3 research outputs found
Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)
We study the costs and benefits of selling data to a competitor. Although
selling all consumers' data may decrease total firm profits, there exist other
selling mechanisms -- in which only some consumers' data is sold -- that render
both firms better off. We identify the profit-maximizing mechanism, and show
that the benefit to firms comes at a cost to consumers. We then construct
Pareto-improving mechanisms, in which each consumers' welfare, as well as both
firms' profits, increase. Finally, we show that consumer opt-in can serve as an
instrument to induce firms to choose a Pareto-improving mechanism over a
profit-maximizing one.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.04005. A full version of this
paper, containing all proofs, appears at arXiv:2302.0028
Incentivizing Honesty among Competitors in Collaborative Learning and Optimization
Collaborative learning techniques have the potential to enable training
machine learning models that are superior to models trained on a single
entity's data. However, in many cases, potential participants in such
collaborative schemes are competitors on a downstream task, such as firms that
each aim to attract customers by providing the best recommendations. This can
incentivize dishonest updates that damage other participants' models,
potentially undermining the benefits of collaboration. In this work, we
formulate a game that models such interactions and study two learning tasks
within this framework: single-round mean estimation and multi-round SGD on
strongly-convex objectives. For a natural class of player actions, we show that
rational clients are incentivized to strongly manipulate their updates,
preventing learning. We then propose mechanisms that incentivize honest
communication and ensure learning quality comparable to full cooperation.
Lastly, we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our incentive scheme on
a standard non-convex federated learning benchmark. Our work shows that
explicitly modeling the incentives and actions of dishonest clients, rather
than assuming them malicious, can enable strong robustness guarantees for
collaborative learning.Comment: Accepted to NeurIPS 2023; 37 pages, 5 figure