Epc/turnkey Contract, Lumpsum Fixed Price Subject to Adjustments

The most important thing before starting the construction project is deciding the type of contract will be used for the project's implementation. In order to get the proper decision, the understanding on various conditions of contracts are required. In Indonesia there are many project using the so called “modified” FIDIC Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Project, but with the incorrect understanding on the reasons of using EPC/Turnkey Contract, so instead of solving the problem it may caused bigger problems in practice, many problems raised during the execution due to such incorrect understanding of the spirit of EPC/Turnkey Contract. Most of Employers, in this case the government institution or state owned enterprises in Indonesia, choose the EPC/Turnkey Contract with minimum understanding of the essence of the EPC/Turnkey Contract. Their reasons of choosing the EPC/Turnkey Contract was the “tied schedule” and the “higher certainty of cost”. FIDIC EPC/Turnkey Contract based on the discussion in this paper, instead of fit the Employer's need only, the EPC/Turnkey Contract still give chance to the contractor to submit their claim (Clause 20) and even the price is fixed, payment could be made once the claim is accepted (Sub-Clause 17.4) means that additional to the contract price can be done. One of the important noteworthy thing is that if there is additional cost it should be “added to the contract price”, while in the conventional contract it should be “included in the contract price”, so the final price will be the same (Sub-Clause 14.1)

Intent to Contract

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties\u27 intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that [n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts\u27 approach to most contracts, the parties\u27 intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social arrangements, reporters’ promises of confidentiality to sources, and gratuitous promises. This Article develops an analytic framework for evaluating these rules and examines their relationship to the broader principles that animate contract law. Rules that condition contractual liability on proof of contractual intent must include rules for interpreting that intent. Those interpretive rules will include both interpretive defaults and rules for what it takes to opt-out of the default. By adjusting these default and opt-out rules, the law can achieve different balances between the duty-imposing and power-conferring functions of contract law, or among the various reasons for enforcement. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the rules for gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, spousal agreements and reporters\u27 confidentiality promises. The results of that analysis include a new argument for the Model Written Obligations Act; a critique of Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott\u27s proposal preliminary agreements and a recommended alternative to it; and recommended changes to the rules for agreements between spouses. Attention to intent to contract requirements also indicates an overlooked aspect of how the enforcement of contracts affects extralegal norms and relationships of trust. Interpretive rules that require parties who want, or who do not want, legal liability expressly to say so are particularly likely to interfere with or erode extralegal forms trust that otherwise create value in transactions

Russia’s Contract Arbitrage

Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that they are commercial debt. In all, Russia has effectively arbitraged the prevailing sovereign debt regime, where public and private lending to sovereigns are separated by legal form and restructuring institutions. Because the bonds in question are governed by English law, the U.K. Parliament can limit the scope for abuse by making them unenforceable. Such legislation has ample precedent, and would compare favorably to traditional sanctions. Uniquely among sanctions, it would not only punish Russia, but could deliver immediate financial relief for Ukraine

A New Contract

Jeremiah 31:32-3

The Social Contract and Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of the Social Contract in the United States Workplace and the Emergence of New Strategies of Dispute Resolution

In recent years, a significant amount of public and academic attention has been devoted to the unravelling of the so-called \u27New Deal\u27 social contract and the emergence of a new social contract between workers and employers in the United States of America (US). In our paper, we will identify the forces of change that undermined the New Deal social contract during the post-World War II era and led to the reformulation of the workplace social contract in the US. It is our thesis that the transformation of the workplace social contract in the US significantly affected the resolution of employment disputes, giving rise to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other new approaches to conflict management. After briefly describing the origins of the New Deal social contract, we will assess the alignment of forces that resulted in the reformulation of the social contract in the 1990s. This new social contract has had historic consequences for most dimensions of the employment relationship, including job security, methods of pay, unionisation, and supervision, but its effects on workplace dispute resolution are especially noteworthy

The license/contract dichotomy in open licenses: a comparative analysis

The paper looks at the legal nature of so-called open licenses – agreements designed to provide permissions to users and publishers through “some rights reserved” clauses. The article starts with the assertion that copyright licenses are contracts in Civil Law jurisdictions, and looks at the opposing views and practice in Common Law jurisdictions. The article particularly looks at recent case law in the United States which deals specifically with the issue, and concludes that there is now a clear jurisdictional split between both traditions on whether these licenses are contracts

Soft Contract Verification

Behavioral software contracts are a widely used mechanism for governing the flow of values between components. However, run-time monitoring and enforcement of contracts imposes significant overhead and delays discovery of faulty components to run-time. To overcome these issues, we present soft contract verification, which aims to statically prove either complete or partial contract correctness of components, written in an untyped, higher-order language with first-class contracts. Our approach uses higher-order symbolic execution, leveraging contracts as a source of symbolic values including unknown behavioral values, and employs an updatable heap of contract invariants to reason about flow-sensitive facts. We prove the symbolic execution soundly approximates the dynamic semantics and that verified programs can't be blamed. The approach is able to analyze first-class contracts, recursive data structures, unknown functions, and control-flow-sensitive refinements of values, which are all idiomatic in dynamic languages. It makes effective use of an off-the-shelf solver to decide problems without heavy encodings. The approach is competitive with a wide range of existing tools---including type systems, flow analyzers, and model checkers---on their own benchmarks.Comment: ICFP '14, September 1-6, 2014, Gothenburg, Swede

Penalty and reward contracts between a manufacturer and its logistics service provider

Contracts are used to coordinate disparate but interdependent members of the supply chain. Conflicting objectives of these members and lack of coordination among the members lead to inefficiencies in matching supply with demand. This study reviews different types of contracts and proposes a methodology to be used by companies for analyzing coordinating contracts with their business partners. Efficiency of the contract is determined by comparing the performance of independent companies under the contract to the supply chain performance under the central decision maker assumption. We propose a penalty and reward contract between a manufacturer and its logistics service provider that distributes the manufacturer’s products on its retail network. The proposed contract analysis methodology is empirically tested with transportation data of a consumer durable goods company (CDG) and its logistics service provider (LSP). The results of this case study suggest a penalty and reward contract between the CDG and its LSP that improves not only the individual firm’s objective functions but also the supply chain costs. Compared to the existing situation, the coordination efficiency of the penalty and reward contract is 96.1 %, proving that optimizing contract parameters improves coordination and leads to higher efficiencies

What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?

This essay, to appear in Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law (Miller & Gold, 2016), explores three ways fiduciary obligations might be like contractual ones: in the methods lawmakers use or should use to determine the content of the obligation; in the private voluntary acts that generate the obligation; and in the fact that the obligation is a default that parties have the power to alter. The thesis is that to the extent that these similarities exist, they are not especially revealing. Theorists who emphasize the similarities commonly treat contract law as a private power-conferring rule, then analogize the law of fiduciary obligations to it. In fact, the law of contract is more complex and serves a broader range of purposes than just giving private parties the ability to undertake legal obligations when they choose. Contract obligations are sometimes imposed for reasons other than party choice, and contract defaults and altering rules can be designed to serve other social purposes. A more nuanced understanding of the functions and design of contract law suggests that structural similarities between fiduciary obligations and contractual ones tell us less about the fiduciary obligations than we might have hoped. The explanation of why that is so, however, reveals important features both of contract law and of the law of fiduciary obligations