765 research outputs found
Bad Data Injection Attack and Defense in Electricity Market using Game Theory Study
Applications of cyber technologies improve the quality of monitoring and
decision making in smart grid. These cyber technologies are vulnerable to
malicious attacks, and compromising them can have serious technical and
economical problems. This paper specifies the effect of compromising each
measurement on the price of electricity, so that the attacker is able to change
the prices in the desired direction (increasing or decreasing). Attacking and
defending all measurements are impossible for the attacker and defender,
respectively. This situation is modeled as a zero sum game between the attacker
and defender. The game defines the proportion of times that the attacker and
defender like to attack and defend different measurements, respectively. From
the simulation results based on the PJM 5 Bus test system, we can show the
effectiveness and properties of the studied game.Comment: To appear in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Special Issue on Cyber,
Physical, and System Security for Smart Gri
Minimum Sparsity of Unobservable Power Network Attacks
Physical security of power networks under power injection attacks that alter
generation and loads is studied. The system operator employs Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs) for detecting such attacks, while attackers devise attacks that
are unobservable by such PMU networks. It is shown that, given the PMU
locations, the solution to finding the sparsest unobservable attacks has a
simple form with probability one, namely, , where
is defined as the vulnerable vertex connectivity of an augmented
graph. The constructive proof allows one to find the entire set of the sparsest
unobservable attacks in polynomial time. Furthermore, a notion of the potential
impact of unobservable attacks is introduced. With optimized PMU deployment,
the sparsest unobservable attacks and their potential impact as functions of
the number of PMUs are evaluated numerically for the IEEE 30, 57, 118 and
300-bus systems and the Polish 2383, 2737 and 3012-bus systems. It is observed
that, as more PMUs are added, the maximum potential impact among all the
sparsest unobservable attacks drops quickly until it reaches the minimum
sparsity.Comment: submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic Contro
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