The Mental Database

This article uses database, evolution and physics considerations to suggest how the mind stores and processes its data. Its innovations in its approach lie in:- A) The comparison between the capabilities of the mind to those of a modern relational database while conserving phenomenality. The strong functional similarity of the two systems leads to the conclusion that the mind may be profitably described as being a mental database. The need for material/mental bridging and addressing indexes is discussed. B) The consideration of what neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) between sensorimotor data and instrumented observation one can hope to obtain using current biophysics. It is deduced that what is seen using the various brain scanning methods reflects only that part of current activity transactions (e.g. visualizing) which update and interrogate the mind, but not the contents of the integrated mental database which constitutes the mind itself. This approach yields reasons why there is much neural activity in an area to which a conscious function is ascribed (e.g. the amygdala is associated with fear), yet there is no visible part of its activity which can be clearly identified as phenomenal. The concept is then situated in a Penrosian expanded physical environment, requiring evolutionary continuity, modularity and phenomenality.Several novel Darwinian advantages arising from the approach are described

Fundamental Principles of Neural Organization of Cognition

The manuscript advances a hypothesis that there are few fundamental principles of neural organization of cognition, which explain several wide areas of the cognitive functioning. We summarize the fundamental principles, experimental, theoretical, and modeling evidence for these principles, relate them to hypothetical neural mechanisms, and made a number of predictions. We consider cognitive functioning including concepts, emotions, drives-instincts, learning, “higher” cognitive functions of language, interaction of language and cognition, role of emotions in this interaction, the beautiful, sublime, and music. Among mechanisms of behavior we concentrate on internal actions in the brain, learning and decision making. A number of predictions are made, some of which have been previously formulated and experimentally confirmed, and a number of new predictions are made that can be experimentally tested. Is it possible to explain a significant part of workings of the mind from a few basic principles, similar to how Newton explained motions of planets? This manuscript summarizes a part of contemporary knowledge toward this goal

Consciousness Science Underdetermined: A short history of endless debates

Consciousness scientists have not reached consensus on two of the most central questions in their field: first, on whether consciousness overflows reportability; second, on the physical basis of consciousness. I review the scientific literature of the 19th century to provide evidence that disagreement on these questions has been a feature of the scientific study of consciousness for a long time. Based on this historical review, I hypothesize that a unifying explanation of disagreement on these questions, up to this day, is that scientific theories of consciousness are underdetermined by the evidence, namely, that they can be preserved “come what may” in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence. Consciousness scientists may have to find a way of solving the persistent underdetermination of theories of consciousness to make further progress

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Dream-Work in Psychotherapy: Jungian, Post-Jungian, Existential-Phenomenological, and Cognitive-Experiential Approaches

This literature review examines the theoretical underpinnings and clinical approaches of Jungian, Post-Jungian, Existential-Phenomenological, and Cognitive-Experiential models of working with dreams therapeutically. A review of applicable empirical studies is included, examining utility and effectiveness of dream-work across a variety of domains. Suggestions for the training of therapists in working with dreams are made. Results indicate that working with dreams therapeutically can have a variety of beneficial outcomes

Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness

The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett. The aim of the present contribution is to review the core similarities and differences of these exemplars, as well as to outline the main strengths and remaining challenges to this general sort of approach

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement

This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and pursue its goals

Consciousness: A Simple Information Theory Global Workspace Model

The asymptotic limit theorems of information theory permit a concise formulation of Bernard Baars' global workspace/global broadcast picture of consciousness, focusing on how networks of unconscious cognitive modules are driven by the classic 'no free lunch' argument into shifting, tunable, alliances having variable thresholds for signal detection. The model directly accounts for the punctuated characteristics of many conscious phenomena, and derives the inherent necessity of inattentional blindness and related effects

Quantum features of consciousness, computers and brain

Many people believe that mysterious phenomenon of consciousness may be connected with quantum features of our world. The present author proposed so-called Extended Everett's Concept (EEC) that allowed to explain consciousness and super-consciousness (intuitive knowledge). Brain, according to EEC, is an interface between consciousness and super-consciousness on the one part and body on the other part. Relations between all these components of the human cognitive system are analyzed in the framework of EEC. It is concluded that technical devices improving usage of super-consciousness (intuition) may exist.Comment: LATEX, 6 pages; the paper is reported at The 9th WSEAS International Conference on Applied Computer Science (ACS'09), Genova, Italy, October 17-19, 200

Implicit memory

The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Second Edition is a comprehensive three-volume reference source on human action and reaction, and the thoughts, feelings, and physiological functions behind those actions