4 research outputs found
Correction to "An Efficient Game Form for Unicast Service Provisioning"
A correction to the specification of the mechanism proposed in "An Efficient
Game Form for Unicast Service Provisioning" is given
Generalized Proportional Allocation Mechanism Design for Unicast Service on the Internet
In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social
welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single
infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first
mechanism achieves weak budget balance, while the second is an extension of the
first, and achieves strong budget balance. One important application of this
mechanism is unicast service on the Internet where a network operator wishes to
allocate rates among strategic users in such a way that maximise overall user
satisfaction while respecting capacity constraints on every link in the
network. The emphasis of this work is on full implementation, which means that
all Nash equilibria of the induced game result in the optimal allocations of
the centralized allocation problem.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1307.256
A General Mechanism Design Methodology for Social Utility Maximization with Linear Constraints
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in
such a way that the sum of agents' utilities is maximized under the system
constraints. Such allocation arises in several problems in the general area of
communications, including unicast (and multicast multi-rate) service on the
Internet, as well as in applications with (local) public goods, such as power
allocation in wireless networks, spectrum allocation, etc. Mechanisms that
implement such allocations in Nash equilibrium have also been studied but
either they do not possess full implementation property, or are given in a
case-by-case fashion, thus obscuring fundamental understanding of these
problems.
In this paper we propose a unified methodology for creating mechanisms that
fully implement, in Nash equilibria, social utility maximizing functions
arising in various contexts where the constraints are convex. The construction
of the mechanism is done in a systematic way by considering the dual
optimization problem. In addition to the required properties of efficiency and
individual rationality that such mechanisms ought to satisfy, three additional
design goals are the focus of this paper: a) the size of the message space
scaling linearly with the number of agents (even if agents' types are entire
valuation functions), b) allocation being feasible on and off equilibrium, and
c) strong budget balance at equilibrium and also off equilibrium whenever
demand is feasible
Mechanism design for resource allocation in networks with intergroup competition and intragroup sharing
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for
allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control
protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and
across groups they contest for it. A prototypical example is the allocation of
data rate on a network with multicast/multirate architecture. Compared to the
unicast architecture (which is a special case), the multicast/multirate
architecture can result in substantial bandwidth savings. However, design of a
market mechanism in such a scenario requires dealing with both private and
public good problems as opposed to just private goods in unicast.
The mechanism proposed in this work ensures that social welfare maximizing
allocation on such a network is realized at all Nash equilibria (NE) i.e., full
implementation in NE. In addition it is individually rational, i.e., agents
have an incentive to participate in the mechanism. The mechanism, which is
constructed in a quasi-systematic way starting from the dual of the centralized
problem, has a number of useful properties. Specifically, due to a novel
allocation scheme, namely "radial projection", the proposed mechanism results
in feasible allocation even off equilibrium. This is a practical necessity for
any realistic mechanism since agents have to "learn" the NE through a dynamic
process. Finally, it is shown how strong budget balance at equilibrium can be
achieved with a minimal increase in message space as an add-on to a weakly
budget balanced mechanism.Comment: Technical repor