The Constitutional Convention and Court Merger in New York State

In November 2017, voters in New York, for the first time in twenty years, will be asked to decide whether there “[s]hall be a convention to revise the constitution and amend the same?” If it is decided by the electorate to call a convention, “delegates will be elected in November 2018, and the convention will convene in April 2019.” One of the significant goals of a convention would be the achievement of court merger in the Empire State. The purpose of this perspective is to discuss the pros and cons of a constitutional convention with an emphasis on court merger

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident

This Note examines the conflicting provisions of the Liability Convention in the context of the Cosmos 954 incident to determine whether the damages that Canada claimed would be recoverable under the Convention. The analysis will illustrate the need for change in the Liability Convention\u27s definition of the measure of damages. Finally, this Note presents a proposal that would render the provisions more consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Liability Convention

A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague Judgments Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements

Can the Hague Judgments Convention be saved through radical downsizing? It has been more than ten years since the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Hague Conference) first officially began exploring the possibility of drafting a global convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters. (1) It has been more than four years since the Conference presented its preliminary draft convention, (2) itself modeled largely on the European Community\u27s 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I). (3) However, this preliminary draft convention was rejected as unacceptable by the American delegation, (4) and a subsequent interim text (5) indicated that Hague Conference delegates remained far from consensus on a wide range of issues. (6

Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague

From time to time, various state legislatures have adopted resolutions designed to require Congress to call a limited convention in which one or another possible amendments to the Constitution might be proposed. In 1967, thirty-two states, two short of the requisite two-thirds filed such resolutions requesting a convention for the purpose of considering an amendment to overrule the Supreme Court\u27s principal reapportionment decisions. In 1971, Senator Ervin of North Carolina introduced a bill to provide guidelines to be followed upon a state call for a convention. This year, approximately twenty-eight states have adopted some kind of resolution for the purpose of considering an amendment to impose fiscal restraint upon the federal government-to require a balanced budget. Curiously, the convention mode of proposing amendments remains completely untested- no such convention has ever been assembled. Yet the amending convention obviously is contemplated by article V of the Constitution: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratfied by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratfication may be proposed by the Congress .... Several scholars, including Professors Charles L. Black, Jr. and Bruce A. Ackerman, both of Yale Law School, have argued that unless the state legislative resolution reflects a desire to convoke a constitutional convention having the authority to propose an unlimited variety of fundamental changes in the Constitution, Congress should treat the state resolution as a nullity. Recently, Professor Ackerman sent Professor Van Alstyne a reprint of his New Republic editorial and asked Professor Van Alstyne whether he had any thoughts on this. The following is Professor Van Alsyne\u27s reply

A Transnational Perspective on Extending NEPA: The Convention on Environmental Impact on Assessment in a Transboundary Context

Introduction In recent years, the potential adverse impacts of transboundary pollution have received heightened attention both domestically and abroad. 1 International pollution may detrimentally affect outer space, the atmosphere, the oceans, the weather, and possibly the climate, freshwater bodies, groundwater aquifers, farmland, cultural heritage, and life forms. 2 Specific pollution threats include acid deposition, nuclear contamination, debris in outer space, stratospheric ozone depletion, and toxic petroleum spills. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, on April 26, 1986, raised the world\u27s consciousness about the potentially devastating effects of transboundary nuclear pollution. 3 Given this backdrop and the emerging interdependence of nations, particularly within the European Economic Community, it is not surprising that the United States, later joined by twenty-five other countries, signed the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (hereinafter the Convention ) at Espoo, Finland on February 25, 1991. 4 Among its provisions, the Convention establishes legal procedures for bilateral and multilateral protests against future sources of transboundary pollution. 5 The Convention also establishes a transboundary environmental impact assessment process similar to the process implemented under the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which is the first national environmental impact assessment law passed by the U.S. government. 6 However, three years have passed since the United States signed the Convention, and it still has not been formally adopted. 7 Consequently, questions about its legal basis remain. This Article examines issues relating to the implementation and enforceability of the Convention in the United States ..

Up in the Air Without a Ticket: Interpretation and Revision of the Warsaw Convention

This Note will examine the validity of the Convention\u27s objective contract approach to defining international transportation. Although the Convention\u27s requirements will be discussed separately, the focus will be upon the regulated contract and the relationship between article 1 and article 3 of the Convention. The need for revising the Convention will be discussed and a proposal for a new definition of international transportation will be made

The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure

A reworking of the basic terms of the Hague Evidence Convention is proposed. Under current law, US courts typically do not employ the Convention\u27s evidence-taking mechanisms when ordering discovery from either a litigant or a witness subject to the court\u27s subpoena power

Genocide

Overview: Before the 1940s the word genocide did not exist. There was no name for unique mass killings involving thousands to millions of targeted people. A man named Raphael Lemkin coined and popularized the word genocide and took on the responsibility to get the Genocide Convention passed. In the 1980s the United States finally joined The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Genocide Convention), however this came with many clauses and restrictions, causing the terms to be less effective. The convention defined genocide as any criminal acts harming or destroying national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, but left the terms very vague and confusing. It gave no specifics on a number of crimes or deaths which must be reached to qualify as genocide. Even with the passing of the Genocide Convention, there still was no judiciary system to enforce the international law and give repercussions. Many nations, including the U.S., remain resistant to intervene on genocide, and the United Nations has little authority due to limited funding and no military power. The Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda are strong examples of the lack of willingness of the United States and international community to acknowledge genocide, intervene on the crimes, and hold war criminals responsible for their action