Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Constitute: The world’s constitutions to read, search, and compare

Constitutional design and redesign is constant. Over the last 200 years, countries have replaced their constitutions an average of every 19 years and some have amended them almost yearly. A basic problem in the drafting of these documents is the search and analysis of model text deployed in other jurisdictions. Traditionally, this process has been ad hoc and the results suboptimal. As a result, drafters generally lack systematic information about the institutional options and choices available to them. In order to address this informational need, the investigators developed a web application, Constitute [online at http://www.constituteproject.org], with the use of semantic technologies. Constitute provides searchable access to the world’s constitutions using the conceptualization, texts, and data developed by the Comparative Constitutions Project. An OWL ontology represents 330 ‘‘topics’’ – e.g. right to health – with which the investigators have tagged relevant provisions of nearly all constitutions in force as of September of 2013. The tagged texts were then converted to an RDF representation using R2RML mappings and Capsenta’s Ultrawrap. The portal implements semantic search features to allow constitutional drafters to read, search, and compare the world’s constitutions. The goal of the project is to improve the efficiency and systemization of constitutional design and, thus, to support the independence and self-reliance of constitutional drafters.Governmen

Constitutional Rules

This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. The first-best cannot be achieved whenever constitutional rules cannot be made contingent on information about the costs and benefits of policy reforms. We characterize and welfare rank four classes of second best constitutions: constitutions that specify one rule for all types of decisions; constitutions that provide incentives for information about costs and benefits to be revealed; constitutions that allow for vetoes from interested parties and constitutions that specify different rules for different policy areas. In addition, we provide conditions for the existence of amendment rules that allow for changes to the original constitutional rules after the constitutional stage. Finally, we provide a new rationale for the existence of checks and balances.constitutions, social contracts, majority rules, bill of rights, vetoes, referenda, amendments, checks and balances

Viable tax constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question

Flags, Constitutions, and the well-being of nations

This exploratory paper estimates the effects on well-being of two very important institutional symbols of 59 countries in 2007: national flags and constitutions. The results indicate that well-being responds positively to investment in material things as well as the existence of flags. However, nationalwell-being is highly inelastic with respect to measures of constitutions and national flag colors. In fact, nations with fewer flag colors, infrequent constitutional changes, and small constitutions tend to have higher well-being than others. I resist comment on what this all means, but it would seem GDP per capita, despite its obvious limitations, is still the most important influence on national well-being.Well-being of nations, humand development index (HDI), national flags, number of constitutions, articles of constitutions, national flag colors

Which Democracies Pay Higher Wages?

This paper asks if and how constitutions affect labour market outcomes. This question is motivated by Rodrik (1999), who suggests that 'democracies pay higher wages' and Persson and Tabellini (2003) who provide evidence that constitutions impact on economic outcomes. An empirical analysis using treatment effect estimators and Bayesian Model Averaging provides robust causal evidence that presidential democracies are associated with lower wages, after controlling for other potential determinants such as the level of income per capita.Democracy, Constitutions, Wages, Factor Shares, Bayesian Model Averaging

The Meaning of Distributive Justice for Aristotle’s Theory of Constitutions

Abstract: This paper examines Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and its meaning for his theory of constitutions. First, it shows that his account of constitutions in Books IV–VI of the Politics is an extension and refinement of his scheme of six constitutions in Book III. Second, it argues for the thesis that the account of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in distribution of political offices that Aristotle gives in Book III of the Politics links up with and extends the doctrine of justice (δικαιοσύνη) that he develops in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. Third, it substantiates the thesis that Aristotle understands the different forms of constitution as embodiments of different conceptions of distributive justice, and argues for the thesis that Aristotle has a clear preference for the aristocratic conception and, as a consequence, for aristocracy. Finally, it supports the thesis that the constitution of the best polis, which Aristotle outlines in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, has to be understood as a true aristocracy and not as a polity (πολιτεία).Keywords: Aristotle’s Politics, Theory of Justice, Distributive Justice, Constitutions doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2016.2529