Thick Concepts

A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts seem to be evaluative, unlike purely descriptive concepts such as red and water. But they also seem different from general evaluative concepts. In particular, thick concepts are typically contrasted with thin concepts like good, wrong, permissible, and ought, which are general evaluative concepts that do not seem substantially descriptive. When Jane says that Max is good, she appears to be evaluating him without providing much description, if any. Thick concepts, on the other hand, are evaluative and substantially descriptive at the same time. For instance, when Max says that Jane is courageous, he seems to be doing two things: evaluating her positively and describing her as willing to face risk. Because of their descriptiveness, thick concepts are especially good candidates for evaluative concepts that pick out properties in the world. Thus they provide an avenue for thinking about ethical claims as being about the world in the same way as descriptive claims. Thick concepts became a focal point in ethics during the second half of the twentieth century. At that time, discussions of thick concepts began to emerge in response to certain disagreements about thin concepts. For example, in twentieth-century ethics, consequentialists and deontologists hotly debated various accounts of good and right. It was also claimed by non-cognitivists and error-theorists that these thin concepts do not correspond to any properties in the world. Dissatisfaction with these viewpoints prompted many ethicists to consider the implications of thick concepts. The notion of a thick concept was thought to provide insight into meta-ethical questions such as whether there is a fact-value distinction, whether there are ethical truths, and, if there are such truths, whether these truths are objective. Some ethicists also theorized about the role that thick concepts can play in normative ethics, such as in virtue theory. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the interest in thick concepts had spread to other philosophical disciplines such as epistemology, aesthetics, metaphysics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of law. Nevertheless, the emerging interest in thick concepts has sparked debates over many questions: How exactly are thick concepts evaluative? How do they combine evaluation and description? How are thick concepts related to thin concepts? And do thick concepts have the sort of significance commonly attributed to them? This article surveys various attempts at answering these questions

The ecology of management concepts

How does the popularity of a concept depend on how it contrasts with and complements existing concepts? We argue that being similar to existing concepts, being located in a popular domain, and being combined with similar existing concepts are important for gaining attention early on but less important and even negative for sustaining popularity. To examine this question, we focus on the rise and fall of management concepts. We analyze data on the rise and fall of keywords in the Harvard Business Review between 1922 and 2010. Multiple tests confirm our hypotheses. The implication is that lessons learned from studies of popular concepts can be misleading as guides for how to make novel concepts popular

Concepts of microdosimetry

This is the first part of an investigation of microdosimetric concepts relevant to numerical calculations. The definitions of the microdosimetric quantities are reviewed and formalized, and some additional conventions are adopted. The common interpretation of the quantities in terms of energy imparted to spherical sites is contrasted with their interpretation as the result of a diffusion process applied to the initial spatial pattern of energy transfers in the irradiated medium

Probabilistic Programming Concepts

A multitude of different probabilistic programming languages exists today, all extending a traditional programming language with primitives to support modeling of complex, structured probability distributions. Each of these languages employs its own probabilistic primitives, and comes with a particular syntax, semantics and inference procedure. This makes it hard to understand the underlying programming concepts and appreciate the differences between the different languages. To obtain a better understanding of probabilistic programming, we identify a number of core programming concepts underlying the primitives used by various probabilistic languages, discuss the execution mechanisms that they require and use these to position state-of-the-art probabilistic languages and their implementation. While doing so, we focus on probabilistic extensions of logic programming languages such as Prolog, which have been developed since more than 20 years

On EPR paradox, Bell's inequalities and experiments which prove nothing

This article shows that the there is no paradox. Violation of Bell's inequalities should not be identified with a proof of non locality in quantum mechanics. A number of past experiments is reviewed, and it is concluded that the experimental results should be re-evaluated. The results of the experiments with atomic cascade are shown not to contradict the local realism. The article points out flaws in the experiments with down-converted photons. The experiments with neutron interferometer on measuring the "contextuality" and Bell-like inequalities are analyzed, and it is shown that the experimental results can be explained without such notions. Alternative experiment is proposed to prove the validity of local realism.Comment: 27 pages, 8 figures. I edited a little the text and abstract I corrected equations (49) and (50

Concepts in Perception

I can agree with much of what D.H. Mellor says in his response to my paper ('Crane's Waterfall Illusion'). I can agree that perception in some sense 'aims' at truth, that its function 'is to tell us how the world truly is'..

Concepts, Belief, and Perception

At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief