6 research outputs found
Controlled Data Sharing for Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting
Although sharing data across organizations is often advocated as a promising
way to enhance cybersecurity, collaborative initiatives are rarely put into
practice owing to confidentiality, trust, and liability challenges. In this
paper, we investigate whether collaborative threat mitigation can be realized
via a controlled data sharing approach, whereby organizations make informed
decisions as to whether or not, and how much, to share. Using appropriate
cryptographic tools, entities can estimate the benefits of collaboration and
agree on what to share in a privacy-preserving way, without having to disclose
their datasets. We focus on collaborative predictive blacklisting, i.e.,
forecasting attack sources based on one's logs and those contributed by other
organizations. We study the impact of different sharing strategies by
experimenting on a real-world dataset of two billion suspicious IP addresses
collected from Dshield over two months. We find that controlled data sharing
yields up to 105% accuracy improvement on average, while also reducing the
false positive rate.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in DIMVA 2015. This is
the full version. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with
arXiv:1403.212
On Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting
Collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB) allows to forecast future attack
sources based on logs and alerts contributed by multiple organizations.
Unfortunately, however, research on CPB has only focused on increasing the
number of predicted attacks but has not considered the impact on false
positives and false negatives. Moreover, sharing alerts is often hindered by
confidentiality, trust, and liability issues, which motivates the need for
privacy-preserving approaches to the problem. In this paper, we present a
measurement study of state-of-the-art CPB techniques, aiming to shed light on
the actual impact of collaboration. To this end, we reproduce and measure two
systems: a non privacy-friendly one that uses a trusted coordinating party with
access to all alerts (Soldo et al., 2010) and a peer-to-peer one using
privacy-preserving data sharing (Freudiger et al., 2015). We show that, while
collaboration boosts the number of predicted attacks, it also yields high false
positives, ultimately leading to poor accuracy. This motivates us to present a
hybrid approach, using a semi-trusted central entity, aiming to increase
utility from collaboration while, at the same time, limiting information
disclosure and false positives. This leads to a better trade-off of true and
false positive rates, while at the same time addressing privacy concerns.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in ACM SIGCOMM's Computer
Communication Review (Volume 48 Issue 5, October 2018). This is the full
versio
A Superficial Analysis Approach for Identifying Malicious Domain Names Generated by DGA Malware
Some of the most serious security threats facing computer networks involve malware. To prevent malware-related damage, administrators must swiftly identify and remove the infected machines that may reside in their networks. However, many malware families have domain generation algorithms (DGAs) to avoid detection. A DGA is a technique in which the domain name is changed frequently to hide the callback communication from the infected machine to the command-and-control server. In this article, we propose an approach for estimating the randomness of domain names by superficially analyzing their character strings. This approach is based on the following observations: human-generated benign domain names tend to reflect the intent of their domain registrants, such as an organization, product, or content. In contrast, dynamically generated malicious domain names consist of meaningless character strings because conflicts with already registered domain names must be avoided; hence, there are discernible differences in the strings of dynamically generated and human-generated domain names. Notably, our approach does not require any prior knowledge about DGAs. Our evaluation indicates that the proposed approach is capable of achieving recall and precision as high as 0.9960 and 0.9029, respectively, when used with labeled datasets. Additionally, this approach has proven to be highly effective for datasets collected via a campus network. Thus, these results suggest that malware-infected machines can be swiftly identified and removed from networks using DNS queries for detected malicious domains as triggers