931 research outputs found

    The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance

    Get PDF
    We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games

    Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap

    Full text link
    For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the optimal mechanisms. In this paper, we give a theoretical explanation of this fact, based on a connection to the notion of correlation gap. Loosely speaking, for auction environments with matroid constraints, we can relate the performance of a mechanism to the expectation of a monotone submodular function over a random set. This random set corresponds to the winner set for the optimal mechanism, which is highly correlated, and corresponds to certain demand set for SPMs, which is independent. The notion of correlation gap of Agrawal et al.\ (SODA10) quantifies how much we {}"lose" in the expectation of the function by ignoring correlation in the random set, and hence bounds our loss in using certain SPM instead of the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, the correlation gap of a monotone and submodular function is known to be small, and it follows that certain SPM can approximate the optimal mechanism by a good constant factor. Exploiting this connection, we give tight analysis of a greedy-based SPM of Chawla et al.\ for several environments. In particular, we show that it gives an e/(e1)e/(e-1)-approximation for matroid environments, gives asymptotically a 1/(11/2πk)1/(1-1/\sqrt{2\pi k})-approximation for the important sub-case of kk-unit auctions, and gives a (p+1)(p+1)-approximation for environments with pp-independent set system constraints

    Submodularity of Energy Related Controllability Metrics

    Full text link
    The quantification of controllability and observability has recently received new interest in the context of large, complex networks of dynamical systems. A fundamental but computationally difficult problem is the placement or selection of actuators and sensors that optimize real-valued controllability and observability metrics of the network. We show that several classes of energy related metrics associated with the controllability Gramian in linear dynamical systems have a strong structural property, called submodularity. This property allows for an approximation guarantee by using a simple greedy heuristic for their maximization. The results are illustrated for randomly generated systems and for placement of power electronic actuators in a model of the European power grid.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figures; submitted to the 2014 IEEE Conference on Decision and Contro
    corecore