Fermionic characters for graded parafermions

Fermionic-type character formulae are presented for charged irreduciblemodules of the graded parafermionic conformal field theory associated to the coset $osp(1,2)_k/u(1)$. This is obtained by counting the weakly ordered `partitions' subject to the graded $Z_k$ exclusion principle. The bosonic form of the characters is also presented.Comment: 24 p. This corrects typos (present even in the published version) in eqs (4.4), (5.23), (5.24) and (C.4

How Fast Can Dense Codes Achieve the Min-Cut Capacity of Line Networks?

In this paper, we study the coding delay and the average coding delay of random linear network codes (dense codes) over line networks with deterministic regular and Poisson transmission schedules. We consider both lossless networks and networks with Bernoulli losses. The upper bounds derived in this paper, which are in some cases more general, and in some other cases tighter, than the existing bounds, provide a more clear picture of the speed of convergence of dense codes to the min-cut capacity of line networks.Comment: 15 pages, submitted to IEEE ISIT 201

Constrained exchangeable partitions

For a class of random partitions of an infinite set a de Finetti-type representation is derived, and in one special case a central limit theorem for the number of blocks is shown

Quantized VCG Mechanisms for Polymatroid Environments

Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism can provide the efficient allocation with strong incentive properties (namely dominant strategy incentive compatibility), its well-known high communication requirements can prevent it from being used. There have been a number of approaches for reducing the communication costs of VCG by weakening its incentive properties. Here, instead we take a different approach of reducing communication costs via quantization while maintaining VCG's dominant strategy incentive properties. The cost for this approach is a loss in efficiency which we characterize. We first consider quantizing the resource allocations so that agents need only submit a finite number of bids instead of full utility function. We subsequently consider quantizing the agent's bids