Inventory Signals

How does operational competence translate into market value, when firms cannot credibly communicate their competence to the market? I consider the example of inventory and fill rates. When the market sees a high-inventory firm, it cannot tell whether the inventory is due to incompetence or a strategy to enhance fill rate. Firms might decide to signal their competence to the market by carrying less inventory. I show conditions for separating and pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria. I also provide empirical evidence for this theory that inventory has a signaling role. The theory could potentially provide a framework that describes one way in which a range of operational competences such as purchasing and outsourcing, translate to market value. Practically, it has implications for firms, such as how to strategically communicate to the market, reward managers, or even whether to go public and be subject to market pressures.Inventory; signaling; operations management; asymmetric information

Laying the Foundation: An Analytical Tool for Assessing Legal and Institutional Readiness for PES

This booklet has been created as an initial resource for public sector officials interested in fostering an environment in which PES transactions can occur. While PES legal and policy readiness is likely to look very different from one country to another -- depending on legal frameworks, as well as historical and current circumstances and pressures -- understanding policy options for getting ready for PES transactions is an important first step towards assessing readiness within a specific national and subnational context.This booklet offers an analytical framework for assessing legal and institutional readiness for PES transactions. It is divided into three sections based on timing and the order of addressing issues, with an eye to what will be most important to investors and buyers in payment for ecosystem services agreements. Specifically, the first level of preparing for PES agreements should be ensuring that fundamental or threshold conditions are in place for buyers to feel that there is sufficient stability in place to consider entering in these business arrangements. The second level of preparedness, while important for well-functioning PES, may be developed adaptively as needs and options become clearer via PES experience on the ground. Finally, level three includes non-urgent aspects that may be important to streamline or scale up PES, depending on the particular circumstances

Inventory Signals

Among practitioners, inventory is often thought to be the root of all evil in operations management. The stock market hates it, the media abhors it, and managers have come to fear it. But high inventory levels can also be the result of strategic buying and high-availability strategies. The problem is that when the market sees lots of inventory, it cannot tell whether it is because of poor or smart operations. We hypothesize that inventory has a signaling role. In our model, publicly- traded firms use inventory levels to signal their operational competence to the market. There is a separating equilibrium that leads some firms to maintain inventory levels below what their capability could achieve. We offer this as one explanation why, for example, stock-outs are pervasive even among operationally competent firms. We provide empirical evidence for the assumptions behind this inventory signaling hypothesis: (1) the market cannot tell the difference between “good” and “bad” inventory; and (2) the counterfactual: the market punishes firms when it can tell that their inventory is bad, such as when they write off supplies. Consistent with these assumptions, we find that inventory levels do not explain firm value. And on average, stocks suffer an abnormal negative return of 7% in the month of announcing inventory write-offs.Inventory, signaling, operations management, asymmetric information

CATFISH PRODUCER HARVEST RESPONSE TO PRODUCTION AND ASYMMETRIC PRICE RISK

Harvest response to production and asymmetric price risk was analyzed using an ordinary least squares model. Statistically significant responses to production-quality and output price risk were indicated. Results suggest that alternative pricing strategies designed to reduce risk may alter harvest response and decrease month to month harvest variability.Demand and Price Analysis, Production Economics,

On the Interface Between Operations and Human Resources Management

Operations management (OM) and human resources management (HRM) have historically been very separate fields. In practice, operations managers and human resource managers interact primarily on administrative issues regarding payroll and other matters. In academia, the two subjects are studied by separate communities of scholars publishing in disjoint sets of journals, drawing on mostly separate disciplinary foundations. Yet, operations and human resources are intimately related at a fundamental level. Operations are the context that often explains or moderates the effects of human resource activities such as pay, training, communications and staffing. Human responses to operations management systems often explain variations or anomalies that would otherwise be treated as randomness or error variance in traditional operations research models. In this paper, we probe the interface between operations and human resources by examining how human considerations affect classical OM results and how operational considerations affect classical HRM results. We then propose a unifying framework for identifying new research opportunities at the intersection of the two fields

Inventory Sharing and Demand-Side Underweighting

Problem definition: Transshipment/inventory sharing has been used in practice because of its risk-pooling potential. However, human decision makers play a critical role in making inventory decisions in an inventory sharing system, which may affect its benefits. We investigate whether the opportunity to transship inventory influences decision makers’ inventory decisions and whether, as a result, the intended risk-pooling benefits materialize. Academic/practical relevance: Previous research in transshipment, which is focused on finding optimal stocking and sharing decisions, assumes rational decision making without any systematic bias. As one of the first to study inventory sharing from a behavioral perspective, we demonstrate a persistent stocking-decision bias relevant for inventory sharing systems. Methodology: We develop a behavioral model of a multilocation inventory system with transshipments. Using four behavioral studies, we identify, test, estimate, and mitigate a demand-side underweighting bias: although inventory sharing brings both a supply-side benefit and a demand-side benefit, players underestimate the latter. We show analytically that such bias leads to underordering. We also explore whether reframing the inventory sharing decision reduces this bias. Results: Our results show that subjects persistently reduce their order quantities when transshipments are allowed. This underordering, which persists even when a decision-support system suggests optimal quantities, causes insufficient inventory in the system, in turn reducing the risk-pooling benefits of inventory sharing. Underordering is evidently caused by an underweighting bias; although players correctly estimate the supply-side potential from transshipment, they only estimate 20% of the demand-side potential. Managerial implications: Although inventory sharing can profitably reduce inventory, too much underordering undermines its intended risk-pooling benefits. The demand-side benefits of transshipment need to be emphasized when implementing inventory sharing systems

