The effects of contract detail and prior ties on contract change : a learning perspective

Despite the large literature on alliance contract design, we know little about how transacting parties change and amend their underlying contracts during the execution of strategic alliances. Drawing on existing research in the alliance contracting literature, we develop the empirical question of how contract detail and prior ties influence the amount, direction, and type of change in such agreements during the collaboration. We generated a sample of 115 joint ventures (JVs) by distributing a survey to JV board members or top managers and found that the amount of contract change is negatively associated with the level of detail in the initial contract but is positively associated with the number of prior ties between alliance partners. In relation to the direction of contract change, we find that the level of detail of the initial agreements negatively correlates with the likelihood of removing or weakening existing provisions and that prior collaborative experience positively correlates with the likelihood of strengthening of existing provisions or adding of new ones. We also find that prior ties affect the type of change in that JV parents prefer to change enforcement provisions more so than the coordination provisions in the contract. Our paper generates new insights on the complementarities between relational governance and transaction cost economics perspectives on alliance contracting

Size-Change Termination as a Contract

Termination is an important but undecidable program property, which has led to a large body of work on static methods for conservatively predicting or enforcing termination. One such method is the size-change termination approach of Lee, Jones, and Ben-Amram, which operates in two phases: (1) abstract programs into "size-change graphs," and (2) check these graphs for the size-change property: the existence of paths that lead to infinite decreasing sequences. We transpose these two phases with an operational semantics that accounts for the run-time enforcement of the size-change property, postponing (or entirely avoiding) program abstraction. This choice has two key consequences: (1) size-change termination can be checked at run-time and (2) termination can be rephrased as a safety property analyzed using existing methods for systematic abstraction. We formulate run-time size-change checks as contracts in the style of Findler and Felleisen. The result compliments existing contracts that enforce partial correctness specifications to obtain contracts for total correctness. Our approach combines the robustness of the size-change principle for termination with the precise information available at run-time. It has tunable overhead and can check for nontermination without the conservativeness necessary in static checking. To obtain a sound and computable termination analysis, we apply existing abstract interpretation techniques directly to the operational semantics, avoiding the need for custom abstractions for termination. The resulting analyzer is competitive with with existing, purpose-built analyzers

Short-term or long-term contracts? - A rent-seeking perspective

In this paper, .rms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in the contract length a¤ects the .rms. rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract assignment stage, as the .rms value the contract higher. On the other hand, the contract has to be assigned less often, which of course leads to less rent seeking. Finally, a longer contract makes a possible cooperation between the .rms solving the rent-seeking problem more difficult to sustain.Contract length; rent seeking; cooperation; relational contract

Understanding smart contracts as a new option in transaction cost economics

Among different concepts associated with the term blockchain, smart contracts have been a prominent one, especially popularized by the Ethereum platform. In this study, we unpack this concept within the framework of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). This institutional economics theory emphasizes the role of distinctive (private and public) contract law regimes in shaping firm boundaries. We propose that widespread adoption of the smart contract concept creates a new option in public contracting, which may give rise to a smart-contract-augmented contract law regime. We discuss tradeoffs involved in the attractiveness of the smart contract concept for firms and the resulting potential for change in firm boundaries. Based on our new conceptualization, we discuss potential roles the three branches of government – judicial, executive, and legislative – in enabling and using this new contract law regime. We conclude the paper by pointing out limitations of the TCE perspective and suggesting future research directions

Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (RUPA) section 404 establishes a comprehensive definition of partnership fiduciary duties and includes an express recognition of the unique position of a partner. The approach taken by RUPA endorses too great an invasion of the principle of freedom of contract among partners, and a change in the language of RUPA is proposed with the goal of expanding freedom of contract without abandoning the requirement of good faith

Farmers or Slaves: Contract Production

This paper discusses the pros and cons of contract production of agricultural products and specifically investigates contract pig production in the USA. Discussion includes the impact that contract production will have on the traditional farm life as many think of it. The author discusses the major global trends impacting the role of the farmer and concludes that agriculture at the farm is continuing its rapid change. Farm families of the future will be required to change rapidly and to adapt to changes in farm management structure.Farm Management,

Psychological contract expectations of construction project managers

The past 20 years have seen a period of fundamental change for many construction businesses as they have restructured, downsized, de-layered, merged and de-merged to survive turbulent markets and rapidly changing demand cycles. Such change places significant new pressures, challenges and constraints on the employer/employee relationship. This paper argues that these changes are likely to have reconstituted employee expectations of the less formal aspects of the employment relationship, known collectively as the psychological contract. Explores this inductive research which examines the psychological contract of 30 construction project managers

The Social Contract and Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of the Social Contract in the United States Workplace and the Emergence of New Strategies of Dispute Resolution

In recent years, a significant amount of public and academic attention has been devoted to the unravelling of the so-called \u27New Deal\u27 social contract and the emergence of a new social contract between workers and employers in the United States of America (US). In our paper, we will identify the forces of change that undermined the New Deal social contract during the post-World War II era and led to the reformulation of the workplace social contract in the US. It is our thesis that the transformation of the workplace social contract in the US significantly affected the resolution of employment disputes, giving rise to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other new approaches to conflict management. After briefly describing the origins of the New Deal social contract, we will assess the alignment of forces that resulted in the reformulation of the social contract in the 1990s. This new social contract has had historic consequences for most dimensions of the employment relationship, including job security, methods of pay, unionisation, and supervision, but its effects on workplace dispute resolution are especially noteworthy

TreatJS: Higher-Order Contracts for JavaScript

TreatJS is a language embedded, higher-order contract system for JavaScript which enforces contracts by run-time monitoring. Beyond providing the standard abstractions for building higher-order contracts (base, function, and object contracts), TreatJS's novel contributions are its guarantee of non-interfering contract execution, its systematic approach to blame assignment, its support for contracts in the style of union and intersection types, and its notion of a parameterized contract scope, which is the building block for composable run-time generated contracts that generalize dependent function contracts. TreatJS is implemented as a library so that all aspects of a contract can be specified using the full JavaScript language. The library relies on JavaScript proxies to guarantee full interposition for contracts. It further exploits JavaScript's reflective features to run contracts in a sandbox environment, which guarantees that the execution of contract code does not modify the application state. No source code transformation or change in the JavaScript run-time system is required. The impact of contracts on execution speed is evaluated using the Google Octane benchmark.Comment: Technical Repor