61,436 research outputs found
Physical Layer Security: Coalitional Games for Distributed Cooperation
Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a promising technique for
improving the physical layer security of wireless transmission, in terms of
secrecy capacity, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing
physical layer security literature answered the question "what are the
link-level secrecy capacity gains from cooperation?", this paper attempts to
answer the question of "how to achieve those gains in a practical decentralized
wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity cost for information
exchange?". For this purpose, we model the physical layer security cooperation
problem as a coalitional game with non-transferable utility and propose a
distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm,
the wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into disjoint
independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy capacity taking into
account the security costs during information exchange. We analyze the
resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the
users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes such as
mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users
to cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy capacity per
user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: Best paper Award at Wiopt 200
Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set
The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each
transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers
perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive
noise. In this setting, noncooperative transmission does not take into account
the interference generated at other receivers which generally leads to
inefficient performance of the links. To improve this situation, we study
cooperation between the links using coalitional games. The players (links) in a
coalition either perform zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding
to each other. The -core is a solution concept for coalitional games
which takes into account the overhead required in coalition deviation. We
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the strong and weak
-core of our coalitional game not to be empty with zero forcing
transmission. Since, the -core only considers the possibility of
joint cooperation of all links, we study coalitional games in partition form in
which several distinct coalitions can form. We propose a polynomial time
distributed coalition formation algorithm based on coalition merging and prove
that its solution lies in the coalition structure stable set of our coalition
formation game. Simulation results reveal the cooperation gains for different
coalition formation complexities and deviation overhead models.Comment: to appear in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 14 pages, 14
figures, 3 table
A Distributed Merge and Split Algorithm for Fair Cooperation in Wireless Networks
This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which
allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and
distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed.
This algorithm is applied to study the gains resulting from the cooperation
among single antenna transmitters for virtual MIMO formation. The aim is to
find an ultimate transmitters coalition structure that allows cooperating users
to maximize their utilities while accounting for the cost of coalition
formation. Through this novel game theoretical framework, the wireless network
transmitters are able to self-organize and form a structured network composed
of disjoint stable coalitions. Simulation results show that the proposed
algorithm can improve the average individual user utility by 26.4% as well as
cope with the mobility of the distributed users.Comment: This paper is accepted for publication at the IEEE ICC Workshop on
Cooperative Communications and Networkin
Coalition Formation Games for Distributed Cooperation Among Roadside Units in Vehicular Networks
Vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) communications enable vehicular networks to support
a wide range of applications for enhancing the efficiency of road
transportation. While existing work focused on non-cooperative techniques for
V2R communications between vehicles and roadside units (RSUs), this paper
investigates novel cooperative strategies among the RSUs in a vehicular
network. We propose a scheme whereby, through cooperation, the RSUs in a
vehicular network can coordinate the classes of data being transmitted through
V2R communications links to the vehicles. This scheme improves the diversity of
the information circulating in the network while exploiting the underlying
content-sharing vehicle-to-vehicle communication network. We model the problem
as a coalition formation game with transferable utility and we propose an
algorithm for forming coalitions among the RSUs. For coalition formation, each
RSU can take an individual decision to join or leave a coalition, depending on
its utility which accounts for the generated revenues and the costs for
coalition coordination. We show that the RSUs can self-organize into a
Nash-stable partition and adapt this partition to environmental changes.
Simulation results show that, depending on different scenarios, coalition
formation presents a performance improvement, in terms of the average payoff
per RSU, ranging between 20.5% and 33.2%, relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: accepted and to appear in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications (JSAC), Special issue on Vehicular Communications and Network
Spectrum Leasing as an Incentive towards Uplink Macrocell and Femtocell Cooperation
The concept of femtocell access points underlaying existing communication
infrastructure has recently emerged as a key technology that can significantly
improve the coverage and performance of next-generation wireless networks. In
this paper, we propose a framework for macrocell-femtocell cooperation under a
closed access policy, in which a femtocell user may act as a relay for
macrocell users. In return, each cooperative macrocell user grants the
femtocell user a fraction of its superframe. We formulate a coalitional game
with macrocell and femtocell users being the players, which can take individual
and distributed decisions on whether to cooperate or not, while maximizing a
utility function that captures the cooperative gains, in terms of throughput
and delay.We show that the network can selforganize into a partition composed
of disjoint coalitions which constitutes the recursive core of the game
representing a key solution concept for coalition formation games in partition
form. Simulation results show that the proposed coalition formation algorithm
yields significant gains in terms of average rate per macrocell user, reaching
up to 239%, relative to the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the proposed
approach shows an improvement in terms of femtocell users' rate of up to 21%
when compared to the traditional closed access policy.Comment: 29 pages, 11 figures, accepted at the IEEE JSAC on Femtocell Network
Situation awareness and ability in coalitions
This paper proposes a discussion on the formal links between the Situation Calculus and the semantics of interpreted systems as far as they relate to Higher-Level Information Fusion tasks. Among these tasks Situation Analysis require to be able to reason about the decision processes of coalitions. Indeed in higher levels of information fusion, one not only need to know that a certain proposition is true (or that it has a certain numerical measure attached), but rather needs to model the circumstances under which this validity holds as well as agents' properties and constraints. In a previous paper the authors have proposed to use the Interpreted System semantics as a potential candidate for the unification of all levels of information fusion. In the present work we show how the proposed framework allow to bind reasoning about courses of action and Situation Awareness. We propose in this paper a (1) model of coalition, (2) a model of ability in the situation calculus language and (3) a model of situation awareness in the interpreted systems semantics. Combining the advantages of both Situation Calculus and the Interpreted Systems semantics, we show how the Situation Calculus can be framed into the Interpreted Systems semantics. We illustrate on the example of RAP compilation in a coalition context, how ability and situation awareness interact and what benefit is gained. Finally, we conclude this study with a discussion on possible future works
Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in
cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the
probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a
reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum
utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the
network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to
cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem
as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms
for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation
(CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions
while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented
with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation
with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the PU. The
CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e.,
coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs.
For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to
network structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results
show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45%
relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm.
For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required
detection probability through MWCComment: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, to appea
Coalitional Games with Overlapping Coalitions for Interference Management in Small Cell Networks
In this paper, we study the problem of cooperative interference management in
an OFDMA two-tier small cell network. In particular, we propose a novel
approach for allowing the small cells to cooperate, so as to optimize their
sum-rate, while cooperatively satisfying their maximum transmit power
constraints. Unlike existing work which assumes that only disjoint groups of
cooperative small cells can emerge, we formulate the small cells' cooperation
problem as a coalition formation game with overlapping coalitions. In this
game, each small cell base station can choose to participate in one or more
cooperative groups (or coalitions) simultaneously, so as to optimize the
tradeoff between the benefits and costs associated with cooperation. We study
the properties of the proposed overlapping coalition formation game and we show
that it exhibits negative externalities due to interference. Then, we propose a
novel decentralized algorithm that allows the small cell base stations to
interact and self-organize into a stable overlapping coalitional structure.
Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm results in a notable
performance advantage in terms of the total system sum-rate, relative to the
noncooperative case and the classical algorithms for coalitional games with
non-overlapping coalitions
- …