A Continuous Review Inventory System with Lost Sales and Emergency Orders

We analyze a continuous review lost sales inventory system with two types of orders—regular and emergency. The regular order has a stochastic lead time and is placed with the cheapest acceptable supplier. The emergency order has a deterministic lead time is placed with a local supplier who has a higher price. The emergency order is not always filled since the supplier may not have the ability to provide the order on an emergency basis at all times. This emergency order has a higher cost per item and has a known probability of being filled. The total costs for this system are compared to a system without emergency placement of orders. This paper provides managers with a tool to assess when dual sourcing is cost optimal by comparing the single sourcing and dual sourcing models

The development of decentralized supplier networks in East Germany: a challenge to the German model of industrial organization

The paper examines the relationship between supplier network organization and regional economic development. A distinctive feature of the German economy is theexistence of a large and productive base of small and medium companies,commonly called the Mittelstand. Chambers of Commerce, trade associations, local research institutes and other para-public institutions provide a public infrastructure helping groups of Mittelstand companies develop research and development, quality control, training and other important competencies that they are too small to invest in individually. The paper argues that sophisticated firms must also engage these institutions if they are to function. Case studies of the newest East German car production networks show that final assemblers are creating supplier chains with minimal technical collaboration with local suppliers and the delegation rather thansharing of contracting risks. As a result, few sophisticated companies are engaginglocal para-public institutions, with negative consequences for the development of local Mittelstand companies in the two regions. -- In dem Papier werden die Beziehungen zwischen den organisatorischen Strukturen der Zulieferer-Netzwerke und der regionalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung untersucht. Ein typisches Element der deutschen Volkswirtschaft ist die Existenz einerweitgefächerten und produktiven Basis kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen,gemeinhin als Mittelstandbezeichnet. Industrie- und Handelskammern,Wirtschaftsverbände, lokale Forschungsinstitute und andere para-staatliche Institutionen bilden eine öffentliche Infrastruktur, die den mittelständischen Unternehmen hilft, Forschung und Entwicklung, Qualitätskontrollen sowie Ausbildungskapazitäten aufzubauen und andere wichtige Kompetenzen zuentwickeln, in die zu investieren sie alleine zu klein wären.In dem Diskussionspapier wird die Meinung vertreten, daß aufgeweckte Unternehmen sich aber auch dieser Institutionen bedienen müssen, sollen sie funktionieren. Fallstudien der erst kürzlich aufgebauten Produktionsnetzwerke vonAutoherstellern in Ostdeutschland zeigen, daß die Endhersteller Zuliefererketten aufbauen, die nur in geringem Umfang mit den lokalen Zuliefereren technisch kooperieren. Außerdem versuchen die Endhersteller, Vertragsrisiken abzuwälzen statt sie gemeinsam mit den Zulieferern zu übernehmen. Als Ergebnis kann festgestellt werden, daß nur einige clevere Unternehmen diese lokalen und regionalen para-staatlichen Institutionen nutzen. Dies hat negative Konsequenzen für die Entwicklung der lokalen und regionalen mittelständischen Unternehmen inden beiden untersuchten Regionen Sachsen und Thüringen.

Bargaining power and supply base diversification

In this paper, the authors examine a supply base diversification problem faced by a buyer who periodically holds auctions to award short term supply contracts among a cohort of suppliers (i.e., the supply base). To mitigate significant cost shocks to procurement, the buyer can diversify her supply base by selecting suppliers from different regions. The authors find that the optimal degree of supply base diversification depends on the buyer’s bargaining power, i.e., the buyer’s ability to choose the auction mechanism. At one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can dictatorially implement the optimal mechanism, she prefers to fully diversify. At the other extreme, when the buyer uses a reverse English auction with no reserve price due to her lack of bargaining power, she may consider protecting herself against potential price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers by using a less diversified supply base. The authors find that in general the more bargaining power the buyer has to control price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers the more she prefers a diversified supply base. This insight is shown to be robust to correlation between regional costs, asymmetry across regions, and intermediate levels of bargaining power.supply base diversification; supplier; buyer; procurement; bargaining

On the Relationship of Expected Supply and Demand to Futures Prices

Expectations about future economic conditions are important determinants of commodity prices. This paper presents a relatively simple model that makes futures prices for corn a function of expected production and inventories and of variables that account for demand shifts. The intent is to provide an historical, objective context for new price and quantity observations, which may help market analysts.expected supply, futures prices, commodity prices, Demand and Price Analysis, Risk and Uncertainty,