Constraint Aggregation Principle in Convex Optimization

A general constraint aggregation technique is proposed for convex optimization problems. At each iteration a set of convex inequalities and linear equations is replaced by a single inequality formed as a linear combination of the original constraints. After solving the simplified subproblem, new aggregation coefficients are calculated and the iteration continues. This general aggregation principle is incorporated into a number of specific algorithms. Convergence of the new methods is proved and speed of convergence analyzed. It is shown that in case of linear programming, the method with aggregation has a polynomial complexity. Finally, application to decomposable problems is discussed

Price decomposition in large-scale stochastic optimal control

We are interested in optimally driving a dynamical system that can be influenced by exogenous noises. This is generally called a Stochastic Optimal Control (SOC) problem and the Dynamic Programming (DP) principle is the natural way of solving it. Unfortunately, DP faces the so-called curse of dimensionality: the complexity of solving DP equations grows exponentially with the dimension of the information variable that is sufficient to take optimal decisions (the state variable). For a large class of SOC problems, which includes important practical problems, we propose an original way of obtaining strategies to drive the system. The algorithm we introduce is based on Lagrangian relaxation, of which the application to decomposition is well-known in the deterministic framework. However, its application to such closed-loop problems is not straightforward and an additional statistical approximation concerning the dual process is needed. We give a convergence proof, that derives directly from classical results concerning duality in optimization, and enlghten the error made by our approximation. Numerical results are also provided, on a large-scale SOC problem. This idea extends the original DADP algorithm that was presented by Barty, Carpentier and Girardeau (2010)

Informational Substitutes

We propose definitions of substitutes and complements for pieces of information ("signals") in the context of a decision or optimization problem, with game-theoretic and algorithmic applications. In a game-theoretic context, substitutes capture diminishing marginal value of information to a rational decision maker. We use the definitions to address the question of how and when information is aggregated in prediction markets. Substitutes characterize "best-possible" equilibria with immediate information aggregation, while complements characterize "worst-possible", delayed aggregation. Game-theoretic applications also include settings such as crowdsourcing contests and Q\&A forums. In an algorithmic context, where substitutes capture diminishing marginal improvement of information to an optimization problem, substitutes imply efficient approximation algorithms for a very general class of (adaptive) information acquisition problems. In tandem with these broad applications, we examine the structure and design of informational substitutes and complements. They have equivalent, intuitive definitions from disparate perspectives: submodularity, geometry, and information theory. We also consider the design of scoring rules or optimization problems so as to encourage substitutability or complementarity, with positive and negative results. Taken as a whole, the results give some evidence that, in parallel with substitutable items, informational substitutes play a natural conceptual and formal role in game theory and algorithms.Comment: Full version of FOCS 2016 paper. Single-column, 61 pages (48 main text, 13 references and appendix

Decentralized Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Constrained Deterministic Mean Field Control

This paper considers decentralized control and optimization methodologies for large populations of systems, consisting of several agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and affected by the aggregate behavior of the overall population. For such large-scale systems, the theory of aggregative and mean field games has been established and successfully applied in various scientific disciplines. While the existing literature addresses the case of unconstrained agents, we formulate deterministic mean field control problems in the presence of heterogeneous convex constraints for the individual agents, for instance arising from agents with linear dynamics subject to convex state and control constraints. We propose several model-free feedback iterations to compute in a decentralized fashion a mean field Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size. We apply our methods to the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control problem and to the constrained mean field charging control problem for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (cond. accepted