; Organized crime; Risk dominance; Self-reporting.