State of Arizona 2005 Homeland Security strategy: securing Arizona, together

tableOfContents: Foreword -- Vision -- Focus -- Coordination -- Effort -- Description of jurisdictions -- Strategic goals, priorities and objectives -- Capability-specific objectives and action items -- Evaluation plan -- Implementation plan -- Glossary of terms -- Glossary of acronyms Civil defense -- Arizon

Cybersecurity: Are we Ready in Latin America and the Caribbean?

This study aims to deepen our understanding of the cybersecurity risks, challenges and opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Utilizing surveys and other data provided by experts and officials from 32 OAS Member States, the report examines each country’s cyber maturity in five dimensions: i) Cybersecurity policy and strategy; ii) Cyber culture and society; iii) Cybersecurity education, training and skills; iv) Legal and regulatory frameworks; and v) Standards, organizations, and technologies. It should also be noted that the OAS Cybersecurity Program received generous assistance from Microsoft, which helped identify key areas to be presented in the project’s inception phase. The report’s country-by-country approach should help us to develop a more nuanced understanding of each of our States’ cybersecurity regimes and assist policymakers and technicians to strategically improve existing cybersecurity efforts, and to design and implement new initiatives going forward. It must be acknowledged that these findings merely represent a snapshot in time of an ever changing landscape. Further studies will be necessary to continue to keep abreast of the state of cybersecurity in the Americas and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, we hope that by improving our collective understanding of the cybersecurity challenges and opportunities presently confronting our region, the information and analysis contained in this report will assist stakeholders in all sectors government, private sector, academia, and civil society to better work together to build a more secure, resilient and productive cyberspace in our hemisphere. We look forward to continuing to play a role in this vital mission

Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet originated as a U.S. government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to summarize its report--Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). This report (1) identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.

Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet originated as a U.S. government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today--Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). This report (1) identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.

Due diligence in cyberspace: guidelines for international and European cyber policy and cybersecurity policy

Global cyberspace is undergoing fundamental change. There are now frequent references to a "fragmentation of the Internet", but many European and international working groups are also increasingly aware that "a free, open and at the same time secure Internet" is a global public good. However, the political rules adopted for International and European cyber policies and cybersecurity policies will always lag behind technological developments. It is the more important, therefore, to subject these rules to the over-arching norm of due diligence in cyberspace, and to do so on the national, European and international levels. This generates three requirements for Germany's future strategic orientation in cyberspace: European cooperation: integrating national policies into the European framework; inclusiveness: giving different interest groups broad and publicly accessible representation in formulating policies; civilian response: prioritising the civilian component over the military component, particularly in times of peace. However, Germany's major partners are confused as to what goals precisely it is pursuing in cyberspace. It is therefore advisable for Berlin to improve its coordination and communication of responsibilities at the national and EU levels, be it on issues of Internet Governance, the fight against cybercrime, or cyberdefence. (author's abstract

Beyond the Network: A Holistic Perspective on State Cybersecurity Governance

I. Introduction II. Governance: The New Frontier of Information Assurance III. State Cybersecurity Governance Extends Beyond the Network IV. Centralizing Security Governance to Defend State Networks V. Governance Beyond Network Defense ... A. Disruption Response ... B. Law Enforcement ... C. Cybersecurity Centers VI. Conclusion Appendix: States and Indicator

Regulation of Algorithmic Tools in the United States

Policymakers in the United States have just begun to address regulation of artificial intelligence technologies in recent years, gaining momentum through calls for additional research funding, piece-meal guidance, proposals, and legislation at all levels of government. This Article provides an overview of high-level federal initiatives for general artificial intelligence (AI) applications set forth by the U.S. president and responding agencies, early indications from the incoming Biden Administration, targeted federal initiatives for sector-specific AI applications, pending federal legislative proposals, and state and local initiatives. The regulation of the algorithmic ecosystem will continue to evolve as the United States continues to search for the right balance between ensuring public safety and transparency and promoting innovation and competitiveness on the global stage

A systemic review of the cybersecurity challenges in Australian water infrastructure management

Cybersecurity risks have become obstinate problems for critical water infrastructure management in Australia and worldwide. Water management in Australia involves a vast complex of smart technical control systems interconnected with several networks, making the infrastructure susceptible to cyber-attacks. Therefore, ensuring the use of security mechanisms in the control system modules and communication networks for sensors and actuators is vital. The statistics show that Australia is facing frequent cyber-attacks, most of which are either undetected or overlooked or require immediate response. To address these cyber risks, Australia has changed from a country with negligible recognition of attacks on critical infrastructure to a country with improved capability to manage cyber warfare. However, little attention is paid to reducing the risk of attacks to the critical water infrastructure. This study aims to evaluate Australia’s current cybersecurity attack landscape and the implemented controls for water infrastructure using a systematic literature review (SLR). This study also compares Australia in the context of global developments and proposes future research directions. The synthesis of the evidence from 271 studies in this review indicates the importance of managing security vulnerabilities and threats in SCADA water control systems, including the need to upgrade the contemporary water security architecture to mitigate emerging risks. Moreover, human resource development with a specific focus on security awareness and training for SCADA employees is found to be lacking, which will be essential for alleviating cyber threats to the water infrastructure in Australia